Tunisia has been a republic since independence. Following the constitutional referendum of 25 July 2022, the new Constitution entered into force on 16 August 2022, establishing a highly centralised presidential system that consolidates authority within the executive branch. Although the Constitution formally guarantees freedom of association, peaceful assembly, expression, opinion, and judicial safeguards, these rights are not effectively upheld in practice.
Civic space has undergone profound regression since the entrenchment of the current autocratic order. It has deteriorated sharply, shifting from “obstructed” to “repressed” in the CIVICUS Monitor. Government-aligned narratives increasingly dominate the public sphere, while the number of prisoners of conscience has risen substantially—particularly among journalists, politicians, lawyers, and human rights defenders. According to Human Rights Watch, as of January 2025 more than 80 individuals remained detained for exercising fundamental freedoms, including participation in peaceful protests and political activism. Freedoms of expression, opinion, the media, association, and peaceful assembly—gains secured and exercised since the 2011 revolution—are no longer guaranteed. Political pluralism, which characterised the national landscape until 2021, has been severely undermined.
The media environment is now dominated by outlets aligned with the government, operating within a climate of surveillance and intimidation directed at journalists, activists, and commentators. Key institutional counterweights and regulatory bodies have been dissolved and/or suspended. The credibility of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) has been significantly eroded since its members became presidential appointees rather than being selected by Parliament, as was the case from 2011 to 2019. The audiovisual regulatory authority (HAICA) has seen its activities frozen. Several potential presidential candidates have been excluded, prosecuted, or imprisoned, paving the way for elections shaped to favour a single political trajectory.
Executive power has become heavily concentrated, marginalising citizens from meaningful participation and reducing public consultation to a symbolic process. The online environment has been further constrained by Decree-Law 54/2022 on Cybercrime, which criminalises so‑called “false news”, imposes severe penalties, and enables extensive surveillance. These provisions have been widely criticised by international human rights organisations.
Despite these mounting pressures—including restrictive legislation on associations, an increasingly subordinated judiciary, and an assertive security apparatus—Tunisian civil society continues to demonstrate resilience. Throughout 2025, organisations remained active under difficult conditions, persistently exposing violations despite recurrent smear campaigns, administrative suspensions, judicial harassment, and threats of custodial sentences targeting civil society actors. These restrictions are neither isolated nor incidental. Rather, they form part of a deliberate strategy by the executive to silence dissenting voices and suppress calls for the restoration of Tunisia’s democratic transition. The sections that follow examine the principal obstacles affecting civic space and the consolidation of the rule of law in Tunisia.
