



SUPPORTING
AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Enabling Environment Snapshot

Chad

July 2026

Context

Reporting Period: December 2025 - July 2026

Chad's civil society operates within a complex political and legal environment marked by ongoing democratic transition, security challenges, and restrictions on civic space. On 3 October 2025, the Chadian Parliament adopted a [constitutional amendment](#) removing the limit on the number of presidential terms and extending the presidential term to seven years, renewable indefinitely – a reform described by Human Rights Watch as a “serious setback for the rule of law”. The ruling party (MPS) retains a large majority in the National Assembly, which was constituted in February 2025 (124 seats out of 188). Inter-communal violence has also escalated, notably with the [Mandakao massacre](#) (Western Logone) in May 2025, which left more than 40 people dead, followed by the [sentencing](#) of former Prime Minister and opposition figure Succès Masra [to 20 years' imprisonment](#) and the [dissolution of several civil society organisations](#) (AJADR, CONAJEPDT) in June 2025. In April 2026, the Supreme Court [dissolved](#) the Consultative Group of Political Actors (GCAP), a coalition of opposition parties and civil society organisations; nine leaders were arrested ahead of a banned peaceful march, and eight were subsequently sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. A [state of emergency](#) was also declared on 7 May 2026 in the Lac province following attacks by Boko Haram that claimed the lives of several dozen soldiers. Whilst N'Djamena remains relatively unscathed according to several respondents, insecurity is rife in Lac, BET, Tibesti, Mayo-Kebbi, Moyen-Chari and Logones, as well as in towns such as Korbol, Zouar and Korotoro, where highway robbers and conflicts between farmers and herders are hampering movement and the work of CSOs. CSOs also remain heavily dependent on external funding, which has been declining since several donors withdrew their support in 2025–2026.

1. Respect and protection of fundamental freedoms

Despite the constitutional guarantees set out in Article 28, civil society actors in Chad operate in a climate of fear, exacerbated by the constitutional amendment of October 2025, which extends the presidential term indefinitely. The human rights defenders interviewed cite arbitrary arrests by the intelligence services, death threats, abduction, torture, revocation of nationality and forced exile as the main risks, with some reporting the infiltration of authorised CSOs by intelligence agents. The revocation of Charfadine Galmaye's nationality, as well as the cases of trade unionist Faustin Djimoudeul (SIET), the Association of Victims of Hissène Habré and the Chadian Human Rights League, illustrate these risks. Journalists Olivier Mbaindinguim Monodji and Mahamat Saleh Al Hisseine were [arrested in March 2025](#) for alleged collusion with the Wagner Group. Following the Mandakao massacre, the N'Djamena public prosecutor [threatened to prosecute any journalist](#) conducting a ‘parallel investigation’, and Reporters Without Borders has since [documented increased surveillance of journalists](#). Peaceful demonstrations continue to be systematically banned when deemed political. In April 2026, nine GCAP leaders [were arrested ahead](#) of a march banned by the Supreme Court, and eight were subsequently sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. Demonstrations organised by the collective of prize-winners, teacher-training colleges or the trade union face similar restrictions, whilst pro-government rallies remain permitted. Chad scores just [15 out of 100 on the 2025 Freedom House index](#). Several interviewees report a steady deterioration in freedom of expression over the past twelve months.

2. Supportive legal and regulatory framework

The legal framework governing civil society remains restrictive. [Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018](#) requires prior ministerial authorisation, criminalises the existence of unauthorised associations (Articles 31 and 32) and prohibits coalitions between political parties and civil society organisations. In practice, the majority of those interviewed noted that pro-government associations are registered quickly, whereas others face very long delays or even have their applications blocked. Ordinances 009, 010 and 011/PT/2023 on demonstrations have a deterrent effect, according to several consistent accounts. On 26 June 2025, the Ministry of Territorial Administration [dissolved the AJADR and the CONAJEPDT](#) on the grounds of ‘procedural irregularities’ according to one of the interviewees, and [banned the activities of the Mouvement Citoyen Le Temps and the political wing of Wakit Tama](#). In April 2026, the Supreme Court similarly [dissolved the GCAP](#) prior to the sentencing of eight of its leaders to eight years’ imprisonment. According to the majority of respondents, the international instruments ratified by Chad remain largely unenforced. Protection institutions (the National Human Rights Commission, the Ombudsman) are regarded by most interviewees as ineffective and dependent on the state, although some consider them accessible and effective. A draft law on the protection of human rights defenders has been stalled in discussions for several months, with no known timetable for its adoption.

3. Accessible and sustainable resources

Chadian CSOs remain heavily reliant on external funding (the European Union, AFD, GIZ, Misereor, Secours Catholique, the Dutch Embassy, the French Embassy, PPLM, Expertise France, OHCHR, UNDP, NED, IOM), which is mainly mobilised through calls for proposals. Internal resources (membership fees, donations, fundraising) remain marginal. The ability to draft project proposals, the technical complexity of the reports required by donors, and administrative and tax obligations limit access to funding for many organisations, particularly those outside N’Djamena.

Several partners reduced or ceased their support in 2025–2026: the US Embassy and USAID ended their funding, the NED also ceased its support, whilst the OHCHR, AFD, IOM and the World Bank reduced theirs, further weakening organisations that were already understaffed. There is no tax mechanism to encourage local philanthropy, and the [legal framework](#) does not facilitate the mobilisation of domestic resources. This structural dependence exposes Chadian CSOs to the volatility of donors’ priorities and threatens the sustainability of several human rights and peace-building initiatives.

4. Open and responsive state

Consultations between the state and civil society do take place but remain largely formal: several respondents report that CSOs are only consulted ‘at the last minute’. Since the end of the pre-dialogue that preceded the 2022 inclusive and sovereign national dialogue, the executive branch has regarded CSOs as apolitical, which, according to several respondents, explains the lack of institutionalised dialogue between the state and civil society. Certain frameworks do, however, function, such as the inter-ministerial committee for monitoring international agreements led by the Ministry of Justice, or coalitions such as the Coalition Against Impunity, ‘Tournons la page’ or the CCOSC; a positive example of concrete collaboration is cited at Mont de Lam, where the authorities were involved in the design of a protection project. Chad has no [law on access to information](#): regulatory texts and budget reports remain largely inaccessible outside a restricted circle. Organisations aligned with the official line are more closely involved than independent, feminist or youth-led voices.

5. Supportive public culture and discourses on civil society

The authorities publicly portray independent civil society as a threat to public order whenever it deviates from the official line. The [warning](#) issued by the N'Djamena public prosecutor against ‘parallel investigations’ into the Mandakao massacre and the [warning from the High Authority](#) for Media and Audiovisual Affairs regarding ‘media excesses’ illustrate this institutional mistrust. The role of civil society is not included in the national curriculum. Pro-Russian and anti-French disinformation campaigns are helping to polarise public opinion. Women’s participation [is](#) progressing in fits and starts: the [Chadian League for Women’s Rights organised a sit-in in January 2025](#) to denounce a gang rape, which received extensive media coverage. The views of those interviewed differ on the representation of women in CSOs: some consider it encouraging and supported by quota mechanisms, whilst others believe that women leaders are under-represented and face persistent stereotypes. Organisations defending the rights of people with disabilities, such as UNAPHT, also report significant progress in the recognition of their rights, within a civic space that is otherwise highly constrained. Young people’s engagement remains largely exploited for political ends, characterised, according to some respondents, by intergenerational conflict within human rights organisations themselves, despite United Nations Resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security.

6. Access to a secure digital environment

Access to a secure digital environment remains very limited. Internet penetration in Chad, which is among the lowest in the world, [stands at around 12–13 per cent](#), with significant disparities between N'Djamena and rural areas where the network is unreliable and expensive, particularly in towns such as Korbol, Zouar and Korotoro, as mentioned by those interviewed. As a landlocked country, Chad relies on land-based connections with Cameroon and Sudan, which undermines its digital resilience. Internet outages are a recurring problem: the Lac province has been without a connection since 2024, a situation exacerbated by [the closure of borders](#) and the curfew imposed during the state of emergency declared on 7 May 2026 following attacks by Boko Haram. A [nationwide outage](#) also left 4.18 million users without internet access for nearly 24 hours in October 2025.

CSOs and human rights defenders report regular digital surveillance, hacking and online harassment; some use VPNs or encryption tools, but these remain costly and unfamiliar to the majority of organisations, particularly in regional areas.

Challenges and Opportunities

Over the next six months, Chadian civil society is likely to continue to face the implementation of Ordinances 009, 010 and 011 of 2023 and Ordinance 023/2018, the institutional deadlock following the constitutional amendment of October 2025, the deterrent effect of the dissolution of the GCAP, and the consequences of the withdrawal of funding (USAID, NED, IOM). The absence of a law on the protection of human rights defenders and digital instability remain major obstacles.

Opportunities do, however, exist: the draft law on the protection of human rights defenders, although stalled, remains under discussion and could be revived through coordinated advocacy; the inter-ministerial committee for monitoring international agreements offers a point of entry for enhanced dialogue with the state; and several interviewees call on CSOs to work more collaboratively and to diversify their internal funding sources to reduce their dependence on external donors.

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