By Clarisse Sih and Bibbi Abruzzini, Forus, EU SEE consortium partners
Constitutional reform is moving rapidly across Africa and beyond: sometimes in promising ways, sometimes in ways that risk overly concentrating power and delegitimising people power. For civil society, constitutional reform represents a critical window to push for more transparent, participatory, and inclusive processes, but can also be a period when the enabling environment comes under strain – even where institutions are seen as stable.
To respond for the need to share best practice and resources of countries in Africa that are currently presented with challenges, the EU SEE convened a pan-African learning exchange from select African countries in which the network works, where civil society leaders, legal experts and practitioners compared experiences and shared practical tactics for navigating these high-stakes processes.
In this article we’ll be sharing our learnings and presenting critical insights for organisations and stakeholders engaged in constitutional reform processes. At the heart of these advocacy efforts is the goal of securing an enabling environment for civil society, notably in terms of how legal and regulatory frameworks should enable civil society actors to operate freely, effectively, and with recognition of their essential contributions to democratic life.
Key highlights from the conversation
- Process matters as much as content. Across contexts, the most urgent ask is for predictable, transparent, participatory processes (clear roadmaps, civic education phases, translation/accessibility, and reasoned responses to public input) before any text is finalized.
- Coalitions amplify impact. Trade unions, faith leaders, professional associations, and community networks are essential partners for broad-based legitimacy and reach.
- Timing is political. Election calendars and executive incentives shape reform windows; many processes stall or get reshaped as elections approach — planning advocacy around these cycles is critical.
- Safeguards for civic space are a precondition. Where protests, media, or digital spaces are restricted, inclusive constitutional consultations are unlikely to be credible without minimum guarantees.
New Government, Same Problems?
In Botswana, civil society in the country raised alarm after the government gazetted the Constitution (Amendment) Bill No.14 of 2025 without prior public consultation or a transparent roadmap. At this stage, it has been presented at the House of chiefs and awaiting the 3rd reading at Parliament which will be the voting stage to pass it into an Act – leaving very little time for advocacy.
This follows a 2024 attempt at constitutional reform that failed to pass and drew criticism for concentrating executive power. Civil society organisations played a crucial role in this outcome, uniting to raise public awareness and demonstrating the risks such reforms posed to democratic governance. After elections, the new government pledged a “people-centred” review within six months, but CSOs also reported policing and harassment around the previous process. CSOs warned that repeating a non-participatory, opaque approach would undermine legitimacy and risk entrenching executive power.
“We have extended a hand to government to say as Civil Society we believe we are a partner in development and most importantly we play a critical role in a democratic state as our own and therefore, civil society participation cannot be wished away and cannot be understated. It has been widely said that civil society in Botswana is weak, Civil Society in Botswana is NOT weak. This process has been a demonstration of the power that civil society yields but most importantly, how that power can be utilized to bring about positive change,” Cindy Kelemi, BOCONGO Board Chairperson, said.
In response, for the second time since 2024, civil society convened a dialogue, developed a unified position, and called for the Bill’s withdrawal, arguing that any reform must be preceded by civic education and enabled through a Constitutional Review Act that guarantees inclusive participation and a transparent roadmap in multiple languages.
Repression vs. Reform: The Context That Shapes Constitutional Changes
Constitutional processes are often shaped by the strength, or weakness, of the environment in which civil society organisations operate.
In some cases, reformers must pair advocacy on the content of constitutional change with defensive work to keep civic participation in the process possible.
In Somalia, the 2012 Provisional Constitution remains in force while state-building is incomplete. The country is pursuing constitutional changes amid state tensions and an ongoing electoral agenda. Civil society is pushing for stronger presidential powers, a single national electoral commission, measures to encourage women’s participation, a five-year presidential term, and political changes — all in the context of a fragile federal settlement and persistent disagreements between federal and state leaders. Recent alerts show a repressed enabling environment with media closures and journalist arrests, frequent shutdowns and repression of protests, which are conditions that complicate inclusive constitution-making and meaningful public input.
“Somalia remains one of the hardest places to be a journalist. Reporting on abuses immediately triggers intimidation or detention,” a network member from Somalia outlined.
In Kenya, we saw a process with the 2010 Constitution offering a set of participatory and accountability tools, which CSOs are actively using. However, on 7 March 2025, the ruling party (UDA) and the main opposition party (ODM) announced a political cooperation agreement, which could weaken oversight and accountability. At the same time, the enabling environment and the ability of people to protest, speak freely, and organise has been shrinking. During 2024–25 protests, authorities used lethal force, there was a media blackout in July 2025, and there were attacks on civil society groups, such as an assault on the Mother’s Forum in August 2025. Mothers of victims of police brutality convened a press conference at the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) offices, yet the peaceful gathering was violently disrupted by armed men who stormed the compound, stealing property and forcing women, children and journalists to flee.
The recently published snapshot report on Kenya pulls all this together, showing that Kenya’s civil society environment is getting tougher with increasing crackdowns on protests, pressure on digital rights, and uncertainty about how the Public Benefits Organizations (PBO) Act will affect nonprofits in practice.
All these factors shape how civil society can fight for constitutional reforms: they must spend time protecting their space to operate, while also pushing for reform.
In Zambia, transparency advances have been recorded, including the Access to Information Act (2024), but also concerns around assembly rights under the Public Order Act and digital rights related to the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Acts (April 2025). Further, the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 7 of 2025 was deferred on 26 June 2025 after stakeholder outcry and consultations, and with the appointment of a Technical Committee to oversee a consultative process, anticipation is high of an independent, transparent, and accountable process characterized with unbiased meaningful consultation. CSOs continue to press for a single, agreed, people-driven review and constitution that stands the test of time rather than piecemeal amendments. Amid these worrying developments, there are also milestones of progress. For example, the appointment of a new Human Rights Commission board included several prominent civil society leaders, such as Bishop Emmanuel Yona Chikoya and activist Laura Miti. Their presence raises hope for a stronger, more independent Commission, able to safeguard human rights, oversee the operationalisation of the access to information law under the auspices of the commission and rebuild public trust in governance.
“In Zambia, the deferment of the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 7 and subsequent establishment of the technical working group to lead consultations on constitutional reforms is a significant and important breakthrough. It shows advocacy can pay off,” Khazike Sakala, Executive Director of Peoples Action for Accountability & Good Governance in Zambia (PAAGZ) noted.
In The Gambia, the 2020 draft Constitution — which would have introduced presidential term limits and tighter checks such as increased parliamentary oversight, independent judicial appointments, anti-corruption measures— was rejected. In 2024, a new draft retained a two-term limit but removed retroactive application, potentially allowing the current president to serve beyond two terms. Civil society also raised concerns about limited consultation and an executive-driven process compared to 2020. With elections approaching and legal timelines tight, CSOs are weighing whether to push now, or sequence efforts for after 2026, while continuing line-by-line public education and advocacy to keep reform alive. These setbacks can be looked at within broader enabling-environment dynamics that are shaping timing and tactics.
For instance, Gambian police arrested 23 protesters opposing the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority’s decision to impose a price floor on mobile data, a move widely criticised for protecting telecom companies at the expense of consumers – with the arrested youths being denied bail until their next hearing on 4 September. The arrests highlight the shrinking enabling environment in The Gambia, where dissent on policies directly affecting livelihoods is increasingly met with repression.
“Youth in The Gambia protested because data access is about livelihoods. The arrests showed how quickly authorities criminalise dissent, even on bread-and-butter issues.”
A Contested Enabling Environment
The enabling environment for civil society remains a “contested terrain” across Africa: it is not static. It is simultaneously being narrowed by repression and expanded by reform, reflecting both the fragility and resilience of civil society.
As Irene Petras, Regional Director (Africa) at ICNL, reminded participants of the EU SEE peer-exchange session, periods of constitutional reform bring this contest into sharp relief:
“Constitutional windows often coincide with attempts to restrict civic space of organisations and individuals participating in, or overseeing the process and content. Governments may impose legislative restrictions on funding, assembly constraints, online surveillance, and seek to control content and digital organising spaces and more. Expect restrictive moves during reform, and pair reform advocacy with defensive work on enabling-environment laws by building legal readiness packs, protest-policing monitoring protocols and rapid-response legal aid. ICNL stands ready to provide technical assistance to safeguard an enabling legislative framework to facilitate civil society’s work during such processes.”
Across the region, examples show how constitutional reform does not happen in a vacuum but is shaped by the freedoms (or restrictions) surrounding participation.
In Congo Brazzaville, investigative journalist Rosie Pioth was forced into exile after receiving death threats, harassment and surveillance linked to her reporting on historical bomb attacks. This alert illustrates the dangerous climate for independent journalism, where those who seek to shed light sensitive issues are punished rather than protected.
In Uganda, the enabling environment for civil liberties and the rule of law experienced a profound regression with the passage of the Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces (Amendment) Bill, 2025, which effectively reinstated the trial of civilians before military courts. This development directly contravenes a landmark Supreme Court ruling issued earlier in the year, which unequivocally declared such trials unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the principles of fair trial guarantees enshrined in the Constitution. Different civic actors, including the Uganda Law Society (ULS), vowed to challenge the legislation, arguing that it undermines judicial independence and erodes public confidence in civilian justice institutions. For many legal analysts and human rights observers, the move signifies not only a rollback of judicial progress but also a broader encroachment on civic and political freedoms. The reassertion of military jurisdiction over civilians is emblematic of the increasing securitization of governance in Uganda, where mechanisms of military justice are being leveraged in ways that chill dissent and constrain democratic participation.
In Zimbabwe, the right to freedom of assembly is increasingly under siege, as civil society organisations face growing interference and intimidation. On 31 July 2025, ZimRights’ Stakeholders Engagement Meeting in Gwanda was abruptly halted by local authorities, who insisted the organisation lacked the required Memorandum of Understanding with district officials — agreements that are only granted after opaque vetting by security and government bodies. Similar obstacles were reported in other parts of the country. These practices, reinforced by the dominance of the ruling party in the day-to-day administration of local government authorities, have created an atmosphere of fear and control, stifling citizens’ willingness to participate in civic life and underscoring the steady erosion of assembly rights in Zimbabwe.
“In Zimbabwe, MoUs have become a weapon to block citizens from gathering. It’s not about law and order; it’s about control.” the Network Member from Zimbabwe underlined.
Meanwhile, rhetoric is also being weaponised. In Namibia, senior officials have shifted from labelling civil society as a “key driver of progress” to accusing it of being a tool for foreign regime change. Such narratives, increasingly echoed across the region, delegitimise civil society and create fertile ground for restrictive policies, funding barriers and public mistrust.
In Tanzania, the government has called for “online patrols” during election season, citing the need to prevent financial crimes and protect public order. Yet civil society fears that such surveillance will be used the stifle descent and restrict digital freedoms – turning online spaces which are critical for civic engagement and democratic participation, into new frontlines in the battle for an enabling environment.
“Fighting cybercrime is important, but online patrols should not be used to silence people. Without clear rules and accountability, such surveillance can further limit civic space in Tanzania,” the Network Member from Tanzania commented.
The Road Ahead: Process, Planning and Content
Constitutional moments are rarely neutral, as we have seen; they often emerge hand-in-hand with the hard work of civil society actors working hard to secure positive changes and expand the enabling environment. Governments may tighten controls on assembly, limit foreign funding, or clamp down on digital platforms just as reform debates begin. That is why constitutional advocacy must be two-track: pushing for inclusive, transparent processes while simultaneously defending the enabling environment that makes public participation possible.
How constitutional reform happens is as important as what is being reformed. Transparent, predictable, and participatory processes are the foundation of legitimacy and of an enabling environment for civil society.
Some key recommendations from civil society include:
- Clear roadmaps and published schedules
- Civic education phases before any drafting
- Translation and accessibility for all communities
- Mechanisms to show how public input is used
As mentioned by Winluck Wahiu, Senior Adviser for Constitution-Building Processes in the Africa and West Asia region for International IDEA, constitutional reform succeeds when the process is as carefully designed as the content. Clear, legally binding rules, meaningful public participation, transparency, and early agreement on adoption mechanisms are essential. Civic education, inclusive consultations, feedback loops, and proper resourcing to translate input into draft text help ensure legitimacy, while safeguards for language access, documentation, and conflict-sensitive approaches strengthen both participation and outcomes.
“Even after extensive consultations and the development of well drafted constitutional proposals, the legal enactment of new constitutions or amendments, as well as their effective implementation, may prove considerably challenging in the absence of political will, and require concerted advocacy and pressure from diverse civil society actors,” Winluck Wahiu shared.
International IDEA’s stance is not to prescribe a model but to expand “constitutional imagination” with comparative options that local actors adapt for instance with ConstitutionNet’s thematic resources and country experience to frame option menus, “not pre-cooked answers”.
“Constitutional and legal reform processes are complex but civil society does not have to navigate them alone. Through networks like PILnet, pro bono legal support can provide comparative research, legislative analysis, and training — enabling CSOs to engage more effectively and confidently,” Zainab Onuh-Yahaya, Program Consultant for Sub-Saharan Africa for PILnet, added.
Civil society will continue to pair resilience with strategic engagement, resisting intimidation where necessary and seizing opportunities to strengthen accountability wherever possible.
The enabling environment across the region is at a crossroads – shrinking in some places, shifting in others. Its future depends on whether governments choose fear and control, or dialogue and partnership. Civil society will continue to push for the latter.