Enabling principles scores
“Mali is undergoing a prolonged political transition and security tensions, which are weighing heavily on democratic governance and civic space.”
Mali continues to face a profound political, security, and institutional crisis, with the military authorities tightening their grip on power since the initial coup in 2020 and the subsequent coup in 2021. The transitional leadership has repeatedly postponed elections and prolonged the transition well beyond initial commitments, while introducing a new Constitution in 2023 and revised criminal legislation that, although formally reaffirming certain fundamental rights and anti‑corruption measures, has attracted widespread criticism for concentrating authority in the presidency and being enacted at a time when civic freedoms are increasingly constrained.
The security situation remains deeply troubling. Jihadist attacks, intercommunal conflict, and recurrent abuses perpetrated by the Malian armed forces and foreign partners, particularly in central and northern regions, continue to drive widespread displacement and undermine social cohesion. Efforts to reform the security sector have stalled, with civil society organisations largely excluded from meaningful participation in oversight and policymaking, despite their recognised role in promoting accountability and citizen engagement in security governance.
Regionally, Mali’s withdrawal from ECOWAS in 2024–2025, alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, represents a fundamental reorientation of its international partnerships. Analysts note that this decision is likely to disrupt established trade flows, further restrict regional mobility, weaken multilateral security mechanisms, and limit opportunities for citizens to seek regional justice. In parallel, the three military‑led states have built up the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which in 2025 advanced rapidly towards deeper political, economic, and security integration. Developments included the operationalisation of a unified 5,000‑strong joint military force, the consolidation of new regional financial and media institutions, and the establishment of governance bodies designed to function as alternatives to ECOWAS structures.
Domestically, the transitional authorities endorsed new legislation enabling the junta leader to serve renewable five‑year terms, potentially extending military rule until at least 2030. This move, along with the dissolution of political parties and ongoing repression of dissent, provoked significant public mobilisations in 2025. These demonstrations represented the most substantial challenge to the military authorities since their ascent, with citizens condemning the erosion of democratic institutions and the intention to entrench indefinite military rule.
Across this landscape, civil society operates in an increasingly hostile environment. By 2025, the environment for civil society had become markedly repressive. The authorities imposed far‑reaching restrictions on political and civic activity, dissolving political parties, suspending associations, and employing cybercrime legislation to prosecute critics. Activists, journalists, and opposition figures were exposed to arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and systematic harassment. The conviction and imprisonment of former Prime Minister Moussa Mara for expressing solidarity with prisoners of conscience came to symbolise the broader collapse of judicial independence and the instrumentalisation of legal processes to silence dissent. Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2025 report once again rated Mali as “Not Free,” recording significant deterioration in political participation, media freedom, and civil liberties.
Despite the severity of these constraints, Malian civil society continues to play an indispensable role in humanitarian action, conflict mitigation, anti‑corruption monitoring, and the promotion of social cohesion. However, without credible progress towards restoring democratic governance and safeguarding fundamental freedoms, the civic space required for effective engagement risks further erosion, placing at risk both national stability and the capacity for inclusive, rights‑based development. The following report presents enabling‑environment developments from January to December 2025, with occasional references to key events that occurred prior to January 2025 where relevant.
