

Peru

Country Focus Report 2026



Credit: Willian Justin de Vasconcellos



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A) An Introduction to the Enabling Environment

What we understand by an Enabling Environment is the combination of laws, rules and social attitudes that support and promote the work of civil society. Within such an environment, civil society can engage in political and public life without fear of reprisals, openly express its views, and actively participate in shaping its context. This includes a supportive legal and regulatory framework for civil society, ensuring access to information and resources that are sustainable and flexible to pursue their goals unhindered, in safe physical and digital spaces. In an enabling environment, the state demonstrates openness and responsiveness in governance, promoting transparency, accountability, and inclusive decision-making. Positive values, norms, attitudes, and practices towards civil society from state and non-state actors further underscore the supportive environment.

To capture the state of the Enabling Environment, we use the following six principles:

SIX ENABLING PRINCIPLES



Respect and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms



Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework



Accessible and Sustainable Resources



Open and Responsive State



Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society



Access to a Secure Digital Environment

Brief overview of the country context

Reporting period: This report covers the period October 2025 – July 2026

Civil society activity in Peru from 2025 to 2026 was shaped by an electoral context that exposed existing divisions within Peruvian society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and other civic actors operated amid discriminatory, [racist and classist](#) narratives that sought to delegitimize the votes of vulnerable populations and questioned the political participation of people from rural and Indigenous communities.

During the review period, the political crisis that has affected Peru for the past decade continued, with four [different presidents](#) serving between September 2025 and September 2026, and [eight in the past 10 years](#). This period was also marked by significant corruption scandals, including [ChifaGate](#), in which involved former president José Jerí and contributed to his removal from office, as well as the continuation of cases such as [RolexGate](#), [Lava Jato](#) and [Qali Warma](#). These developments took place against a broader deterioration in perceptions of public-sector integrity: Peru's [Corruption Perceptions Index](#) score fell by eight points between 2020 and 2025, from 38 to 30.

The period under review also saw the first impacts of Law No. 32301, commonly known as the APCI Law, which was enacted on 14 April 2025. Among its effects, regional civil society organisations have reported [increased administrative](#) burdens, particularly for smaller teams. The law was also used in an initial attempt to sanction a CSO for providing legal assistance. Following a judicial decision declaring the law [inapplicable](#) in a case involving the Legal Defence Institute (IDL), a member of Congress responded by [filing legal complaints against the judges](#) who had declined to apply the law. This illustrates not only the regulatory risks created by the APCI Law, but also the broader pressure that civil society organisations and those defending their rights may face when challenging its application.

These developments occurred alongside several legislative [setbacks](#) that have further narrowed the enabling environment for civil society. Among the most significant were measures expanding [legal protections](#) for police and armed forces, raising concerns over impunity for victims of state violence, as well as laws affecting the recognition and implementation of [gender equality](#) policies. These measures have particularly affected organisations working on human rights, accountability, gender equality and the protection of vulnerable populations.

The period also revealed a shift rather than a clear reduction in political hostility toward civil society organisations. While 2025 was characterised by sustained political and public [attacks against CSOs](#), particularly in relation to the APCI Law and the withdrawal of USAID funding, political and media attention during 2026 was increasingly centred on the presidential election campaign. This shift in focus reduced the visibility of anti-CSO rhetoric but did not eliminate it. Confrontational narratives remained present among [key political actors](#) and were incorporated into broader electoral agendas, particularly through attacks against organisations and actors perceived as politically opposed to them.

Journalists were also among those most affected when carrying out their work during the period under review. In 2025, [four journalists were killed](#), while the National Association of Journalists of Peru (ANP) recorded [140 attacks](#) against journalists and media outlets. Some of these attacks involved political candidates, who publicly portrayed journalists as poorly

qualified or politically biased. These developments illustrate the broader deterioration of the environment enabling freedom of expression and the risks faced by actors investigating corruption, illegal economies and abuses of power.

The digital environment has simultaneously become an increasingly important space for information, civic participation and activism, while also presenting significant risks. Unequal [access to digital technologies](#) continues to limit participation, particularly among rural and Indigenous communities, while [surveillance capabilities](#), [data breaches](#), [disinformation](#) and other forms of digital interference create additional risks for civic actors.


Despite these constraints, civil society organisations provided civic education and training, monitored elections, documented corruption and illegal economies, denounced abuses of power, provided legal assistance and advocated for the rights of women, LGBTQIA+ people, persons with disabilities, and indigenous and rural communities. They also continued to address socio-environmental conflicts and emerging digital rights concerns. The evidence examined in this report therefore points to an increasingly constrained and unequal civic space, in which organisations face growing regulatory, political, financial and security pressures, while continuing to provide essential functions in accountability, rights protection and citizen participation.

B) Assessment of the Enabling Environment

PRINCIPLE SCORE

1. Respect and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms

Score: ¹



Peru's legal framework formally guarantees the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, with constitutional protections for CSOs and safeguards against administrative dissolution. However, the enabling environment has deteriorated due to the adoption of [Law No. 32301](#), which expands state oversight of internationally funded CSOs. Freedom of peaceful assembly has also come under increasing pressure through prolonged states of emergency, expanded police powers, reduced avenues for accountability for state violence, and restrictions affecting access to justice for protest-related human rights cases. At the same time, journalists, human rights defenders, environmental defenders, and Indigenous leaders continue to face threats, harassment, criminalisation, and violence, while attacks on the press and shrinking protections for civic actors have contributed to a more restrictive environment for freedom of expression.

According to the latest score reported in the CIVICUS Monitor report [People Power Under Attack 2025](#), Peru is rated as Repressed, with a score of 40 out of 100.

1.1 | Freedom of association

In Peru, there are different types of organisations, including associations, foundations and other nonprofit organisations, which can be established without prior authorisation. These forms of organisation are recognised by the Political Constitution, [Article 2, paragraph 13](#), under the fundamental right to freedom of association. The constitution also stipulates that

¹This is a rebased score derived from the [CIVICUS Monitor rating](#) published in December 2025.

these organisations cannot be dissolved through administrative means, but only by judicial decision.

As of 2025, the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI) had registered 2,146 development NGOs. However, this figure does not represent the total number of civil society organisations (CSOs) operating nationwide, but only those receiving funding from international cooperation. According [to the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru \(IDEHPUCP\)](#) and the [National Superintendence of Public Registries \(SUNARP\)](#), it was estimated that, as of 2024, there were more than 300,000 nonprofit organisations in Peru. These figures illustrate the breadth of civil society in the country and could suggest that freedom of association is broadly respected.

However, since its promulgation, [Law No. 32301](#) continues to be the main factor disabling freedom of association. This Law amended the APCI Law, making the pre-approval of CSOs' projects mandatory, as well as strengthening government oversight and sanctions. Furthermore, prior to the APCI Law, throughout 2024 and early 2025 misleading information was disseminated to discredit NGOs, suggesting that [between just 1% and 10% of them could be subject to state oversight because the rest were not registered](#) with APCI. This narrative conflated figures on the total number of nonprofit organisations with those of NGOs, creating the impression that all such organisations were required to register with APCI, even though registration is not a legal requirement for forming a nonprofit organisation. In 2025, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association [described](#) the amendment as an unusual measure that incorrectly equates efforts to promote transparency with undue and excessive control, thereby restricting the right to freedom of association.

1.2 | Freedom of assembly

Freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed by [Article 2, paragraph 12](#) of the Political Constitution of Peru. However, over the past year, this right has been increasingly undermined by declared states of emergency and legislative amendments that endanger civil society actors participating in public protests, while also hindering victims' and their relatives' access to justice in cases involving state violence.

Between October 2025 and June 2026, the declared states of emergency were repeatedly extended. According to [Article 137](#) of the Political Constitution of Peru: "The President of the Republic, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, may declare, for a specified period [...] a State of Emergency in the event of a disturbance of the peace or internal order, a catastrophe, or serious circumstances affecting the Nation. In such cases, the exercise of the constitutional rights relating to personal liberty and security, the inviolability of the home, and the freedoms of assembly and movement within the affected territory may be restricted or suspended."

The state of emergency in Metropolitan Lima and Callao was first declared in [October 2025](#), the same month in which [protests](#) took place over the appointment of José Jerí as president. Since then, it has been repeatedly extended. Prior to that date, emergency measures had already been implemented in districts of the capital with the highest levels of crime. It is important to remain vigilant to ensure that these measures are used solely for the purposes for which they were established and do not become an obstacle to the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly. On 28 June, a 60-calendar-day [extension of the state of emergency](#) was declared in Metropolitan Lima and the constitutional province of Callao.

The level of civilian vulnerability increases as the legal framework is amended to strengthen law enforcement agencies. One example is [Law No. 32291](#), which expands the ability of police officers to [use lethal force](#).

This problem is compounded by the erosion of avenues for accessing justice, resulting from the elimination or restructuring of mechanisms for investigating human rights violations and restrictions on access to legal advice and representation.

For example, the Public Prosecutor's Office [disbanded](#) the Special Team of Prosecutors for Victims of Social Protests (Eficavip) in [Resolution No. 005-2026-MP-FN](#). Eficavip, which was created in 2023, investigated cases stemming from the protests that took place during the early months of former president Dina Boluarte's administration, between December 2022 and March 2023, and focused on allegations of [excessive use of force](#). In addition, on 3 June, the Congressional Subcommittee on Constitutional Accusations declared [inadmissible](#) the complaint against Dina Boluarte and her former ministers regarding the deaths that occurred during the 2022–2023 protests.

Other example is [Law No. 32735](#). The law undermines access to justice, as it allows any [ordinary crime](#) committed by police officers or military personnel – including homicide, corruption, human rights violations, and property-related offences – in areas under a state of emergency to be tried by military courts. This law could facilitate [impunity](#) in cases involving human rights violations, including victims of the internal armed conflict (1980–2000), the 2020 social protests, the 2022–2023 massacres, and cases of state violence in 2025–2026. This law was promulgated on 21 July, even though the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had [urged](#) Peru not to approve the bill.

Moreover, the APCI Law [establishes clear restrictions](#) on funding activities believed to constitute “political activism” or actions contrary to the state's agenda. Among these restrictions are limitations on access to legal advice and representation in cases involving the state, including those concerning environmental defenders. In addition, Article 211 restricts the allocation of international resources to activities that are administratively or judicially classified as “acts that affect public order, public security, national defence, internal order, or harm public or private property.” Given the ambiguity of the provision, participation in or organisation of a peaceful protest could potentially be construed as conduct affecting public order, particularly in light of the [narrative](#) adopted by successive governments in recent years. This directly affects projects related to human rights, gender equality, environmental protection and the defence of rights against abuses. In some cases, it has even been suggested that accessing funding for such activities could be considered unlawful, increasing risks and reducing opportunities for CSOs to engage in advocacy and influence public policy.

1.3 | Freedom of expression

Although freedom of expression is guaranteed under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Political Constitution of Peru, it came under sustained pressure throughout 2025 and into 2026. Freedom of expression in Peru remains formally protected but is increasingly constrained in practice, particularly in the context of journalism and investigative reporting. Journalists and media outlets face reprisals for reporting on corruption and illegal economies, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, and illegal mining. This pressure takes different forms, including threats and harassment, physical and verbal assaults, judicial intimidation, administrative sanctions and other forms of coercion, and, in the most serious cases, killings. This pattern of attacks has contributed to an increasingly challenging environment for the exercise of freedom of expression and the work of the press.

The operating environment for journalists deteriorated significantly in 2025, making it the most lethal year so far for journalism in Peru. In 2025, [458 attacks](#) were recorded against the press, including the killing of four journalists. All four had been [highly critical](#) of authorities, illegal economies and the financing of public projects.

This pattern continued into 2026. According to the [World Press Freedom Index](#), Peru fell from 130th to 144th place this year. The 2026 Press Freedom Thermometer Report, published in May this year, by the ANP reported [140 attacks](#) against the press. Of these, 76 involved civilians, with most incidents occurring in connection with candidates for elected office or supporters of political parties. The press has been under attack from politicians in Peru, as discussed further in section 5.1. More broadly, the 2026 elections became a high-risk environment for the press. Journalists faced direct violence, including the attacks described above, and there was a growing public debate over proposals that could systematically restrict their freedoms. At the same time, concerns arose over unequal access to information during the electoral campaign. During the second-round campaign, the European Union Election Observation Mission found that most private media outlets systematically portrayed presidential candidate Roberto Sánchez and his political party, Juntos por el Perú, in a [negative light](#). Although no third-party interference was reported, this bias in the information presented to the public limited access to diverse political information and, consequently, the conditions for informed electoral participation.


Freedom of expression has also been undermined by violence and insecurity affecting environmental defenders, particularly those reporting on environmental degradation, illegal economies and threats to their territories. In 2025, 161 environmental defenders faced situations of serious risk, some of which resulted in killings, including the cases of [Hipólito Quispe Huamán Conde](#) in July 2025 and [Isai Shuk Shawit](#) in November 2025. The legal framework for the protection of human rights defenders, including the [Intersectoral Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders](#), remains limited in scope, with insufficient budgetary and staffing resources to ensure its effective implementation. According to [Ojo Público](#), between 2021 and August 2025 only 10 of the 36 environmental defenders in the Peruvian Amazon who requested protection measures were granted access to them.

This pattern of insecurity and violence has continued into 2026. In certain territories, particularly in the Amazon region, [illegal economies and criminal networks](#) threaten Indigenous leaders, environmental defenders, journalists, and local organisations, materially limiting their ability to organise, report abuses, and participate in public affairs. In February 2026, [Front Line Defenders](#) warned that the criminalisation of Asháninka human rights defender Fabián Antúnez remained ongoing. Meanwhile, Olivia Bisa, president of the Autonomous Territorial Government of the Chapra Nation in the Peruvian Amazon, [reported](#) before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that she had received death threats, including threats against her children, in connection with her work as an environmental defender.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

2. Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework

Score:



Peruvian CSOs face registration framework that requires legal registration, tax registration and mandatory APCI registration for organisations receiving international cooperation funds, creating significant administrative and financial burdens, particularly for smaller and indigenous organisations. Recent amendments to the Law No. 32301 and its regulations introducing broad reporting requirements, pre-approval mechanisms, and severe sanctions that may affect CSOs' autonomy and operational independence. While legal protections generally prevent arbitrary dissolution of CSOs, the potential cancellation of APCI registration poses a serious threat to organisational sustainability, given the sector's heavy dependence on international funding.

2.1 | Registration

At the administrative level, CSOs are required to complete registration procedures to obtain legal personality. They must also register with the APCI if they receive international cooperation funding – which, in the panel's experience, represents their main source of funding – in accordance with Law N° 27692, Law No. 32301 and its [implementing regulations](#).

The registration process with the [National Superintendence of Public Registries \(SUNARP\)](#) consists of three procedures: the name search, name reservation and incorporation filing. The final step includes the notarial deed (approximately USD 270) and the certification of the opening of three mandatory corporate books – the register of members, the minutes book of the general assembly, and the board of directors' minutes book. The cost of these certifications depends on the number of pages and ranges from approximately USD 9 to USD 18 per book. These procedures entail significant costs and, in many cases, require specialised legal assistance, which may be an additional financial burden for smaller organisations.

CSOs must also obtain a [Taxpayer Identification Number \(RUC\)](#) as a legal entity if they engage in economic activities. The RUC is part of a registry maintained by the National Superintendency of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT), and the information it contains must be kept up to date by both the registered entity and SUNAT.

Under [Law No. 27692](#), APCI is responsible for maintaining several registries, including the Registry of National Development NGOs Receiving International Technical Cooperation, the National Registry of Foreign Entities and Institutions for International Technical Cooperation (ENIEX), the Registry of Private Non-Profit Institutions Receiving Assistance or Educational Donations from Abroad (IPREDA), the Registry of Cooperation Sources, and the Registry of International Cooperation Donors.

[Law No. 32301](#) provides that: “Each entity’s registration contains information on its legal address and the plans, programmes, and projects under its responsibility, including their objectives and the amounts and sources of funding, as established by the regulations implementing this law. The registration also contains the Annual Activity Plan for the year of commencement, the Annual Report on activities carried out, and, where applicable, the report on assistance or educational activities carried out during the preceding year. Organisations implementing international technical cooperation are responsible for keeping their registration up to date and may be held liable for failing to do so.” Failure to keep this information up to date may constitute an infringement and result in sanctions. One of the sanctions available to APCI is the cancellation of an organisation’s registration in the registries it administers. Given that international cooperation constitutes the primary source of funding for most CSOs, registration with APCI is essential for their continued operation.

Barriers to the registration and regularisation of documents for Indigenous organisations and federations also persist. According to the panel, indigenous organisations face a digital divide and have difficulties maintaining more robust administrative structures. As a result, they are often required to incur transportation and accommodation expenses when procedures must be completed in urban centres, or to hire additional personnel to manage documentation processes, creating a disproportionate financial burden.

Another [barrier to the registration](#) of Indigenous organisations is the denial of fee exemptions for registration, despite these being recognised by law under Supreme Decree [No. 019-2019-JUS](#). Other barriers include challenges to the documents submitted by SUNARP certifying officers and repeated observations regarding the inclusion of an intercultural approach in their statutes.

2.2 | Operational environment

As mentioned in the previous sub-principles, [Law No. 32301](#), which amended the APCI Law, together with the 2025 implementing regulations, has significantly transformed the environment in which CSOs operate in Peru. The APCI Law introduces a layer of state [pre-approval](#) for all activities financed with foreign resources. Failure to align with APCI’s priorities may pose a risk to the authorisation of projects, as the applicable legal framework requires activities to be aligned with the public interest, national development priorities, foreign policy, and the international commitments undertaken by the state. However, neither the law nor its implementing regulations provide detailed criteria for defining these priorities or assessing whether a CSO’s activities are sufficiently aligned with them. As a result, the interpretation of these requirements may depend to a significant extent on the priorities established by the government in office at a given time.

This lack of specificity is particularly relevant in view of the political instability in Peru, where there have been [eight presidents](#) in the past decade. Frequent changes in government may lead to shifts in policy priorities, creating uncertainty for CSOs whose activities and strategic

planning depend on international cooperation. In this context, changes in government priorities could affect the continuity of CSO programmes and require organisations to adapt their strategies to changing policy environments.

Although no cases of approval denial have been documented so far, in October 2025 five media outlets filed constitutional [protection actions](#) (known as *amparos*) challenging Law No. 32301, arguing that it grants the state the power to authorise or block journalism projects funded through international cooperation.

Other risk for CSOs are disproportionate sanctions. According to the APCI Regulation on administrative infringements and sanctions, the applicable sanctions are imposed in proportion to the severity of the administrative infringement:

- Minor infractions are sanctioned with a written warning when committed for the first time. In cases of repeated violations, a fine is imposed.
- Serious infractions are sanctioned with a fine.
- Very serious infractions are also sanctioned with a fine. Fines may amount to up to 500 tax units (*unidad impositiva tributaria* – UIT). The value of the tax unit for 2026 is equivalent to USD 1635.

However, as noted in the section on freedom of assembly, “acts that affect public order, public security, national defence, internal order, or harm public or private property” are classified as serious infringements under the APCI framework. The same applies to “advising, assisting, or financing, in any form or manner, administrative, judicial, or other actions, before national or international bodies, against the Peruvian State.” These provisions create a potential risk for CSOs involved in public protests, particularly given the broad and potentially ambiguous scope of what may be considered an act affecting public order. They also explicitly encompass the provision of legal advice and representation in actions against the state.

If these provisions were applied to such activities, CSOs could face fines of up to 500 tax units, equivalent to USD 818,350, which could significantly affect their ability to operate. Recidivism may also result in the cancellation of an organisation’s registration. The severity of these sanctions, combined with the broad wording of the provisions, may have a chilling effect on CSOs’ willingness to engage in public advocacy, support legal actions or participate in protests.

A relevant case occurred on 12 November 2025, when a congressman from the Honour and Democracy party [requested](#) the initiation of sanctioning proceedings against the Legal Defence Institute (IDL) and the National Human Rights Coordinator (CNDDHH) under APCI law. The congressman argued that “the organisations were allegedly using international cooperation funds for political purposes unrelated to their institutional objectives.” The action in question was a call by the organisations for the urgent appointment of a new attorney general to replace the interim attorney general (who was elected the new attorney general in March 2026), whom they believed lacked independence and who has been [linked](#) to investigations related to the [Cuellos Blancos del Puerto](#) case, an alleged judicial corruption network exposed by IDL-Reporteros in 2018. Gálvez denies any involvement and claims that the [Cuellos Blancos case is a fabrication](#) that only existed within the Constitutional Province of Callao. Furthermore, while he was a Supreme Prosecutor, his prosecutor’s office ordered the dismissal of the investigation into the [former president](#), José Jerí, who had been accused of sexual assault. As interim attorney general, he also removed [prosecutors who were members](#) of the investigative team in the Cuellos Blancos del Puerto case and [disbanded](#) the Special Team of Prosecutors for Victims of Social Protests (Eficavip), created in 2023.

Although in January 2026 the judiciary declared the APCI Law [inapplicable](#) to IDL on the grounds that it violated constitutional rights and international legal standards, risks remain for other organisations. Furthermore, the ruling led to the [public harassment](#) of the judge who

issued the decision. The former president of Congress [filed a complaint](#) against her before the National Board of Justice, accusing her of having “disregarded” the law approved by Congress concerning NGOs, alleging misconduct and claiming that she was part of a “mafia that controls the judicial system.”

On the other hand, panel participants indicated that several CSOs have been formally sanctioned. The [APCI’s registry of sanctioned entities](#) (as of 31 May 2026) lists 872 infractions related to the failure to file an annual report; however, none date from 2026, and fewer than half pertain to 2025.

Given that the annual report carries a risk of sanctions if it is not submitted within the established deadlines or is not completed correctly, the panel noted that APCI does not provide sufficient clarity or timely responses regarding reporting requirements. The lack of timely responses during the transition to a new platform for submitting the annual report, together with limited notice of changes to submission deadlines, increased organisations’ concerns about their chances of being sanctioned.

This uncertainty has also created an additional administrative burden for CSOs. In one panellist’s organisation, administrative staff have been compelled to retain emails, screenshots and other forms of evidence demonstrating that they submitted inquiries or documentation that went unanswered by APCI. These records are kept as evidence that the organisation attempted to comply with reporting requirements within the applicable deadlines and sought clarification from APCI when necessary.

According to the experience of another panellist, these fields were only implemented on the platform on 19 March 2026. The participant from this NGO indicated that training on the use of the platform took place on 5 April. The [press release](#) announcing the training is dated 30 April, while APCI’s YouTube channel shows that the [first video](#) in the webinar series entitled “Submission of the 2025 Annual Activities Report and the 2026 Annual Activities Plan” was uploaded on 22 May, only nine days before the initial filing deadline. Furthermore, the [latest update](#) to the annual report section of the government website (gob.pe) was made on 28 May. It was also reported that some reporting tabs were activated at inappropriate hours, including during the early morning. Moreover, the [extension of the deadline](#) to 30 June was not announced until 1 June.

The impacts of the APCI Law may vary depending on the size, geographic scope, resources and areas of work of each organisation. Organisations with national reach, greater funding, larger teams and more defined areas of work – particularly those working on sensitive issues – may be more exposed to direct oversight and inspections, which could affect their operational and strategic capacity. By contrast, regional organisations may face a greater administrative burden due to their smaller teams and more limited resources. As one panellist noted, the workload increases when APCI does not provide timely responses, as organisations must retain evidence of their communications and attempts to comply, particularly when their inquiries receive no response. Finally, Indigenous organisations may face additional barriers. The digital divide affecting Indigenous peoples, as discussed under the previous sub-principle, can also limit their access to information and their ability to comply with APCI reporting requirements. This may be compounded by limited legal expertise within smaller organisations, making it more difficult to understand and navigate increasingly complex regulatory and reporting requirements.

These differences were reported in [Civil Society Under Siege](#): The Effects of the APCI Law on Organisations Linked to the Extractive Sector and suggest that the impact of the APCI Law is asymmetrical.

In addition to APCI monitoring, CSOs are required to submit an [annual income tax return](#) to SUNAT. Entities qualified as recipients of tax-deductible donations must [report](#) to SUNAT on

the receipt and use of donated funds and assets, supported by the corresponding payment vouchers.

2.3 | Protection from interference

The Political Constitution of Peru [establishes](#) that nonprofit organisations cannot be dissolved by administrative resolution.

There are several [grounds for the dissolution](#) of an association under the legal framework:

- By operation of law: An association is dissolved by operation of law when it is no longer able to operate in accordance with its bylaws.
- By liquidation: An association is dissolved through liquidation, as agreed by its creditors' meeting in accordance with the applicable law.
- For acting against public order or public morals: The public prosecutor's office may petition the courts for the dissolution of an association whose activities or purposes are, or become, contrary to public order or public morals. A judgement that is not appealed is automatically referred to the superior court for review.

According to an administrative team, in practice, the procedure for dissolving a legal entity registered with SUNARP is through the [voluntary dissolution](#) process decided by the governing bodies of the CSO. This often happens when the CSO cannot sustain itself financially and consequently chooses to close voluntarily.


The state does not conduct inspections as such. However, as previously mentioned, CSOs are required to submit an [annual income tax return](#) to SUNAT. Furthermore, CSOs must report their activities to APCI, which has the authority to impose a range of sanctions depending on the severity of the infraction. The law also empowers the APCI to refer to the public prosecutor's office any activities it considers contrary to the Constitution or the applicable legal framework – a discretionary standard – and authorises SUNAT to establish a specialised oversight unit for NGOs, thereby institutionalising a state inspection regime whose scope and due process guarantees remain unclear.

Overall, the legal framework protects CSOs from dissolution. Although there are grounds for dissolution, in practice this generally occurs voluntarily rather than as a result of state pressure. Reporting requirements to SUNAT are proportionate to the organisations' activities. The main risk facing CSOs is the possibility of having their APCI registration cancelled, which could amount to a de facto dissolution, given that international cooperation is the primary source of funding for many development NGOs.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

3. Accessible and Sustainable Resources

Score:



Peru's CSOs face a worsening funding environment driven by the withdrawal of USAID support, increased competition for a shrinking pool of international resources, and amendments to the APCI Law. While alternative funding opportunities remain available, the law creates additional compliance costs, legal uncertainty, and potential disincentives for funding work related to human rights, advocacy, and access to justice. Although relationships between donors and CSOs generally remain collaborative and respectful of organisational autonomy, state-defined development priorities increasingly influence funding flows and program design. Overall, the sector's long-term sustainability is challenged by declining international cooperation, short-term project-based funding, limited support for institutional costs, and the absence of diversified domestic funding sources, making many organisations financially vulnerable.

3.1 | Accessibility

The accessibility of funding has declined since January 2025, mainly due to the withdrawal of USAID. Although funding opportunities remain available, they are highly competitive, reducing organisations' chances of securing resources. In addition, the amendments to the APCI Law create a risk of losing access to international funding.

The suspension of USAID funding has affected more than [60 civil society actors](#) which represent projects valued at over [USD 70 million](#) through 2030. Although the 2025 reporting cycle had not yet been finalised at the time of writing, the figures reported so far show a substantial decline compared to previous years. National development NGOs have [reported](#) receiving only USD 1,382,363 in donations, whereas USAID funding had previously exceeded USD 10 million annually in 2022, 2023 and 2024. Larger NGOs are currently navigating a complex process of adapting to these developments.

Despite this major development, panel participants noted that funding opportunities do still exist, although they remain limited. The principal sources of funding were the bilateral donor agencies, embassies and international NGOs funding, but their calls for proposals are highly competitive, attracting a large number of applicants despite the small number of grants available. As an example, one panel participant shared that a donor reported 270 expressions of interest to a call for proposals that, based on prior years, was only expected to fund around six projects.

Nonprofit associations are [exempt](#) from income tax until 31 December 2026, provided they comply with the applicable legal requirements. In addition, a significant fiscal incentive available is a [tax deduction](#) of up to 10% of net income for donations made to qualified entities.

Finally, [Law No. 32301](#), imposing restrictions on the use of international cooperation funds, limits opportunities to access funding for legal advice and representation aimed at facilitating access to justice. Its provisions may also restrict funding for activists representing vulnerable populations. In addition, they may implicitly discourage international cooperation actors from providing funding for activities that are perceived to be unaligned with the government's priorities or national interests.

At the same time, the process of adapting to the APCI Law has generated additional administrative burdens and required CSOs to reallocate resources towards regulatory compliance. The adaptation to the APCI Law may [disproportionately affect](#) regional organisations, which often have smaller administrative teams and fewer resources to manage additional reporting and compliance requirements. Indigenous organisations may face additional challenges due to limited access to legal expertise and the difficulties involved in navigating complex regulatory procedures. While it is still too early to fully assess the long-term effects of the [APCI Law](#), the costs it is generating are already evident.

3.2 | Effectiveness

In Peru the relationship between CSOs and donors is generally collaborative. The bilateral donor agencies, embassies and international NGOs who work in the country respect the autonomy of CSOs in matters of governance.

Most CSO work plans are developed through mutual agreement with donors, who typically allow minor adjustments within agreed objectives. However, as previously mentioned, the objectives and priorities of programmes, plans, and projects implemented with international cooperation by both national and international organisations must be aligned with the priorities of the country according to APCI Law. The Coordination Network of Foreign International Cooperation Organisations ([COEECI](#)), organisations are expected to take the National Policy on International Technical Cooperation (PNCTI) 2030 into account when planning their future activities.

Restrictions or thematic priorities are not imposed by donors on CSOs; rather, the state establishes the priorities that are expected to guide both donors and CSOs.

On the other hand, the lack of clarity regarding how APCI regulates the “use of resources” creates uncertainty and increases the risk of sanctions, which may discourage investment in sensitive areas such as the rights of vulnerable populations and strategic litigation, particularly where these issues are portrayed negatively in public discourse. This not only restricts the use of funds but also hampers access to the information, networks, and training necessary for the transparent planning and implementation of projects.

According to members of the expert panel, available resources are increasingly concentrated in specific thematic areas, such as economic inclusion, innovation, migration governance, labour formalisation, employment and fair elections (because is an electoral year) while other issues – including the prevention of human trafficking and gender-based violence – have

received less attention. In response to the risk of losing funding for work on issues that are not considered national priorities, or of facing sanctions for activities that may be deemed prohibited, many CSOs have [adapted](#) their agendas to align with emerging donor priorities, incorporating themes that offer greater funding potential.

3.3 | Sustainability

The long-term financial sustainability of CSOs in Peru is not guaranteed.

Peru's 2008 reclassification as a [middle-income country](#) has resulted in the redirection of some international funding streams, leading to a [reduction in sources](#) of development assistance. In addition, short project cycles, limited diversification of funding sources, and the risks associated with seeking greater financial independence leave CSOs vulnerable to financial instability and may undermine their long-term sustainability.

According to the APCI [2011 Annual Report](#), total non-reimbursable international cooperation funding received by Peru between 2006 and 2007 was approximately USD 500 million. According to the [Situation and Trends of International Technical Cooperation in Peru 2010 report](#), this amount fell to just over USD 423 million in 2008, when Peru was reclassified as a middle-income country. Since then, international cooperation funding in Peru has never again exceeded USD 400 million. Overall, funding is now roughly USD 150 million lower than before its reclassification.

Looking specifically at funding implemented by development NGOs, the trend is also indicative of a constrained funding environment. Since 2014, such funding has remained below USD 200 million. According to the [latest full report](#) available, approximately USD 177 million in international cooperation funding was implemented by development NGOs in 2024, representing a decrease of approximately USD 20 million compared with the amounts reported in 2022 and 2023. Although the 2025 reporting cycle has not yet been finalised, funding is expected to have declined further following the withdrawal of USAID, which has historically been an important donor in Peru. As of August 2026, the reported amount stands at USD 84,797,870.

Funding executed by development NGOs has remained relatively stable since 2019, but has not returned to the levels observed before the longer-term decline in international cooperation funding. The withdrawal of USAID as a major donor, combined with limited diversification of funding sources and short project cycles, further increases the risk that organisations may struggle to secure predictable, long-term resources. This creates an important challenge to the financial sustainability and continuity of CSOs, particularly those with limited access to alternative sources of funding.

Existing funding is often restricted to specific projects, making strategic planning and staff retention difficult. According to panel participants, some bilateral donor-funded projects in the past could last up to five years. To assess current funding cycles, a review of 12 calls for proposals issued between 2025 and 2026 by bilateral donor agencies, embassies, and international NGOs was conducted. This review found that the funding opportunities examined generally had project cycles that do not exceed two years, according to research by Proética. Moreover, funding frequently covers activities rather than personnel costs. When staffing costs are included, support is usually confined to technical personnel and does not extend to administrative or financial staff. These restrictions on eligible costs make it difficult for organisations to retain their full teams and can reinforce project-based operations, limiting their ability to maintain institutional activities and undertake longer-term strategic planning.

Income-generating activities, such as the sale of books, merchandise, advisory services and training programmes, and the rental of spaces, are legally permitted but may [jeopardise](#) tax exemptions if SUNAT interprets them as related commercial activities.


Other funding sources, such as individual philanthropy, remain uncommon in Peru and lack a broad fundraising infrastructure. Membership fees, where they exist, generally cover only a marginal portion of operating budgets. Finally, volunteerism exists but remains largely informal and insufficiently integrated into institutional structures.

The sustainability challenge is not solely due to declining resources, but also to the predominance of short-term, project-based funding, which provides limited coverage of institutional and administrative costs. This can undermine CSOs' ability to retain the talent needed to sustain and implement their initiatives, while also limiting their capacity for strategic planning.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

4. Open and Responsive State

Score: 2.8/5



Peru has a comparatively strong legal framework for transparency, participation, and accountability, supported by access-to-information legislation, open government commitments, public consultation mechanisms, and formal accountability requirements. However, implementation remains uneven, as many public institutions provide incomplete information, consultation processes are often superficial rather than genuinely participatory, and significant barriers persist for Indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and communities outside major urban centers. While some public institutions demonstrate good practices in transparency and feedback mechanisms, accountability processes generally remain technocratic, with limited citizen influence over decision-making and insufficient explanation of how public input shapes final outcomes.

4.1 | Transparency

Peru has relatively robust transparency mechanisms in place; however, their implementation remains limited, and, in some cases, superficial. [Law No. 27806](#) (Transparency and Access to Public Information Law) was enacted in 2003 and updated in May 2024. In addition, Peru has also been a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) since 2012. This international initiative promotes transparency, citizen participation, accountability and public integrity through action plans co-created by government and civil society. The [VI Open Government Action Plan 2026–2027](#), developed within the framework of the partnership, entered into force in 2026.

Law No. 27806 and its implementing regulations constitute the main legal framework requiring public administration entities to comply with transparency obligations. Although Peru has made progress in both proactive disclosure and the processing of requests for public information since 2004, implementation remains incomplete. Not all public entities have fully

implemented their Standard Transparency Portals, and significant barriers related to the digital divide, language, and disability continue to limit universal and inclusive access to information.

Since the enactment of the Transparency Law, [2,330 public entities](#) (August 2026) have established Standard Transparency Portals as part of the implementation of proactive transparency measures. The Transparency Law provides that these portals should be implemented “progressively, according to their budget.” However, more than 20 years after the law was enacted, significant gaps remain in the quality and completeness of the information disclosed. According to the National Authority for Transparency and Access to Public Information (ANTAIP), its [Annual Report on Public Information Access Requests and the Level of Compliance in Updating Public Information on Standard Transparency Portals 2025](#) found that only 10 of the 500 public entities assessed achieved 100% compliance with transparency requirements. The average compliance rate was 71%. This figure may even overestimate the overall level of compliance, as the 2025 supervisory sample excluded district municipalities, special projects, and certain public programmes that had recorded particularly low levels of compliance in 2024.

The Transparency Law also establishes mechanisms through which individuals can request public information, both online and in person, and requires public administration entities to receive and process such requests. However, the implementing regulations require applicants to provide their name and identification number, creating an initial barrier to the universal exercise of the right of access to information.

The [annual report](#) stated that 98.5% of public information access requests (SAIP) were processed among the 500 entities monitored. However, the high rate of requests processed does not necessarily indicate that the right to information is being effectively guaranteed. According to panel participants, compliance in practice remains uneven and deficient. In some cases, information is omitted, pages are removed, summaries are provided instead of complete documents, or authorities may invoke grounds for confidentiality or reservation that do not apply. In addition, public information and open data are not always presented in clear, accessible, or reusable formats, limiting their usefulness as tools for citizen oversight, participation and informed decision-making.

Indigenous communities face additional barriers that severely limit their use of digital platforms and exclude many communities from fully exercising their right to information. The main obstacles include geographical remoteness, as many communities live in rural or isolated areas, the digital divide, digital illiteracy and the lack of information available in Indigenous languages.

On the other hand, the same [annual report](#) identified only two entities in its sample that provide assistance to persons with disabilities to help them exercise their right of access to information. This finding suggests that persons with disabilities remain among the least served populations in terms of transparency and access to information. The necessary measures to ensure their effective access are not systematically provided; instead, such measures appear as isolated good practices implemented by a minority of entities, primarily in the health sector.

Finally, when institutions do not respond, they often resort to administrative silence or simply deny access to the requested information. Legal safeguards against the unjustified denial of access to information do exist. First, there is the constitutional remedy of *habeas data*, recognised in Article 2(5) of the [Constitution](#). Second, Peru has a [Transparency and Access to Public Information Tribunal](#), which serves as the highest administrative authority for resolving disputes related to transparency and the right of access to public information nationwide. According to the panellists, although legal remedies exist to challenge denials of access to information, public authorities do not always comply with the decisions issued through these mechanisms. Moreover, these procedures are often lengthy and costly, ultimately defeating the purpose of ensuring transparency.

4.2 | Participation

Peru has a [legal framework](#) that guarantees citizens' rights to participation and oversight. However, in practice, the participatory process can be uneven and difficult to access.

Several consultation mechanisms are established under the law. Under [Supreme Decree No. 023-2025-PCM](#), public consultation is formally recognised as one of the instruments for improving regulatory quality in Peru. Public consultations provide a mechanism through which any government authority may receive information and feedback from citizens, businesses and other interested stakeholders as part of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) process. The Supreme Decree establishes two types of public consultation: early public consultation and regulatory public consultation.

- Early public consultation is designed as an agile and flexible process through which information, comments and contributions are gathered from individuals and other stakeholders to inform the analysis of public problems, policy objectives, possible alternatives and their respective impacts, as well as implementation mechanisms.
- Regulatory public consultation, in turn, involves the timely and proportionate collection of additional relevant information from stakeholders while general regulations are being developed. Its purpose is to improve proposed regulations and identify potential risks in their implementation and enforcement strategies, thereby contributing to their feasibility and the sustainability of their expected benefits.

To strengthen public officials' capacity to conduct both early and regulatory public consultations, on 24 April 2026 the government approved the [Practical Guide to Public Consultation](#) within the framework of regulatory quality improvement instruments. It is intended to provide public administration entities with practical guidance on initiating and conducting public consultation processes, including recommended timelines and procedures for each stage, stakeholder mapping, communication strategies, and replicable examples. Given that it was approved only recently, there is not yet sufficient evidence to assess whether it has resulted in measurable improvements in the quality, consistency or effectiveness of public consultations.

Another kind of consultation is the right to prior consultation. [Law No. 29785](#) establishes the scope, principles, and procedures governing the right of Indigenous peoples to prior consultation regarding legislative or administrative measures that may directly affect them. The law is interpreted in accordance with the obligations established under the International Labour Organisation [Convention No. 169](#).

A [study](#) by the National Centre for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) found that, although 32 of 34 national policies included some form of public participation, only one policy was assessed as having achieved effective participation, while in the remaining 31, participation was considered limited or "superficial." According to CEPLAN, participation was considered limited when it primarily involved information-sharing or consultation, rather than enabling meaningful engagement in the policy-making process. The study also identifies cases in which participation was limited to consultations with CSOs or experts, or conducted through surveys and virtual platforms, without ensuring the meaningful participation of the populations most directly affected by the public issues under discussion. In addition, these processes have not reached the entire country but remain concentrated in the capital and main urban centres.

These findings suggest that, although public participation is formally incorporated into most national policy processes, the depth, inclusiveness and geographical reach of such participation remain limited. The gap between the high proportion of policies reporting some form of participation and the very small proportion assessed as effective indicates that the existence of a participatory process does not necessarily translate into meaningful citizen influence over policy-making.

Recent examples illustrate some of the limitations of these processes. In July 2026, recipients of the Beca 18 scholarship programme staged a protest over [their concerns](#) that the limited public consultation period of only [15 calendar days](#), as outlined in Ministerial Resolution [N° 365-2026-MINEDU](#), failed to guarantee any meaningful participation in the amendments to the regulations governing the National Scholarship and Educational Loan Programme (PRONABEC).

In October 2025, Congress approved the rules governing the [new bicameral Congress](#) to be established in 2026. Under these rules, the current [Congressional Committee](#) on Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples, Environment and Ecology will [be abolished](#) when the newly elected Congress takes office. The decision was not subject to consultation with Indigenous organisations. According to the Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDSEP), this will [result](#) in the disappearance of the only specialised parliamentary space for addressing Indigenous peoples' issues through a technical, differentiated and intercultural approach. The removal of this specialised space not only reduces institutional channels for participation in legislative processes, but also limits opportunities for CSOs and Indigenous peoples to participate in and influence policy-making. It also weakens the conditions for meaningful consultation on legislation affecting their rights.

More broadly, in consultation processes concerning significant legislation, the voices of civil society are often disregarded. This was illustrated by the adoption of Law No. 32301, which was enacted without a meaningful consultation process involving the CSOs directly affected. Of the 12 opinions requested for the [legislative report](#) before the law was enacted, only one came from a nonprofit organisation, while the remaining opinions came from public entities. This limited representation of affected civil society in the consultation process is particularly significant given that several organisations had already raised concerns about the proposed amendments. These included the Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, the National Human Rights Coordinator ([CNDDHH](#)), the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru ([IDEHPUCP](#)), [CooperAcción](#), [Amnesty International](#), four [UN Special Rapporteurs](#), and the [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights \(IACHR\)](#).

At the same time, however, the electoral context has also created opportunities for civil society to advance policy proposals at both the regional and national levels. Examples include the [Governability Agreements](#) promoted by the Round Table for the Fight against Poverty (MCLCP), the [Citizens' Agenda](#) developed by Tejiendo Ciudadanía, Proética's [Reform Agenda for Integrity and the Fight against Corruption](#), and the [Regional Agenda to Address the Political Crisis](#) developed by the Arequipa Promoting Group (GIA), which was formulated through a participatory process and presented to regional authorities and political parties in a spirit of openness and broad engagement.

4.3 | Accountability

Peru has a solid regulatory framework on accountability, supported by constitutional provisions and decentralisation laws. However, its implementation remains a challenge.

Article 3 of [Law No. 26300](#) on Citizens' Rights to Participation and Oversight includes the "demand for accountability". Chapter IV of the law further establishes that, through the accountability process, citizens have the right to question public authorities regarding budget execution and the use of public resources. Moreover, public accountability hearings are mandatory for [regional governments](#) and [municipalities](#).

With regard to public consultation, Article 30(1) of [Legislative Decree No. 1565](#) establishes that "The public consultation process concludes with the publication of its results on the entity's digital platform before the regulation is approved, under the responsibility of the head of the entity. The results include the final public consultation report and a comments matrix

containing duly reasoned responses. In the case of early public consultation, the comments or suggestions received must be compiled and presented in a report.”

However, according to the panel, these mechanisms are generally not accompanied by systematic feedback processes that inform citizens about outcomes or explain why public contributions were incorporated or rejected.


There are some notable exceptions. Regulatory agencies such as the Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Telecommunications (OSIPTEL), the Supervisory Agency for Investment in Energy and Mining (OSINERGMIN), the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA), and National Superintendency of Higher University Education ([SUNEDU](#)); technical ministries such as the [Ministry of Energy and Mines](#) (MINEM) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR); the [Secretariat of Public Management](#); the Secretariat of Public Integrity; and institutions such as the National Institute for the Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) publish or circulate comment matrices at the conclusion of regulatory consultations. These documents explain which contributions were accepted, which were rejected, and the reasons behind those decisions.

However, these remain isolated examples. Most public institutions still view accountability primarily as an obligation towards oversight bodies rather than towards citizens and therefore communicate using highly technical language that is often inaccessible to the general public.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

5. Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society

Score:



Peru's civic space is increasingly shaped by hostile public narratives toward CSOs, independent media, and activists. Political actors and parts of the media continue to use stigmatizing rhetoric that portrays CSOs as ideologically driven, foreign-funded, or even linked to criminal or terrorist interests, contributing to a polarized environment and undermining public trust in civic actors. At the same time, civic participation remains constrained by low trust in institutions, weak civic education outcomes, and widespread perceptions that citizens have limited influence over public decision-making, although electoral engagement and youth-led activism continue to create important opportunities for participation. Structural inequalities, including poverty, geographic exclusion, linguistic barriers, discrimination against Indigenous peoples, and recent setbacks affecting gender equality and LGBTQIA+ rights, continue to limit equal access to civic participation and representation.

5.1 | Public discourse and constructive dialogue on civil society

In Peru, the public and political discourse surrounding CSOs has remained hostile. Since the last reporting period, political actors maintained a confrontational stance toward civil society. The Spanish term [*caviar*](#) has been used pejoratively to discredit CSOs, academics, journalists, and activists associated with progressive agendas. Traditional media outlets have largely replicated or amplified narratives portraying CSOs as [“profit-driven,”](#) [“ideologically motivated”](#) or [“funded by foreign interests”](#), thereby undermining the public legitimacy of their work. This narrative may contribute to CSOs being perceived negatively by certain segments of the population and may even lead some to portray or associate them with terrorist or criminal organisations.

Such stigmatising statements have not been limited to CSOs. University student unions have also been targeted, as some media outlets covering the student occupations of university

campuses focused primarily on [criminalising](#) and highlighting the [disruptive aspects](#) of youth mobilisations rather than addressing the underlying demands that motivated them.

The former President of the Congress of the Republic of Peru is one political actor who exemplifies this confrontational stance toward civil society. He publicly referred to Eduardo Ruiz Sanz, known as “Trvko,” a rapper who used his music as a form of protest and [was killed](#) by an undercover police officer during the October 2025 protests, as a [terrugo](#) (a derogatory term in Peru used to associate individuals with terrorism). In 2026, he accused the Judiciary of [attempting to silence](#) those who denounce the “caviar mafia,” a derogatory term he has used to refer to CSOs, after the Judiciary declared the [APCI Law inapplicable](#) in a case involving an NGO facing sanctions for bringing legal action against the state. In addition to his public accusations, he [filed a complaint](#) against the judge in the case, alleging [judicial misconduct](#) for failing to apply Law No. 32301.

Despite these examples, some panellists considered that the intensity of anti-CSO rhetoric had lessened during 2026. However, the available evidence does not support the conclusion that hostility towards CSOs has diminished. The lower visibility of attacks against CSOs in 2026 appears to reflect a shift in political and media attention toward the electoral campaign rather than an improvement in the enabling environment.

In fact, confrontational and stigmatising narratives targeting CSOs have persisted. Some attacks involved derogatory rhetoric directed at journalists, including accusations that they were poorly qualified, had pursued personal interests or political agendas in their interviews and public statements, or had links to criminal or terrorist organisations.

During the first round of the elections, one presidential candidate who finished in the top three in the election results [claimed](#) that the director of *IDL-Reporteros*, the host of the *Sin Guión* programme on *La República*, and the director of *La Encerrona* were part of a mafia or “criminal network.” According to the [Press Freedom Thermometer 2026 \(January–May\)](#), the same candidate was identified as one of the main perpetrators of attacks against the press.

In a separate development, a potential risk to press freedom emerged from the public debate over the possible expropriation of certain television channels. An ally of another political party [stated](#) that, if their party won the presidential election, it should “expropriate only the free-to-air television media.”

Furthermore, certain political actors and groups promoted narratives of electoral fraud that questioned the legitimacy of votes from rural and remote areas, including Indigenous communities. This was evident in the controversy surrounding polling stations in the [900,000 series](#), which had been officially established by the National Electoral Processes Office (ONPE) in 2006. These [polling stations](#) were created in remote villages to improve voting access for people living in geographically isolated areas and reduce the need for long journeys to reach polling places. After the first round of the 2026 general elections, however, these polling stations became the target of a [disinformation campaign](#) claiming that they had been recently and irregularly established to facilitate electoral fraud and generate votes in support of Roberto Sánchez, with the aim of enabling him to advance to the second round alongside Keiko Fujimori. The [National Jury of Elections \(JNE\)](#), the [ONPE](#), and [CSOs](#) subsequently clarified that the claim was false and that the polling stations had a legal basis and had existed since 2006.

During the runoff campaign, public debate was heavily influenced by discriminatory, racist, and classist [narratives](#), particularly from citizens in Lima directed at voters from the provinces. These narratives [portrayed them as ignorant](#), diminished the value of their political participation, and sought to [delegitimise their right to vote](#).

5.2 | Perception of civil society and civic engagement

In Peru, although civic education is compulsory during secondary education, its objectives are not being achieved satisfactorily. This may be one of the factors contributing to voting being perceived as the primary form of political participation, with other forms of monitoring and advocacy largely organised around the electoral process and attracting greater participation, particularly among young people.

Peru's persistent political crisis may have significantly weakened citizens' sense of political efficacy and trust in public institutions. According to the [Americas Barometer in Peru 2025/26](#), 80% of Peruvians believe that public authorities do not care about their opinions. This perception may discourage civic participation and engagement, as citizens may feel that their participation has little influence on public decision-making.

At the same time, the data suggest that disengagement is accompanied by a weaker appreciation of some of the rights and freedoms that underpin civic participation. According to the [World Values Survey Peru 2025](#), 27% of respondents considered freedom of expression and publication to be of little or no importance, while 59% believed that the limits on public protests and political opposition are important. These attitudes are particularly relevant, because in the context of the increasingly confrontational narratives directed at CSOs by political actors and the legislative changes affecting civil society described above, they may contribute to citizens legitimising restrictive state measures.

Civic education in Peru places limited emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the National Basic Education Curriculum (CNEB), approved in June 2016 through Ministerial Resolution No. 281-2016, includes the subject [Personal Development, Citizenship and Civic Education \(DPCC\)](#) at the secondary education level. Its core competencies are "Building Identity" and "Living Together and Participating in Democracy."

In 2025, the National Assessment of Student Learning Achievement ([ENLA](#)) was conducted, and, for the first time, it included an assessment of the DPCC course among fifth-grade secondary students who were completing the final year of basic education in Peru. The results showed that only 12% of students achieved a satisfactory level of performance in DPCC, while more than 45% were at the initial or pre-initial level. This suggests that the education provided is not fostering sufficient civic values among young people, which may make the development of civic engagement more challenging in adulthood.

During this election year, the prevailing perception has been that most citizens understand participation primarily as voting in electoral processes. In Peru, voting is compulsory by law for all citizens aged 18 and over and becomes optional from the age of 70, in accordance with [Organic Law No. 26859](#); therefore, voter turnout alone cannot be taken as an indicator of civic engagement. Failure to vote in the general elections results in [financial penalties](#), and higher fines are imposed on citizens who fail to fulfil their mandatory duties as polling station officials.

Still, a share of the population – youth in particular – has taken advantage of the electoral context to engage in volunteer activities. Volunteers from the Asociación Civil Transparencia conducted [electoral observation](#) during both rounds of the general elections. Another example is the ["A vote with purpose"](#) forums organised by Impacta.

However, some panellists considered that the demands of young people are not sufficiently reflected in the agendas of traditional NGOs. As a result, young people have organised

independently to mobilise and call for protests, as was the case with the [protests organised by Generation Z](#) in opposition to the political establishment and in the context of Dina Boluarte's removal from office and José Jerí's assumption of the presidency, as well as the [occupations of campuses by students demanding](#) a greater focus on the right to education.

In addition to pursuing distinct agendas, young people are also using digital spaces to access information and engage in activism. An [article](#) published in the *Journal of Electoral Law, Political Participation and Civic Education* of the National Jury of Elections highlighted the potential of digital spaces to strengthen youth political participation, civic education, monitoring efforts and collective action. This potential of digital spaces was reflected in the [use of the National Jury of Elections' Voto Informado platform](#), which recorded 65,077,571 views during the 2026 general elections. One example from civil society is the [Review Your Candidate](#) (RTC) platform, which provided information on candidates while also creating spaces for dialogue and civic education. However, there is not yet sufficient evidence to assess the impact of these or other information platforms on youth political participation or civic engagement.

5.3 | Civic equality and inclusion

In Peru, Article 2(2) of the [1993 Constitution](#) was designed to promote equality. However, equality continues to face structural and historical challenges.

Although the poverty rate [declined](#) by 1.9 percentage points to 25.7%, this still represents more than one quarter of the national population. Monetary poverty is at the root of a number of significant barriers to equal participation, including unequal access to education, limitations on transportation and unequal internet access. In Peru, the School Life Expectancy indicator, according to the [CEPLAN Observatory](#), increased between 2008 and 2024. However, the gap between urban and rural areas persists: School Life Expectancy increased from 14.2 to 14.8 years in urban areas and from 12.9 to 13.5 years in rural areas. Similarly, during the first quarter of 2026, a [technical report](#) by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) highlighted disparities in household internet access, with only 25% of rural households having access, compared with a national average of 62.7%.

Structural barriers to civic participation are even greater for specific populations such as Indigenous communities, which face additional obstacles including geographical distance, language barriers, the use of highly technical language and systemic discrimination. As mentioned above, participatory processes are primarily held in the capital or in major cities in the regions. This means that Indigenous communities wishing to participate may have to travel long distances using various forms of transportation – including river, land, and air transport – sometimes taking several days to reach their destinations and incurring significant costs.

According to the panellists, most calls for participation, technical documents and consultation materials are disseminated exclusively in Spanish and use highly specialised legal or administrative language, without adequate translation into Indigenous languages such as Shipibo-Konibo, Asháninka, or other languages spoken in the Peruvian Amazon. This situation continues despite the fact that Indigenous languages have official status under the [Constitution](#). In practice, Spanish is given priority because it is the most widely spoken language in the country. Although many Indigenous people are bilingual, they may use their Indigenous language as their first or primary language, while these languages are not regularly used by the state in its interactions with communities.

Public entities located in areas where an Indigenous language predominates are required to issue documents and forms and provide services bilingually, with the same legal validity as those provided in Spanish. According to the panellists, however, these requirements are not

consistently implemented. This further increases the barriers to participation, particularly because these processes often involve technical or academic content that is already difficult to access for people without specialised knowledge. As a result, the combination of linguistic, technical and geographical barriers can significantly reduce the ability of Indigenous communities to participate on an equal footing with other citizens. Similarly, the schedules and modalities used for participatory processes rarely take community calendars or productive activities into consideration.

According to experts, a [notable setback](#) was the [congressional approval](#) of [legislation](#) replacing the gender approach, which was included in the [previous law](#), with an “equal opportunities for women and men” framework. It will also be replaced in the [National Gender Equality Policy](#) (PNIG), which was established through Supreme Decree No. 008-2019-MIMP in April 2019, with the aim of promoting full citizenship for women in all their diversity. The amended law, which takes a biological approach, is insufficient to address inequalities affecting LGBTQI+ populations, as it adopts a cisgender and heteronormative perspective that fails to recognise or adequately address these identities. This change to the law, together with the removal of Comprehensive Sexuality Education from the legal framework, requires the Ministry of Education to replace it with “Sexual Education based on Science, Biology, and Ethics.” Additional setbacks include [Bill No. 11561/2024-CR](#) (Law incorporating Article 402-A into Legislative Decree No. 635 (Criminal Code) and strengthening the administration of justice to sanction false complaints in domestic violence proceedings), and [Bill No. 11786/2024-CR](#) (Law for protection against the simulation of aggression in domestic violence proceedings).

In June 2026 the [Law No. 32671](#) was enacted, designating June as the “Month of Life and the Family,” thereby overshadowing LGBTQIA+ Pride Month and reducing the visibility of LGBTQIA+ rights.


These developments represent significant setbacks to rights that have been secured by feminist and LGBTQIA+ civil society after years of advocacy and mobilisation. The state’s failure to recognise and give visibility to their agendas and identities risks undermining the participatory spaces they have gained over time. It also jeopardises the implementation of the [National Gender Equality Policy](#), which incorporated civil society participation during its development and includes measures that require civil society to participate in or contribute to their implementation.

Since 2021, racist and classist narratives have increasingly contributed to social division in Peru. In the context of social protests, some public authorities have generalised and stigmatised Indigenous peoples and peasant communities by labelling them as “terrorists,” “Shining Path supporters,” “Indians,” and other derogatory terms. In the context of the 2022–2023 protests, one of the most serious incidents of excessive use of force by the police was the [Juliaca Massacre](#). Referring to this and other cases, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Commissioner for Peru [stated](#) that the country exhibited “strong stigmatisation based on ethnic, racial, and regional factors.” In 2026, an example of continued police harassment against the relatives of victims and civil society participants in the [March of Sacrifice – Uyariy](#). During the march, participants reported in January that a [police patrol vehicle](#) had continuously followed them during their journey, the [detention](#) of two individuals without justification, as well as [eight identity checks](#) conducted on family members while they travelled to the capital.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

6. Access to a Secure Digital Environment

Score:



Peru has established legal frameworks to protect digital rights, privacy, and cybersecurity, and does not generally impose nationwide internet shutdowns or systematic restrictions on online access. However, significant concerns remain regarding disinformation, selective disruptions of communications during protests, broad state surveillance powers and recurring data protection breaches. At the same time, persistent digital divides, particularly affecting rural, Indigenous, low-income, and marginalized communities, continue to restrict equal access to information, online participation, public services, and civic engagement, undermining the inclusiveness of Peru's digital civic space.

6.1 | Digital rights and freedoms

Since 2022, the [Peruvian Digital Rights Charter](#) has been in force, while since 2013, [Law No. 30096](#) has provided a legal framework for addressing cybercrime. With regard to internet shutdowns, Peru does not experience nationwide internet shutdowns or systematic blocking of CSOs or citizens from accessing the internet. However, other challenges remain insufficiently addressed, including the spread of disinformation, the blocking of mobile phones in the context of protests, and the monitoring of journalists in relation to information they disseminate online. These practices and events can restrict digital rights, particularly the right to access information and the freedom to use digital spaces for activism and civic participation.

The state's capacity to regulate and respond to challenges such as deepfakes, fake news, AI-enabled extortion and hate speech disseminated through social media remains limited. According to the National Jury of Elections, 67% of citizens have believed a [false news](#) story at least once. During the electoral period, it identified more than [700 cases of disinformation](#).

During the Generation Z protests between September and November 2025, [selective suspension](#) of mobile phone lines belonging to journalists, activists and individuals involved in organising demonstrations was documented. On 19 September, more than 50 activists and social leaders woke up to find that their [mobile phone lines had been blocked](#). According to the telecommunications operators, someone had impersonated them and reported their SIM cards as stolen, resulting in both the SIM cards and devices being deactivated and leaving those affected unable to communicate. According to the information provided by those affected, it took approximately one day to reactivate their lines.

Among those affected were a leader of the PUCP Student Federation and a representative of the Association of Families of Victims Killed in Juliaca, who [reported](#) that they were unable to make calls on 19 and 20 September. The FEPUC representative [stated](#) that the measure also affected at least 15 other university students with whom she was organising protests. She stated that, in her view, the purpose of the measure was to cut off their means of communication and prevent them from participating in protests against the proposed reforms. Those affected subsequently denounced the incident publicly and indicated that they would file a formal complaint against the regulatory authority for failing to disclose who had requested the blocking of their lines.

There is also continued uncertainty regarding the scope of the APCI Law, particularly concerning the possibility that its supervisory and oversight powers could be used to scrutinise the content of social media accounts.

6.2 | Digital security and privacy

Peru's [National Digital Transformation Policy](#) includes a Digital Security and Trust indicator, which shows significant differences in implementation between the two levels of government measured. Among ministries in the executive branch, the implementation rate for digital security incident response teams is 89.47%, while the implementation of information security management systems is 100%. In contrast, regional governments report implementation rates of 65.38% and 29.92%, respectively. This disparity indicates that digital security capacities remain considerably weaker at the decentralised level, particularly in the implementation of information security management systems.

Although no malware or spyware attacks specifically targeting CSOs have been identified, two significant digital security concerns remain in Peru: the use of geolocation tracking and communications interception, which are subject to a regulatory framework that does not provide sufficient safeguards, and the occurrence of data breaches. These vulnerabilities can expose civil society actors and their personal or organisational information to unauthorised access, particularly where institutional security capacities and oversight mechanisms remain uneven.

In May 2026, a civil society organisation submitted a contribution on the Peruvian context to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The contribution mentioned the [Legislative Decree 1182](#), which allows the geolocation of any individual by the Peruvian National Police without prior judicial authorisation and even without prior prosecutorial request, requiring only a request from the police itself. Peru's legal framework and state practices create conditions that may [facilitate surveillance](#) of human rights defenders and undermine fundamental rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. Broadly defined legal provisions governing geolocation tracking and communications interception expand the powers available to public authorities to monitor individuals and create an environment in which civil society actors may be subject to surveillance. The risks are heightened by the limited access to information on these practices, including when such information is requested directly.

These concerns were highlighted in the report [Watched in Secret: Norms, Practices and Silences in Access to Public Information on Surveillance](#), which documents restrictions on access to information concerning surveillance practices. Although the report does not document a specific case of surveillance of a civil society actor, it identifies how legal and institutional practices can create conditions for the use of surveillance tools with limited transparency and oversight. This creates an adverse environment for human rights defenders and may discourage civic participation, particularly where the imbalance of power between state authorities and civil society generates fear of reprisals.

During 2026, one case of surveillance was identified: the director of the newspaper *Luz Verde* in Iquitos, a member of the Amazonian Anti-Corruption Journalists' Network, reported on alleged corruption in Loreto as a correspondent for the digital news outlet *Epicentro TV*. She was allegedly subjected to [surveillance and tracking activities](#) near her home, according to reports from local residents. The journalist publicly stated that she did not feel protected by the authorities and expressed distrust in existing state protection mechanisms. As a result, she did not file a formal complaint.

Regarding the processing of personal data, Peru does not have specific regulations that provide protection to CSOs; however, it does have a [Personal Data Protection Law, accompanying regulations](#), a [Methodology](#) for Calculating Fines in Personal Data Protection Matters published on 31 December 2025, and the National Authority for Personal Data Protection (ANPDP). Nevertheless, the institutions responsible for data protection lack sufficient resources and reach, limiting their effectiveness.

The digital landscape in Peru continues to face serious challenges related to data breaches: One of the most recent incidents involved the state's technological platform SISMATE, used to disseminate early warning alerts. In May 2026, the system was [hacked](#) using a known form of cyberattack called spoofing, in which false notifications were sent in large numbers while being made to appear as if they were issued by an official entity. The messages were sent via SMS and [contained a warning](#) of a supposed magnitude 8.7 earthquake off Peru's central coast. The message also included the phrases "electoral fraud" and "Don't turn a blind eye."

Although authorities explained that the perpetrators already had access to the recipients' phone numbers and that the system was used to distribute the message on a mass scale, the available information only establishes that individuals involved in the attack had access to citizens' phone numbers; it does not establish who was behind the attack or their motives. Nevertheless, the references to electoral fraud and the phrase "Don't turn a blind eye," in the context of the period preceding the second-round election, could be interpreted as an attempt to reinforce fraud narratives, sow confusion, and undermine trust in electoral institutions and CSOs that had publicly explained why the allegations of electoral fraud lacked evidence. Another example of a serious data breach was the case of a media outlet that publicly denounced and exposed a municipality's data breach – involving the disclosure of tax information and sensitive personal data belonging to approximately 60,000 individuals – which led the municipality to begin [legal proceedings against](#) the outlet.

The digital landscape in Peru is also facing serious challenges related to the [commercialisation of personal information](#), particularly through platforms such as Telegram, where personal data is frequently used for [extortion schemes](#).

On 13 February 2026, an amendment to cybercrime Law No. 30096 was published in *El Peruano* through [Legislative Decree No. 1741](#). The decree clarifies an exemption from criminal liability related to the acquisition, possession and exchange of digital data. This amendment followed the prior introduction of an offence penalising the illicit trafficking of data used for extortion, among other purposes. Under the revised text, criminal liability does not apply when such activities occur within legitimate operations of the securities, financial, pension and insurance sectors, provided there is no intent of unlawful gain or improper commercialisation.

6.3 | Digital accessibility

Despite significant progress in expanding internet access in Peru, substantial digital divides persist, particularly affecting rural populations, Indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and low-income communities. The digital divide therefore remains a significant barrier to civic participation, limiting people's ability to access public information and participate in consultations, accountability processes, and other opportunities for engagement with public authorities.

The [National Institute of Statistics and Informatics](#) (INEI) reported that, during the fourth quarter of 2025, 60.1% of households had an internet connection, with access reaching 78.2% in Metropolitan Lima but only 23.4% in rural areas.

The experience of the Forest Anti-Corruption Network (RAF) in Loreto, an Amazonian region, illustrates the challenges posed by limited connectivity. Loreto has the [lowest average](#) 4G mobile internet performance in the country, at 72.29%, compared with the national average of 79.47%. The 4G mobile internet performance is measured using five indicators: upload speeds, download speeds, latency, packet loss and coverage time. This is the [region](#) with the highest packet loss rate (2.62%, compared to the national average of 0.7%). Packet loss occurs when mobile data sent or received does not reach its destination, which can result in intermittent connectivity, delays, or disruptions. Loreto also has the highest latency, at 73.92 milliseconds (ms), compared to the national average of 54.06 ms. For video calls, good and stable latency should generally be below 50 ms. Some RAF members are only able to access or download information during specific hours due to low-quality internet connectivity, which affects their ability to participate in training activities. The digital divide may increase the costs of civil society projects, as unstable connectivity often requires in-person activities and the allocation of resources for travel. It may also entail additional expenses for equipment and supplementary internet services.

The digital access and connectivity gap, together with the insufficient integration of technology into education and training, are some of the [causes](#) of the gap in digital literacy, including basic skills in information technologies and the use of AI. This gap limits access to educational platforms, remote-work applications, and digital government services, with negative effects on social, economic and institutional development.

The digital literacy gap is closely linked to widening inequalities and the risk that certain groups may be excluded from the benefits of the digital transformation. According to the CEPLAN Observatory, one of the challenges identified for CSOs is the difficulty in exercising rights and participating in consultation and deliberation processes conducted through digital platforms. This negative impact is further compounded by the growing use of AI in public services, including the [justice](#) sector, while citizens have limited capacity to understand, evaluate and engage with these technologies, potentially widening existing inequalities.

C) Recommendations

1. To the government of Peru

To the executive branch

- Urge public authorities to refrain from using stigmatising rhetoric and to publicly recognise the fundamental role of CSOs in the protection of human rights. Likewise, all three branches of government should remind the public that discrimination in all its forms is prohibited and punishable by law. It is essential to eliminate racist, classist, xenophobic, and anti-LGBTQIA+ narratives from public discourse in Peru.
- All public officials, including those in the executive branch, must act in accordance with the [Code of Ethics for Public Service](#), which establishes respect for the constitution and the laws as one of its guiding principles. Under this premise, public servants must act in accordance with the rights of citizens and civil society. Accordingly, discrimination of any kind is prohibited. Therefore, it is recommended that the executive branch develop protocols or codes of conduct for its staff to discourage the use of discriminatory and stigmatising language.
- Improve mechanisms for proactive transparency and accountability, ensuring compliance at all levels of government, as well as the effective implementation of decisions issued by administrative appeal bodies.
- Ensure that participatory processes are inclusive and culturally appropriate, with particular attention to historically excluded populations. Digital technologies should be used appropriately, ensuring that they facilitate citizens' participation and access to public processes rather than creating additional barriers.
- Reduce the digital divide and strengthen access to the internet, particularly in rural and Indigenous areas, not only by improving connectivity but also by promoting digital literacy.
- It is recommended that Law No. 32301 be repealed or, alternatively, that clear guidance be issued on the application of its provisions, particularly regarding the interpretation of articles that contain vague or ambiguous language. From an operational perspective, greater clarity is also needed regarding the reporting requirements applicable to nonprofit organisations. Finally, the sanctions applicable to each type of infringement should be clearly defined to ensure that they are proportionate to the severity of the infraction. In particular, minor infringements should not result in the most severe sanctions, in accordance with constitutional safeguards.
- The Intersectoral Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders should be strengthened, not only through increased funding but also by enhancing its capacity to be deployed rapidly and expanding its territorial presence. These measures are

essential to ensure effective protection for human rights defenders, particularly Indigenous environmental defenders.

- States of emergency should be declared only when accompanied by concrete measures capable of generating a measurable impact on insecurity. Exceptional measures should not be extended indefinitely when they fail to produce tangible results in addressing the problems they are intended to tackle.

To the legislative branch

- Senators and deputies must comply with the Code of Ethics for Public Service and the [Rules of Congress](#), which establish in Article 117(e), concerning the principle of respect: “Their conduct and relations with other parliamentarians, staff, and citizens in general must take place in an appropriate and harmonious working environment, promoting due attention, respect, and courtesy.”
- Repeal Law No. 32301 and reform the regulations of the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation in order to eliminate the disproportionate restrictions, prior conformity requirements, and excessive sanctions that currently limit the autonomy of CSOs, violate freedom of association, and hinder access to international remedies, thus guaranteeing a legal environment that allows them to operate freely, independently and without fear of reprisals
- Repeal Law No. 32735 and ensure that ordinary crimes committed by members of the National Police and the Armed Forces remain under the jurisdiction of the ordinary justice system. Also repeal Law No. 32291, which expands police power to use lethal force.
- Repeal the regulatory framework setbacks related to gender equality and LGBTQIA+ rights.
- Likewise, the regulatory framework must be strengthened to guarantee the protection of personal data and the safe participation of citizens in the digital space.

To the judiciary

- Continue monitoring the implementation of the APCI Law and intervene whenever it is applied in a manner that is inconsistent with the constitution.
- Continue overseeing the application of military and police jurisdiction to ensure that it is not applied beyond its constitutionally permitted scope and that it does not lead to impunity in cases involving human rights violations.
- Strengthen procedural guarantees against the criminalisation of protest and the excessive use of public force through the implementation of institutional protocols aligned with the standards of the Inter-American Human Rights System, while ensuring full respect for freedom of assembly.

2. To donors and the international community

- Maintain and, where possible, increase flexible, multi-year funding to Peruvian CSOs, prioritising those working with marginalised or historically excluded communities, in order to sustain long-term advocacy, monitoring, and capacity-building efforts.
- Support initiatives aimed at strengthening the institutional resilience of CSOs. In addition, promote funding opportunities more broadly through accessible and user-

friendly formats, while providing greater transparency regarding the number of grants or projects available under each call for proposals.

- Facilitate knowledge exchange and peer-learning between Peruvian CSOs and counterparts in other countries, particularly on best practices for operating in restrictive environments, building coalitions and engaging in evidence-based advocacy.
- Continue diplomatic engagement and public statements in defence of civic space and fundamental rights in Peru, especially on freedom of expression, Indigenous environmental defenders' rights and women and LGBTQIA+ rights.

3. To CSOs

- Strengthen internal governance, transparency, and accountability mechanisms to reinforce public trust and demonstrate the sector's commitment to ethical standards and integrity. This should include enhancing administrative and legal capacities to avoid sanctions, and improving knowledge of available appeal mechanisms and the procedures for using them effectively.
 - Enhance information-sharing on the implementation and enforcement of APCI regulations to support CSOs in identifying and mitigating compliance-related risks arising from limited transparency in government oversight.
 - Develop coordinated advocacy strategies and joint platforms to present unified positions on civic space issues, amplify their influence, and reduce fragmentation within the sector.
 - Monitor government progress and setbacks, actively participate in public consultation processes, and demand accountability with regard to how authorities consider and respond to the contributions received through these participatory mechanisms.
 - Diversify funding sources through own-initiative economic activities aimed at improving the organisation's sustainability, thereby reducing the vulnerability of their teams to fluctuations in external funding.
 - Strengthen organisational capacities in the use of digital technologies, including AI, while enhancing cybersecurity measures to address digital threats such as malware and spyware. CSOs should also adopt robust personal data protection practices when managing information relating to their staff, partners and beneficiaries.
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D) Research Process

Each principle encompasses various dimensions which are assessed and aggregated to provide quantitative scores per principle. These scores reflect the degree to which the environment within the country enables or disables the work of civil society. Scores are on a five-category scale defined as: fully disabling (1), disabling (2), partially enabling (3), enabling (4), and fully enabling (5). To complement the scores, this report provides a narrative analysis of the enabling or disabling environment for civil society, identifying strengths and weaknesses as well as offering recommendations. The process of drafting the analysis is led by Network Members; the consortium provides quality control and editorial oversight before publication.

For Principle 1, which evaluates respect for and protection of freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the score integrates data from the [CIVICUS Monitor](#). However, for Principles 2–6, the availability of yearly updated external quantitative indicators for the 86 countries part of the EUSEE programme are either limited or non-existent. To address this, Network Members convene a panel of representatives of civil society and experts once a year. This panel uses a set of guiding questions to assess the status of each principle and its dimensions within the country. This report has the collaboration of Patricia Pinto (Descosur), Jimena Sánchez (Asociación Educativa Hispanoamericana), Daniel Yovera (Epicentro TV), Ana Gonzales (Impacta), Carol Mora (Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental), Diana Suárez (Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental) and Magaly Avila (Proética). **The panel for this report was convened in June.**

The discussions are supported by secondary sources, such as [V-Dem](#), the [Bertelsmann Stiftung Governance Index](#), the [Right to Information Rating from the Centre for Law and Democracy](#), and other trusted resources. These sources provide benchmarks for measuring similar dimensions and are complemented by primary data collection and other secondary sources of information available for the country. Guided by these deliberations, the panel assigns scores for each dimension, which the Network Members submit to the Consortium, accompanied by detailed justifications that reflect the country's specific context. To determine a single score per principle, the scores assigned to each dimension are aggregated using a weighted average, reflecting the relative importance of each dimension within the principle. This approach balances diverse perspectives while maintaining a structured and objective evaluation framework.

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