Burundi’s civic space remains severely restricted, shaped by a decade-long trajectory of political repression and systemic impunity since the 2015 crisis triggered by former President Pierre Nkurunziza’s controversial third-term bid. That crisis led to mass protests, a failed coup, and widespread human rights violations, forcing many civil society organisations (CSOs) and independent media into exile—a trend that persists today. Despite initial hopes for reform under President Évariste Ndayishimiye, who assumed office in 2020 pledging dialogue and respect for freedoms, civic space has continued to deteriorate. Ahead of the 2025 legislative and municipal elections, reports indicated escalating political intolerance, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation of opposition figures, journalists, and human rights defenders. The ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party maintains tight control over state institutions and security forces, while its youth wing, the Imbonerakure, is repeatedly implicated in harassment, enforced disappearances, and violence against perceived critics.

The constitutional and legal framework entrenches these restrictions. The 2018 Constitution expanded presidential powers and weakened checks and balances, undermining judicial independence. While it guarantees freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, these rights are curtailed through laws such as Law No. 1/02 of 27 January 2017 on the Organic Framework of Non-Profit Associations, which imposes onerous registration requirements and broad government oversight, enabling authorities to dissolve organisations deemed “politically motivated.” Media freedoms are similarly constrained by the Press Law and Penal Code, which criminalise vaguely defined offences like “endangering state security.” Prosecutions of journalists, including Floriane Irangabiye and Sandra Muhoza, underscore the weaponisation of these provisions to silence dissent.

Electoral reforms have further narrowed participation. The 2024 Electoral Code imposed prohibitive candidate fees, raising the cost of registering for elections to as much as 100 million Burundian Francs (approximately US$ 34,700) for presidential contenders—an amount that effectively excludes most opposition figures and independent aspirants. In addition, the Code introduced restrictive eligibility rules, including a provision requiring candidates who leave a political party to wait two years before running as independents. These measures, combined with the politicisation of electoral institutions, have further entrenched ruling party dominance and sidelined prominent opposition leaders such as Agathon Rwasa, undermining prospects for competitive and inclusive elections.

Socio-economic fragility compounds these challenges. Burundi faces soaring inflation that reached 39 percent on average over the first two months of 2025, fuel shortages, and widespread poverty, limiting citizens’ ability to participate in civic life and increasing vulnerability to state coercion. The militarisation of politics and lack of accountability for past abuses perpetuate a climate of fear, eroding trust in institutions and weakening prospects for inclusive governance.

The convergence of restrictive constitutional provisions, repressive laws, political violence, and economic hardship systematically undermines freedoms of association, assembly, and expression. Without structural reforms—such as revising CSO and media laws, decriminalising speech offences, and restoring judicial independence—Burundi risks deepening authoritarianism and further marginalising independent civil society voices.