

Indonesia

Country Focus Report

2026



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A) An Introduction to the Enabling Environment

What we understand by an Enabling Environment is the combination of laws, rules and social attitudes that support and promote the work of civil society. Within such an environment, civil society can engage in political and public life without fear of reprisals, openly express its views, and actively participate in shaping its context. This includes a supportive legal and regulatory framework for civil society, ensuring access to information and resources that are sustainable and flexible to pursue their goals unhindered, in safe physical and digital spaces. In an enabling environment, the state demonstrates openness and responsiveness in governance, promoting transparency, accountability, and inclusive decision-making. Positive values, norms, attitudes, and practices towards civil society from state and non-state actors further underscore the supportive environment.

To capture the state of the Enabling Environment, we use the following six principles:

SIX ENABLING PRINCIPLES



Respect and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms



Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework



Accessible and Sustainable Resources



Open and Responsive State



Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society



Access to a Secure Digital Environment

In this Country Focus Report, each enabling principle is assessed with a quantitative score and complemented by an analysis and recommendations written by our Network Members. Rather than offering a singular index to rank countries, the report aims to measure the enabling environment for civil society across the 6 principles, discerning dimensions of strength and those requiring attention.


The findings presented in this report are grounded in the insights and diverse perspectives of civil society actors who came together in a dedicated panel with representatives from civil society to discuss and evaluate the state of the Enabling Environment. Their collective input enriches the report with a grounded, participatory assessment. This primary input is further supported by secondary sources of information, which provide additional context and strengthen the analysis.

Reporting period covered: May 2025 – June 2026

Brief Overview of the Country Context

President Prabowo Subianto's administration is characterised by an unprecedented consolidation of political power. The inclusion of most major political parties in the governing coalition has substantially diminished effective political opposition, thereby weakening democratic oversight and institutional checks on executive authority. Concurrently, the expanded involvement [of military actors in civilian](#) affairs, the appointment of politically connected individuals to strategic positions, and the erosion of merit-based recruitment have reinforced perceptions of centralisation of power and patronage-driven governance.

During 2025–2026, Indonesia experienced repeated waves of public protest in response to contentious legislation, governance reforms, and socioeconomic grievances. These mobilisations signalled escalating public frustration not only with specific policies but also with declining transparency, limited accountability, and reduced opportunities for meaningful participation in public decision-making. State responses to dissent increasingly included intimidation, criminalisation, excessive use of force, surveillance, online harassment, and efforts to delegitimise critics as threats to stability, development, or national interests. These challenges have been compounded by rising economic uncertainty, as the rupiah declined by more than seven percent and became [one of Asia's worst-performing currencies in 2026](#).



Recent trends indicate that the environment for civil society in Indonesia has also become increasingly constrained. [V-Dem data reveal](#) that both the Core Civil Society Index (CCSI) and the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) declined to their lowest levels since 2000 in 2025. Although Indonesia achieved significant democratic progress following the 1998 Reformasi period, the persistent decline since the mid-2010s reflects mounting restrictions on civic space and weakened mechanisms for democratic accountability. The concurrent deterioration of both indices underscores broader concerns about democratic backsliding, including reduced civil society autonomy, diminished civic participation, and heightened challenges to political freedoms, electoral competitiveness, and independent public scrutiny.

These developments are particularly significant given the long-standing role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in [Indonesia's democratic and developmental trajectory](#). CSOs have served as key actors in promoting accountability, [transparency, civic participation, and policy reform](#), as well as advancing [peacebuilding, gender equality, environmental protection, climate action, indigenous rights, the inclusion of marginalised groups](#), and a broad spectrum of social, economic, and governance issues.


This Country Focus Report evaluates the state of civic space in Indonesia from May 2025 to May 2026 using the six dimensions of the Civil Society Enabling Environment Framework. The findings reveal a widening gap between constitutional guarantees and the lived experiences of civil society actors and citizens. In the absence of substantive reforms to safeguard civic space, Indonesia risks further democratic backsliding and a gradual reversion to authoritarian governance.

B) Assessment of the Enabling Environment

PRINCIPLE SCORE

1. Respect and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms

Score: 2.7/5 ¹



“The criminalisation of dissent, together with surveillance and intimidation, contributes to a broader climate of fear and self-censorship among civil society actors.”

Indonesia’s civic space remains classified as ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor, with a score of 42, a status unchanged since 2018. While freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression are [formally guaranteed](#), developments during May 2025–2026 reflect a measurable and accelerating deterioration in their practical exercise.

Human rights defenders, environmental activists, Indigenous leaders, and civil society organisations (CSOs) faced increasing surveillance, arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and violence. In [conflict-affected areas such as West Papua](#), where a long-running armed conflict and heightened militarisation have created a particularly restrictive environment for civic space, human rights defenders and Indigenous leaders face increased risks. Environmental defenders involved in disputes over mining and natural resources have also increasingly been targeted. In late 2025, [Apolos Sroyer](#), Chair of the Biak Customary Council, was reportedly monitored and intimidated in Papua. Around the same time, activists [Adetya Pramandira and Fathul Munif](#) were arrested on charges of incitement and alleged violations of the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law. On 30 December 2025, Greenpeace Indonesia activist [Iqbal Damanik](#) received a threat involving a dead chicken carcass. In 2026, environmental activist [Arlan Dahrin](#) was arrested during a mining conflict, KontraS activist

¹This is a rebased score derived from the [CIVICUS Monitor rating](#) published in December 2025.

[Andrie Yunus](#) suffered an acid attack, and the [National Committee for West Papua \(KNPB\)](#)'s office was targeted by attempted arson and a suspected drone explosion.

A particularly concerning trend was the growing use of agenda co-optation and informal coercion. Under the pretext of maintaining national stability, loosely organised groups with paramilitary characteristics increasingly engaged in intimidating or confronting critical CSOs. This development reflects a broader shift toward informal authoritarian practices, in which pressure and intimidation are exerted not only by formal state institutions but also by non-state or loosely affiliated societal actors operating with limited accountability.

Several incidents exemplify this pattern. In June 2026, hundreds of protesters from [Front Persaudaraan Muslim Indonesia \(FPMI\)](#) and [Lingkar Muda Indonesia](#) demonstrated outside the office of Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI). They accused YLBHI of politicising human rights issues and questioned the organisation's foreign funding transparency amid increasing public narratives portraying CSOs as "foreign agents." The demonstration took place while YLBHI was actively advocating on politically sensitive issues, including the assault case involving activist Andrie Yunus allegedly linked to Indonesian Armed Forces State Intelligence Agency (BAIS) personnel, judicial review efforts against the revised [Indonesian National Armed Forces \(TNI\) Law](#), and cases of police violence. By portraying YLBHI as politically motivated and foreign-funded during its advocacy on these issues, the protest contributed to broader efforts to delegitimise and intimidate critical civil society organisations.

Similarly, during the [Yogyakarta protests in February 2026](#), unidentified groups conducted sweeps against demonstrators, with one individual reportedly stating affiliation with an organisation whose name "had not yet been decided," as shared by a panellist. These incidents indicate a deliberate strategy to manufacture polarisation and thereby delegitimise and intimidate critical civil society actors.

Panellists from environmental and human rights organisations also reported heightened surveillance and intimidation. During the North Sumatra ecological disaster in November 2025, a local CSO that connected corporate activities to worsening environmental conditions reportedly received messages from individuals claiming military affiliation, who questioned the organisation's data and legitimacy. In Sulawesi, CSOs critical of state violence against protest movements reported repeated monitoring by unidentified individuals near their offices during advocacy activities. While these incidents did not always escalate into formal repression, they contributed to a broader climate of fear, intimidation, and self-censorship among civil society actors.

In the agrarian sector, [the Agrarian Reform Consortium \(KPA\) reported](#) at least 736 victims of violence and criminalisation in agrarian conflict areas in 2025, representing a 32 percent increase from 2024. This figure includes 404 cases of criminalisation, 312 physical assaults, 19 shootings, and one death. Military involvement in agrarian conflicts increased by 300 percent, rising from six cases in 2024 to twenty-four in 2025. This trend reflects the Prabowo–Gibran administration's expanded deployment of military personnel in civilian domains such as food security, plantation investment, and the enforcement of forest area regulations.

Restrictions on peaceful assembly remained severe. Investigation by [Amnesty International in December 2025](#) documented excessive use of force by security forces during the August 2025 protests, including beatings and disproportionate use of water cannon and tear gas against demonstrators. In February 2026, the [Fact-Finding Commission \(KPF\)](#) documented the arrest

of at least 6,719 people in connection with the protests, along with 13 civilian deaths and 703 political detainees, marking the largest wave of activist persecution since the 1998 Reformasi. Similar patterns persisted into 2026. [Security forces repeatedly dispersed peaceful gatherings](#), conducted arbitrary arrests, and used intimidation and physical violence against activists and students in Jayapura, Papua. This incident indicates that the right to peaceful assembly remains vulnerable to both direct state repression and interference by non-state actors.

Freedom of expression also came under increasing pressure, both offline and online. Governance trends have been marked by greater executive control over the information environment, reinforced by close relationships between political and media elites and the growing use of legal and digital regulations to constrain critical voices. Journalists increasingly faced physical attacks alongside doxxing, cyberattacks, SLAPPs, character assassination campaigns, and costly legal proceedings intended to deter investigative reporting and public criticism.

Repression also increasingly extended into the digital sphere, where online harassment, gender-based online violence, criminalisation under the ITE Law, and digital attacks against activists and journalists further restricted civic space and press freedom. These developments have coincided with a marked deterioration in press freedom. Indonesia's ranking in the [RSF World Press Freedom Index](#) declined from 111th in 2024 to 127th in 2025 and 129th out of 180 in 2026, with a score of 43.02. The [Alliance of Independent Journalists \(AJI\) documented](#) 89 cases of violence against journalists and media organisations between January and December 2025. Police officers were identified as perpetrators in 21 cases, while military personnel were implicated in six. The largest category comprised 29 cases perpetrated by unidentified actors, many associated with digital attacks, intimidation, and terror tactics, indicating that perpetrators increasingly operate anonymously. These incidents occurred nationwide, including in Sorong, Ambon, Kendari, Makassar, Lombok, Medan, Aceh, and Bali, demonstrating that threats to press freedom are not limited to major urban centres but constitute a national concern.

Several cases exemplify the increasingly hostile environment confronting journalists. [On 11 December 2025](#), Kompas TV Aceh journalist Davi Abdullah was intimidated by a senior military officer while covering disaster response operations at Sultan Iskandar Muda Air Force Base. His mobile phone was confiscated, video recordings were forcibly deleted, and he was subjected to threats and verbal abuse. Similarly, on [25 December 2025](#), AJI Lhokseumawe journalist Muhammad Fazil had his phone forcibly seized and damaged by a military officer while documenting alleged violence during a peaceful protest in North Aceh. Additional incidents included intimidation of journalists covering international aid distribution, deletion of news content, and suspension of live broadcasts from disaster sites. These actions not only obstructed journalistic work but also undermined the public's right to access information and contributed to the dissemination of official narratives that could not be independently verified. The space for critical cultural and academic expression also narrowed. [Between 9 April and 10 May 2026](#), at least 21 incidents of intimidation occurred during screenings of the documentary *Pesta Babi* on Papua, involving security actors, university authorities, and local officials who forced cancellations and identified organisers.


Support for press freedom further weakened under the Prabowo administration's budget cuts. Budget cuts continued to affect the [Press Council's core programmes in 2026](#), including the Journalist Competency Test (UKJ), significantly limiting the number of journalists who could participate in the programme. Meanwhile, [Human Rights Minister Natalius Pigai](#) sparked controversy with a proposal to establish a government team to assess and certify who qualifies

as a human rights activist. The proposal was subsequently walked back following public criticism, but it reflected the broader climate of executive encroachment on civic freedom. Taken together, these developments indicate a worsening environment for the exercise of fundamental civil liberties in Indonesia.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

2. Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework

Score:



“Bureaucratic issues can hinder the registration process. Lengthy, convoluted, non-transparent, and slow procedures present significant challenges in the process.”

Indonesia formally guarantees freedom of association through constitutional protections and a legal framework that allows individuals and groups, including marginalised communities, to establish and operate CSOs. Compared to 2025, the legal and regulatory framework has deteriorated further. Between May 2025 and May 2026, administrative requirements became more burdensome, state oversight expanded, and protections against interference remained inadequate, particularly for organisations working on accountability, minority rights, control over natural resources, and other politically sensitive issues. The decline reflects a governance trajectory increasingly characterised by [authoritarian statism](#), in which technocratic and development-oriented narratives are used to justify greater executive control while narrowing democratic accountability and civic participation.

Administrative restrictions

During the reporting period, the government introduced new administrative requirements for CSOs. [Minister of Law Regulation No. 18/2025](#), enacted in May 2025, mandated increased administrative control over associations by requiring all legal registration processes to be conducted electronically through the General Legal Administration (AHU) online system. While intended to modernise administration, the mandatory use of notarial services and online systems has created financial and technological barriers for local communities and small organisations in remote areas.

The regulation also introduced a shift in the legal definition of “associations” compared to the now-repealed [Minister of Law and Human Rights Regulation No. 3/2016](#). Under the 2016 regulation, associations were defined as organisations established for social, religious, and humanitarian purposes, whereas Regulation No. 18/2025 defines associations primarily as organisations established “to develop and empower their members”. This shift has raised concerns because it may narrow the recognised public-interest and advocacy functions traditionally associated with CSOs.

Practical compliance has also become increasingly difficult. Digital platforms such as AHU, Online Single Submission (OSS), Directorate General of Taxes Online Portal (DJP Online) and Core Tax Administration System (Coretax) remain inaccessible to many disability-led organisations, while registration costs of 4–5 million Indonesian Rupiah (ca. 200-250 Euros), notarial deeds, tax registration, and expanded reporting obligations place formal registration beyond the reach of many community-based groups. As a result, many grassroots and minority organisations continue to operate informally.

Politicisation of organisational legality

Administrative compliance has increasingly become a tool for political pressure rather than a neutral regulatory mechanism. Organisations working on environmental protection, human rights, and indigenous rights are frequently portrayed as advancing foreign agendas or undermining national interests. One CSO reported that restrictions on freedom of association increasingly take the form of administrative barriers rather than outright bans. An attempt to establish a research unit was delayed by regulatory requirements to amend the organisation's statutes through a general assembly, creating significant institutional, financial, and procedural burdens. As a result, the process has yet to proceed. As one respondent explained, *“The process is formally administrative, but for community-based organisations it requires considerable time, resources, and internal consolidation”*.

The organisation also reported that administrative status had been politicised to undermine its legitimacy. In May 2025, groups opposing its advocacy called for its dissolution on the grounds that it was not registered with the National Unity and Political Agency (Bangkesbangpol). Although authorities took no formal action, the respondent noted that *“administrative legality can still be weaponised to pressure CSOs working on environmental, Indigenous People’s, and corporate accountability issues.”*

Comparable patterns were observed in the media sector. Although media registration remains formally available, verification procedures and mandatory journalist competency requirements continue to disadvantage small, independent, and non-profit media outlets, particularly outside Jakarta. Media outlets that are not verified by the Press Council remain vulnerable to being portrayed as illegitimate or unreliable. This was evident in March 2026, when the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs restricted content from the [women-led media platform Magdalene](#) and publicly labelled it “unverified” following its reporting on the acid attack investigation involving activist Andrie Yunus.

Disproportionate impacts on critical and marginalised CSOs

These administrative and political pressures disproportionately affect marginalised organizations. Disability organisations face additional accessibility costs and also report bureaucratic resistance and organisational delegitimisation. Women with disabilities,

psychosocial and intellectual disability groups, autistic communities, and small rural disability organisations remain particularly vulnerable, as they are often perceived as lacking credibility or technical capacity in formal policymaking spaces. Organisations engaged in policy advocacy or criticism of state services also reported greater scrutiny than those focused primarily on charity or service delivery, indicating that civic actors receive greater institutional acceptance when providing services than when challenging government policies (Expert Panellist 9, CSO representative for persons with disabilities).

Concerns regarding financial autonomy also increased during the reporting period. One NGO reported that donor funding had been frozen without explanation. CSOs further expressed concerns that authorities had begun monitoring foreign funding transfers above certain thresholds, creating fears that politically sensitive organisations could increasingly face funding restrictions, delays, or financial isolation. These concerns are reinforced by [proposed revisions to Law No. 17/2013 on Mass Organisations \(UU Ormas\)](#), which would expand financial oversight and monitoring of organisational activities.

Similarly, [the new Criminal Procedure Code \(KUHAP\)](#), enacted in January 2026 with limited public consultation, drew criticism for provisions that could broaden state discretion. Of particular concern are Articles 105, 112A, 124, and 132A, which allow law enforcement authorities to conduct searches, seizures, and surveillance without prior court authorisation in cases deemed "urgent." CSOs have raised concerns that these provisions could expand the state's access to private spaces and communications.

Weak protection and impunity

State protection of freedom of association remains inadequate. [Government Regulation in Lieu of Law \(Perppu\) No. 2/2017](#) on Mass Organisations continues to permit the dissolution of organisations without judicial oversight, creating an ongoing risk for groups exercising their right to association. Religious minority organisations, LGBTIQ+ communities, and other groups working on politically sensitive issues remain particularly vulnerable, as their activities are frequently framed by vigilante groups and local officials as contrary to public morality or social stability.

The state has also failed to provide effective protection against physical and digital attacks targeting civil society actors. Reports of intimidation, cyberattacks, and harassment frequently receive little or no follow-up from law enforcement, reinforcing perceptions of impunity. Intimidation has increasingly taken indirect but threatening forms, including the delivery of pig heads, dead rats, chickens, Molotov cocktails, and acid attacks against critics.


One of the most prominent cases was the acid attack against [Andrie Yunus](#), a human rights activist from KontraS. The attack allegedly involved four military personnel, including individuals linked to the Indonesian Armed Forces State Intelligence Agency (BAIS), leaving him with permanent eye damage and significant vision loss. CSOs criticised the decision to transfer the case to Military Court II-08 Jakarta, arguing that military courts lack independence and public accountability because of hierarchical command structures and institutional solidarity. They emphasised that attacks against human rights defenders are not ordinary criminal offences but direct attacks on civic freedoms and democratic participation. In this case, the state not only failed to protect civil society actors from physical attacks; its failure to ensure independent accountability sends a dangerous signal that violence against civil society actors can be tolerated.

To conclude, these developments reveal a widening gap between Indonesia's formal guarantees of freedom of association and the realities faced by civil society. Administrative restrictions, politicised enforcement, expanding state oversight, potential restrictions on funding, and inadequate protection against intimidation have progressively constrained CSOs' ability to organise, operate, and advocate independently. While civic space remains formally open, the operating environment increasingly reflects selective enforcement, institutional uncertainty, and growing pressure on organisations engaged in advocacy and politically sensitive issues.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

3. Accessible and Sustainable Resources

Score:



“As funding declines, civil society is increasingly trapped in a cycle of pragmatism, forced to chase donor-driven agendas at the expense of its core advocacy. In the struggle to survive, many organisations become ‘jack-of-all-trades’ institutions, gradually sacrificing their identity and expertise. More ironically, as international funding dries up, the state has become the largest alternative funder, a bitter reality, as financial dependence on those in power undermines the critical voice and independence that define civil society.”

CSOs in Indonesia continue to have formal access to both domestic and international funding. However, during the reporting period, the funding environment became increasingly restrictive, unequal, and uncertain. Shrinking international development assistance, growing state scrutiny of funding sources, donor dependency, and structural inequalities in access to resources have significantly weakened the sustainability of civil society, particularly for grassroots organisations and those working on advocacy, accountability, and politically sensitive issues. Compared to 2025, civil society faced a more constrained and less sustainable funding environment.

International funding continues to serve as the primary funding source for Indonesian CSOs. Combined contributions from international philanthropic foundations and international NGOs accounted for 69% of funding for subnational CSOs and 63% to national CSOs, according to a survey by [Menjadi and Planet Indonesia \(April 2025\)](#). This dependence on international assistance has become increasingly precarious due to the global contraction of development funding. The most pronounced impact resulted from reductions in U.S. foreign assistance. In 2024, [USAID](#) alone contributed approximately US\$153.5 million to Indonesia, supporting programmes in health, climate resilience, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), governance, and other sectors. Subsequent funding cuts disrupted numerous CSO initiatives, including [humanitarian programmes](#) and forcing [independent media outlets](#) such as Remotivi, New Naratif, and Project Multatuli to scale back environmental reporting.

The decline in funding extended beyond U.S. assistance. [Global Official Development Assistance \(ODA\)](#) decreased by 23.1% to US\$174.3 billion in 2025, marking the largest reduction in ODA history. The OECD further projects an additional 5.8% decline in 2026. Domestically, Indonesia's fiscal efficiency measures and reduced public spending further constrained opportunities for government-CSO partnerships, particularly at the local level. Shrinking local budgets weakened community-based programmes and intensified competition for increasingly limited resources.

Unequal access to funding

Although funding remains formally available, disparities in access have become increasingly pronounced. Government oversight of foreign-funded activities remains extensive. Internationally funded programmes continue to require approval and coordination with state institutions, including the Ministry of Home Affairs and, in some cases, intelligence agencies. Concerns also emerged following the circulation of an academic draft of an [Anti-Disinformation and Foreign Propaganda Bill](#), which raised fears that international funding and partnerships could increasingly be portrayed as threats to national interests.

Simultaneously, larger national NGOs with robust administrative systems, English-language proficiency, fundraising expertise, and established donor networks are significantly better positioned to secure funding than grassroots organisations. Smaller organisations frequently encounter challenges in meeting increasingly complex donor requirements, such as proposal development, financial reporting, safeguarding, monitoring and evaluation, and anti-fraud compliance.

Organisations of persons with disabilities face additional barriers. Many local disability organisations have not received direct support from government funding schemes or international donors, relying instead on small project grants, informal support networks, or members' personal contributions. In addition to limited funding opportunities, these organisations must cover additional accessibility costs, such as sign language interpretation, accessible documentation, transportation, and other accommodations, while also complying with increasingly complex administrative, taxation, and audit requirements.

“The experiences of organisations of persons with disabilities (OPDs) in the regions reveal that access to resources remains deeply unequal, with some organisations still operating from board members' private homes due to limited operational support.”

Funding opportunities have also become increasingly concentrated within specific sectors. Organisations focused on climate, technology, and technical policy are generally better positioned to diversify income through consultancy services and private-sector partnerships. In contrast, organisations engaged in democracy, human rights, civic space, and independent media face declining donor support and fewer sustainable funding alternatives, as their work is increasingly perceived as politically sensitive.

Funding conditions and sustainability

The primary challenge is accessing funding that is both flexible and sustainable. According to the [Menjadi and Planet Indonesia survey](#), 75% of CSOs identified insufficient core and overhead funding as their main challenge, followed by reliance on short-term project funding

(71%) and overall funding shortages (63%). These constraints limit organisations' ability to retain staff, strengthen institutional structures, and engage in long-term planning.

Funding arrangements continue to reinforce unequal power dynamics. Donor priorities, project frameworks, and reporting requirements are often established through top-down processes, limiting local organisations' influence over programme design and budget allocations. Community-based organisations, including OPDs, have reported that donor priorities frequently do not reflect local realities, while increasing operational costs are seldom matched by corresponding increases in grant budgets.

Interviewees from the [Menjadi and Planet Indonesia survey](#) also highlighted inequalities in the distribution of donor resources through intermediary organisations. As one respondent explained:

"Funding often starts as a waterfall—strong and abundant at its source, but as it moves through multiple layers, it gradually diminishes. By the time it reaches local organisations like ours, only a few drops remain."

A panellist further noted that dependence on a single donor leaves many organisations vulnerable to sudden funding interruptions:

"Many local CSOs depend on one main donor. When that support ends, sustaining the organisation becomes extremely difficult."

Impact on civil society

These dynamics have significantly weakened the long-term sustainability of Indonesian civil society. [Several organisations](#) have reportedly reduced programmes, downsized staff, or ceased operations following the loss of donor support. Funding interruptions have also [disrupted sustained engagement](#) with local communities and constrained institutional development.

The increasingly restrictive civic environment has further diverted organisational resources toward legal aid, emergency response, digital security, and protection measures. During the August–September 2025 protests, legal aid organisations, including YLBHI and its network of Legal Aid Institutes (LBHs), [redirected substantial resources](#) to provide legal assistance to arrested protesters, reducing the resources available for their core programmes.


In response, many organisations have sought to diversify income through consultancy services, crowdfunding, public donations, partnerships with local governments, and integration into local development planning frameworks such as Regional Medium-Term Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah, RPJMD) and Village Medium-Term Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Desa, RPJMDes). However, these alternatives remain limited. Public funding may compromise organisational independence, while crowdfunding continues to face restrictive regulations. A [2025 civic space study](#) by ACFA and the FATASEA Working Group found that [Law No. 9/1961 on Fundraising](#), [Government Regulation No. 29/1980](#), and [Ministry of Social Affairs Regulation No. 8/2021](#) remain overly bureaucratic and poorly adapted to digital fundraising models. These constraints became particularly evident after the August 2025 protests, when organisations raising emergency donations reportedly faced increased administrative scrutiny over fundraising permits and compliance requirements.

Overall, while access to resources remains formally available, Indonesia's civil society funding environment has become increasingly unequal, donor-dependent, and politically constrained. Shrinking international assistance, restrictive funding conditions, unequal access to resources, expanding financial scrutiny, and burdensome fundraising regulations have significantly weakened the sustainability and independence of CSOs, particularly grassroots organisations and those working on advocacy, accountability, and politically sensitive issues.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

4. Open and Responsive State

Score:



“During the district and municipal development assessment process, we were involved in the evaluation. However, when we provided an objective assessment of government programmes and performance, we faced intimidation and pressure from the local government, both institutionally and personally.”

Indonesia maintains formal legal guarantees for transparency, participation, and public accountability. The right to access information is protected under [Law No. 14/2008 on Public Information Disclosure \(KIP Law\)](#). Public participation mechanisms are available through parliamentary hearings, *Musrenbang* processes, public consultations, and other policymaking forums. However, these formal guarantees were increasingly undermined in practice by more centralised, opaque, and securitised governance.

Transparency and access to information

Although the legal framework guaranteeing access to information and public participation remains in place, panellists identified a marked deterioration in its implementation. Major policies, legislation, and budget decisions are increasingly made without meaningful public consultation or adequate disclosure.

Fiscal transparency emerged as a recurring concern. [The 2026 State Budget Law \(APBN 2026\)](#) was approved by parliament on 23 September 2025, but the full document was not available on the Ministry of State Secretariat website until 7 January 2026. As a result, the law was published nearly three months after adoption and a week after the fiscal year began. In previous years, APBN laws were typically published before the fiscal year started.

Similarly, [the Budget Implementation List \(DIPA\)](#), which is typically distributed to ministries, agencies, and regional governments in November, experienced significant delays. By late December 2025, the presidential handover of the DIPA had still not taken place, contributing to uncertainty around budget implementation.

Respondents reported similar patterns across major legislative and policy initiatives, including [Broadcasting Bill \(RUU Penyiaran\)](#), [revisions to the TNI Law](#), [the Free Nutritious Meals Programme \(MBG\)](#), [Danantara \(Indonesia's sovereign wealth fund\)](#), [the Merah Putih Village Cooperatives programme](#), and [Presidential Regulation No. 8/2026 on Countering Extremism](#). Many described these processes as lacking adequate public consultation and timely disclosure. Several panellists contended that narratives emphasising national stability, security, and nationalism are increasingly invoked to justify restrictions on information access and public scrutiny.

Several respondents characterised this trend as "selective transparency," whereby information highlighting government achievements is actively disseminated while politically sensitive issues, including public budgeting, military involvement in civilian affairs, natural resource governance, and economic redistribution, receive considerably less disclosure. The closed-door deliberations on revisions to the [TNI Law](#) at the Fairmont Hotel in 2025 were frequently cited as emblematic of this approach.

Access to information also remains particularly difficult for CSOs outside Jakarta and for organisations working with marginalised communities. Local CSOs in Sumatra reported that policy documents, regional budgets (APBD), forestry maps, and strategic planning documents are often inaccessible through formal public information mechanisms and instead require personal connections or informal networks to obtain. For organisations of persons with disabilities (OPDs), barriers are compounded by inaccessible information formats, limited dissemination, and inconsistent disability-related data across government institutions, constraining evidence-based advocacy and inclusive policymaking.

Respondents reported increasing formal and informal restrictions on journalists' access to information and official spaces, reflecting a broader decline in government transparency. Frequently cited examples included restrictions on investigative reporting by *Magdalene* and the temporary withdrawal of a presidential press card from a [CNN Indonesia journalist](#). Although information requests remain legally protected under the [KIP Law](#), implementation is inconsistent, with public institutions frequently delaying responses, refusing disclosure without adequate justification, or providing incomplete information.

Public participation in policymaking

The decline in transparency is closely associated with broader concerns about public participation. Although formal participation mechanisms remain in place, most panellists observed that participation has become increasingly procedural rather than substantive. This assessment is supported by the [Varieties of Democracy \(V-Dem\) CSO Consultation Indicator](#), which assigned Indonesia a score of [0.51 in 2025](#), the country's lowest score since 1999.

Respondents also observed growing "selective participation," whereby access to policymaking increasingly depends on political proximity to government institutions. Participation remains comparatively open for technical or non-contentious issues, whereas organisations working on democracy, human rights, accountability, and civic freedoms face greater barriers. This pattern was repeatedly identified in revisions to the [TNI Law](#) and the deliberations on the

[Criminal Procedure Code \(RKUHAP\)](#), where consultation processes were widely perceived as rushed, closed, and largely disconnected from public input. As one respondent explained:

"If we rely solely on indicators of participatory or deliberative democracy, the results may still appear participatory and deliberative. The forums exist, consultations take place, and formal procedures are followed. But the real question is whether participation is genuinely heard or merely used as a formality. The problem is not simply whether participation exists, but how it is co-opted and used to legitimise a system that is, in reality, becoming increasingly closed."

Respondents further noted that the broader political environment has become increasingly hostile to dissent. This development reflects a broader trend of securitisation and militarisation that discourages meaningful engagement. As one respondent recalled:

"These constraints are compounded for marginalised groups. Although disability organisations, women's groups, Indigenous communities, and grassroots organisations are increasingly invited to formal consultation processes, respondents described their involvement as largely symbolic, with recommendations rarely reflected in final policies or budget allocations. Financial constraints, inaccessible transportation, digital inequality, limited access to information, and low institutional capacity further restrict participation, particularly outside Jakarta."

Local experiences highlight significant inequalities. Civil society representatives are sometimes included in government task forces and consultation forums, often through informal networks, but such inclusion frequently serves to manage or neutralise criticism rather than promote genuine collaboration. In agrarian conflict and Indigenous rights cases, civil society may be formally represented but excluded from substantive deliberations. Patronage dynamics are also evident in budget outcomes. According to one expert panellist, when priorities identified through the *Musyawahar Perencanaan Pembangunan (Musrenbang*, Development Planning Consultation Forum) were translated into regional budgets, elderly forums received approximately seven billion Indonesian Rupiah (ca.370,000 Euros), while allocations for children, women, and persons with disabilities remained below two billion Indonesian Rupiah (ca. 105,000 Euros). The panellist attributed this disparity to the influence of politically connected groups, including retired military figures active in the elderly forum.

Government accountability and responsiveness

Respondents consistently reported weak institutional accountability despite the continued existence of formal consultation mechanisms. Public institutions rarely explain how civil society input is considered during policymaking, leaving organisations with little information on whether their recommendations have been accepted, modified, or rejected. As one respondent noted:

"Several CSOs have been formally appointed through government decrees related to the acceleration of agrarian conflict resolution in North Sumatra. However, after this formal inclusion, CSOs were rarely invited to follow-up meetings or involved in substantive decision-making processes."

This pattern was reported to be particularly pronounced for marginalised groups. Disability organisations regularly submit recommendations concerning accessibility, public services, health, and social protection, yet rarely receive information about how their contributions

influence final decisions. Several panellists observed that accountability increasingly depends on the openness of individual officials rather than institutionalised governance mechanisms. Recommendations that align with government priorities are more likely to be accommodated, while criticism is often met with defensiveness, delegitimisation, or efforts to question the credibility and motives of CSOs.


The government's handling of the Free Nutritious Meals Programme (MBG) illustrates these broader accountability challenges. During both policy formulation and implementation, recommendations from CSOs, academics, and oversight institutions were largely disregarded. [FIAN Indonesia](#) criticised the draft Presidential Regulation for lacking meaningful public participation and failing to adopt a human rights-based approach to food and nutrition. [Transparency International Indonesia \(TII\)](#) similarly concluded that the programme's design inadequately addressed the needs of women, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, and other marginalised groups, while [Indonesia Corruption Watch \(ICW\)](#) raised concerns regarding governance risks and potential political conflicts of interest among foundations responsible for programme implementation. In April 2026, the Attorney General's Office launched a corruption investigation involving former National Nutrition Agency (BGN) head Dadan Hindayana and other MBG officials over alleged state losses estimated at approximately [billions of rupiah per day](#) through Nutrition Fulfillment Service Units (SPPG). The subsequent investigation reinforced concerns that governance and oversight risks identified by civil society at an early stage had not been adequately addressed.

Overall, while formal frameworks for transparency, participation, and accountability remain in place, their implementation has weakened considerably. Increasing secrecy in policymaking, declining access to information, procedural rather than substantive participation, and weak responsiveness to civil society concerns have collectively reduced the state's openness. As a result, public oversight, meaningful participation, and government accountability have become increasingly constrained within a more centralised, securitised, and less responsive governance environment.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

5. Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society

Score:



“The government’s agitation campaign, characterised by xenophobic rhetoric and the systematic stigmatisation of ‘foreign agents,’ has undermined social cohesion.”

Public attitudes toward civil society in Indonesia have become increasingly polarised. Although CSOs are still recognised as partners in poverty reduction, health, gender equality, disability inclusion, and community empowerment, those engaged in human rights, environmental protection, democracy, and accountability face escalating hostility. Government officials, political elites, and affiliated actors have increasingly depicted critical CSOs as “foreign agents” (*antek asing*), anti-development actors, or politically motivated groups. This portrayal has contributed to declining public trust and has weakened constructive dialogue between the state and civil society. This principle reflects the growing normalisation of anti-CSO narratives, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and increasing public stigmatisation of advocacy organisations, which have further weakened civic participation and public support for independent civil society.

This hostile discourse has been amplified by coordinated online disinformation, organised buzzer networks, and digital harassment targeting activists, academics, journalists, and advocacy organisations. Another respondent noted:

“Public discourse has become increasingly distorted by the use of organised buzzer networks to dominate online conversations and shape public opinion cohesion.”

Senior state officials have increasingly advanced a “foreign agent” narrative against civil society. According to [BBC Indonesia](#), President Prabowo referenced allegations of foreign interference at least 25 times in public speeches by February 2026, following his inauguration in October 2024. He repeatedly claimed that foreign powers financed NGOs, independent media, and protest movements to undermine Indonesia, including during the Pancasila Day

speech (2 June 2025), the PSI Congress (20 July 2025), and a national coordination meeting (2 February 2026), where he alleged that the *Indonesia Gelap* protests were orchestrated and financed by corrupt interests. [Other cabinet members, such as Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia, reiterated similar narratives when defending government policies.](#)

[Amnesty International](#) documented that these official narratives were reinforced through coordinated online campaigns involving hundreds of accounts posting identical content across social media platforms. Pro-government groups called for investigations into foreign-funded CSOs, labelled them foreign agents linked to George Soros, and demanded restrictions on independent media. [On 6 April 2026, Ulta Levenia, an Expert Staff member of the Presidential Staff Office \(KSP\), publicly accused organisations, including KontraS and CELIOS, of receiving foreign funding to organise violent protests.](#) [Amnesty International](#) also documented coordinated disinformation by accounts appearing to belong to Indonesian military units, targeting human rights defenders, Indonesia Gelap protesters, several critical CSOs, and media. Amnesty International wrote to the Government of Indonesia on 24 April 2026 to seek clarification on whether these accounts were officially affiliated with the military but received no response. Although the government did not confirm any official affiliation, it failed to prevent actors presenting themselves as military institutions from spreading stigmatising disinformation. These developments show how state actors and those presenting themselves as state institutions have helped normalise narratives that delegitimise dissent and restrict civic space.

According to the expert panellist, CSOs, including LGBTQI+ groups, have reduced public advocacy and withdrawn from broader coalitions due to fears of being labelled "foreign agents." The panellist observed that these dynamics have fragmented civil society networks and weakened freedom of association. Simultaneously, major digital platforms such as Meta, X, YouTube, and TikTok [have failed to adequately moderate coordinated disinformation](#), enabling harmful narratives targeting civil society to spread widely.

Recognition of civil society has become increasingly selective, with watchdog organisations, environmental defenders, democracy advocates, and human rights groups facing heightened stigma and exclusion. Many advocacy organisations also struggle to build broader public legitimacy, as their work is often viewed as urban-centred, elite-driven, or disconnected from everyday socioeconomic concerns, increasing their vulnerability to anti-CSO narratives.

Based on a Python-assisted large language model (LLM) content analysis of 24 media outlets², 1333 relevant articles mentioning CSOs were identified from a total of 1,900 collected articles. Most of the coverage was positive (982 articles; 73.7%), followed by neutral coverage (275 articles; 20.6%), while 76 articles (5.7%) framed CSOs negatively³. Positive coverage

² Media outlets were selected from the 2026 Spring Edition of the SCImago Media Rankings (General category), accessed on 6 June 2026. The 19 media outlets included Kompas, Republika, Media Indonesia, Okezone, Jawa Pos, The Jakarta Post, SindoNews, Pikiran Rakyat, Tribun Gayo, Suara Merdeka, Rakyat Merdeka, Pos Kota, Surabaya Tribune, MNC Trijaya, KBR, Koran Tempo, Suara Pembaruan, TVRI World, and SEA Today. To ensure broader representation of Indonesia's digital news landscape, the sample was further supplemented with five widely used online news platforms: Detik, CNN Indonesia, Antara, BBC Indonesia, and Tirto.id.

³ Media coverage was collected from 24 Indonesian news outlets using a keyword-based search strategy. For each media outlet, up to 100 articles were retrieved for each predefined keyword, including LSM (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat), OMS (Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil), NGO (Organisasi Non Pemerintah), CSO (Civil Society Organisation), Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil, Kelompok Masyarakat Sipil, Aktivis HAM, and Aktivis Lingkungan. The collected articles were then analysed using a Python-assisted large language model (LLM) based on a structured codebook developed by the author. The codebook instructed the model to first determine whether an article was substantively relevant to a CSO actor, identify the keyword and the specific organisation or actor discussed, and subsequently classify the dominant media framing as positive, neutral, or negative. Framing was evaluated solely on how the media portrayed the CSO, rather than on the actions or viewpoints of governments, companies, or other stakeholders. To improve consistency, the codebook included explicit decision rules, definitions for each framing category, and evidence-based classification criteria.

predominantly portrays CSOs as legitimate and constructive actors that strengthen democracy, protect human rights, promote public accountability, provide humanitarian assistance, and contribute to policymaking and community empowerment. However, despite representing a relatively small share of coverage, the negative narratives are noteworthy for their consistent questioning of CSOs' legitimacy, integrity, and independence. Media reports commonly associate CSOs with alleged criminal activities, including extortion, corruption, fraud, and violence, while also portraying them as politically biased, foreign-funded, or driven by vested interests rather than the public good. In some cases, CSOs are further depicted as obstructing government initiatives, creating social conflict, or undermining national interests, reflecting recurring themes that may contribute to public distrust despite the overall predominance of positive media portrayals.

Public participation in civic life remains limited and uneven. According to the [V-Dem Institute \(2025\)](#), Indonesia's participatory environment score for CSOs was 1.71, unchanged since 2023 and the lowest level since 1999. Participation in independent political associations, including environmental and human rights organisations, was particularly weak, with a score of only 0.14. Although participation in non-political associations is somewhat higher, the data indicates that broad-based and sustained civic engagement remains fragile. Similarly, the [2026 Edelman Trust Barometer found](#) public trust in NGOs in Indonesia had declined slightly to 67%, slipping one percentage point from 68% in 2025. This places NGOs at the bottom of the trust rankings among the four institutions measured in Indonesia, behind employers, media, business, and government.

Several structural factors continue to constrain the development of a supportive civic culture. Civic education remains weak, solidarity across civil society sectors is fragmented, and political parties are widely regarded as patronage-based electoral vehicles rather than institutions for democratic participation. Nevertheless, civic participation continues to evolve. Protest movements increasingly involve students, online motorcycle taxi drivers, women, grassroots communities, and digital influencers. New solidarity networks have emerged both online and offline, and social media has become a significant space for mobilisation and advocacy. However, participation is increasingly driven by issue-based mobilisation, viral political moments, and expressions of dissatisfaction, rather than by sustained organisational engagement or confidence that participation will influence public policy.

Persistent inequalities further restrict inclusive civic participation. While some progress has been made in the formal recognition of women's rights and disability inclusion, as reflected in [Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights](#), [Law No. 8/2016 on Persons with Disabilities](#), [the ratification of CEDAW](#) and [CRPD](#), and the landmark [Sexual Violence Crimes Law of 2022](#), many marginalised groups continue to face serious barriers to equal participation in civic, political, social, and economic life. V-Dem (2025) reports women's participation in CSOs at 1.32, while women's freedom of expression remains weak at -0.04. Geographic disparities in civil liberties also persist, along with continuing inequalities in legal protection, mobility, and access to justice.

These inequalities are especially pronounced for marginalised communities. Indigenous peoples, women, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+ communities, and other minority groups continue to face barriers to meaningful civic participation.

During the past year, LGBTQI+ individuals experienced a significant escalation in hate speech, stigmatisation, and criminalisation, including growing police intrusion into private spaces. [On 22 June 2025](#), Bogor Police detained 75 people attending a gathering at a villa in

Megamendung, West Java. Although consensual same-sex relations are not criminalised under Indonesian law, police subsequently opened an investigation against the organisers under the [Pornography Law](#) and provisions on facilitating "obscene acts", using these offences to target the gathering.

Similarly, on [19 October 2025](#), a joint operation by Surabaya police units raided a hotel room in Surabaya, resulting in 34 men being designated as criminal suspects under the [Pornography Law](#). These cases illustrate how broadly framed morality provisions continue to be used to criminalise gatherings involving same-sex relations, despite the absence of a general prohibition on consensual same-sex conduct.

Online hate campaigns against LGBTQI+ communities also intensified. [Movements such as "Anti Boti Indonesia" and hashtags like #antibotiindonesia reflected growing hostility](#) fuelled by religious conservatism, identity politics, and anti-LGBT narratives. These campaigns increasingly functioned not only as expressions of hate speech but also as tools for organising public intimidation and social exclusion. In North Sumatra, LGBTQI+ individuals reportedly faced job loss, economic exclusion, and growing discrimination in workplaces and educational environments.

The increasingly hostile environment is also reflected in local and national policy initiatives. In September 2025, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) faction in the Bekasi City DPRD proposed a [regional regulation](#) targeting LGBTQI+ communities. As discussions on a draft regulation on the "prevention of sexual deviation (LGBTIQ)" continue, members of Commission IV have also urged the municipal government to establish a [dedicated task force \(Satgas\)](#) to identify, monitor, and suppress activities associated with the LGBTQI+ community. At the national level, President Prabowo Subianto signed [Presidential Regulation \(Perpres\) No. 111 of 2025 on the General State Defence Policy \(2025–2029\)](#) on 24 October 2025, drawing widespread attention for classifying LGBTQI+ as a non-military threat to national security. Human rights advocates warned that this framing could reinforce stigma and legitimise persecution. Meanwhile, reports indicate that the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) is preparing an academic paper and draft legislation that would introduce criminal provisions targeting LGBTQI+ individuals.

Indigenous communities also continue to experience discrimination and exclusion, particularly in areas affected by extractive industries and land conflicts. In [Sumatera](#) Indigenous groups opposing mining, plantation, or forestry projects were stigmatised as anti-development actors and faced intimidation, social pressure, and unequal access to public services. These tensions often extended beyond political participation into broader social and religious life, including discrimination affecting families and children connected to land conflicts.

Persons with disabilities, particularly outside major urban centres, continue to encounter inaccessible public services, limited digital infrastructure, inadequate local government support, and unequal access to assistive technologies, further excluding them as civic engagement increasingly shifts online.


Socioeconomic inequality also constrains participation. Respondents indicated that access to state resources, development programmes, and economic opportunities increasingly depends on political proximity and patronage networks rather than on equal opportunity. Budget efficiency measures and reduced fiscal transfers have further restricted access to legal aid, social protection, victim services, and healthcare, disproportionately affecting vulnerable communities.

Overall, Indonesia's public culture has become less supportive of independent civil society. Increasing political polarisation, state-sponsored or state-enabled anti-CSO narratives, coordinated online disinformation, weak civic participation, and persistent social inequalities have collectively narrowed civic space and eroded public confidence in advocacy-oriented CSOs.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

6. Access to a Secure Digital Environment

Score:



“The state has adopted mass surveillance tactics, using digital tools to monitor and intimidate activists and critics. This has normalised self-censorship among civil society actors.”

Indonesia has continued to expand digital connectivity and online public participation. However, the conditions that enable civil society to use digital spaces safely and effectively have become increasingly fragile. The decline reflects growing challenges across three interrelated dimensions: the protection of digital rights and freedoms, digital security and privacy, and equitable access to digital technologies and services. Together, these developments have reduced the resilience of Indonesia's digital enabling environment for civil society.

Digital rights and freedoms

Indonesia's digital environment is central to civic participation, public debate, and social mobilisation. Between 2025 and 2026, digital rights declined due to increased state intervention, surveillance, and regulatory controls over online spaces. Despite continued growth in internet access and the ongoing importance of digital platforms for civic engagement, the online environment has become increasingly restrictive for CSOs.

Indonesia's [Electronic Information and Transactions \(ITE\) Law](#), first enacted in 2008 and amended in 2016 and 2024, remains a highly contested legal instrument. Provisions criminalising "false statements" that cause "public unrest" are frequently criticised as vague, overbroad, and inconsistent with international human rights standards. Alongside [the Electronic Systems Operators \(PSE\) framework and online content moderation regulations](#), these laws have expanded state influence over digital spaces by enabling content removal,

account restrictions, and broad anti-disinformation measures that can be used to suppress legitimate political expression.

Evidence demonstrates increasing state oversight of online spaces. According to [V-Dem \(2025\)](#), nationwide internet shutdowns remained uncommon, indicating that the government rarely disrupts internet access at the national level. Similarly, social media shutdowns were infrequent. However, selective restrictions persisted: political content on social media continued to be censored, internet filtering remained substantial, and government monitoring of social media was assessed as extensive. Together, these findings suggest that the Indonesian government relies less on blanket internet shutdowns than on targeted censorship, content filtering, and surveillance of online spaces.

During the August–September 2025 protests, [SAFEnet](#) documented 351 digital rights violations involving 344 victims, representing a 164 percent increase from 2024. Authorities reportedly blocked [592 social media accounts](#) deemed "provocative," restricted TikTok live streaming during demonstrations, and continued to rely on Article 28(2) of the ITE Law to prosecute online expression. These developments indicate that digital platforms are increasingly used for both communication and the monitoring and control of dissent.

Digital security and privacy

Digital insecurity is an escalating challenge for civil society. Activists, journalists, and other government critics increasingly experience hacking, doxxing, malware attacks, coordinated buzzer campaigns, cyber harassment, surveillance, and legal intimidation. [SAFEnet](#) reported 907 cyberattack cases in 2025, nearly triple the 330 cases recorded in 2024. Although activists and journalists remain primary targets, victims now increasingly include students, ordinary citizens, and private-sector employees, demonstrating that expressing critical views online has become riskier for broader segments of society.

Civil society actors, journalists, Indigenous activists, women activists, and marginalised groups increasingly experience doxing, hacking, cyber harassment, coordinated buzzer attacks, legal threats, and online misogyny. Reported incidents include hacking and intimidation targeting activist [Virdian Aurelio following criticism of](#) flood management policies, digital attacks against activist [Neni Nur Hayati after criticising the West Java Governor](#), and [intimidation of Indigenous activists in North Sumatra after posting criticism on Facebook](#). [Women activists](#) face additional vulnerabilities, such as misogyny, body shaming, and [gender-based online harassment](#). Journalists also report [online disinformation, intimidation, and threats of physical violence related to their reporting and advocacy activities](#).

During and after the [August 2025 protests](#), demonstrators reportedly had their mobile phones confiscated by security forces, and personal information of CSO leaders was leaked online. According to the panellists, journalists, activists, and organisations experienced repeated hacking attempts, surveillance, malware attacks, and coordinated harassment. The WhatsApp account of [Konde.co](#) editor-in-chief Luviana was reportedly compromised through malware disguised as an APK file. Panellists described cases in which a CSO in Sulawesi reported malware attacks that exposed internal documents, while a CSO in Sumatra faced attempts to hack its website and social media accounts, including efforts to upload pornographic content to damage the organisation's reputation.

Although the [Personal Data Protection Law \(Law No. 27 of 2022\)](#) became fully enforceable in October 2024, implementation remained weak during the reporting period. As of May 2026, the independent Personal Data Protection Authority had not been established, resulting in

fragmented oversight and inconsistent enforcement. Repeated data breaches, expanding biometric verification systems, increased surveillance capacity, and limited cybersecurity resources among grassroots organisations continue to undermine digital privacy and data protection.

Digital accessibility

Digital accessibility has improved but remains highly unequal. [Freedom on the Net 2025](#) assigned Indonesia a score of 48 out of 100, maintaining its classification as “partly free.” Internet penetration reached 81.17 percent in 2025, and the Indonesian Digital Society Index (IMDI) recorded a score of 44.53, reflecting infrastructure improvements but limited progress in empowerment and meaningful digital participation. Approximately [50 million Indonesians](#), or about 20 percent of the population, remain digitally excluded. Significant disparities persist between Java and regions outside Java, particularly in eastern Indonesia, remote islands, border areas, Indigenous territories, and rural communities. Infrastructure quality, affordability, and network reliability remain inconsistent, and community-based connectivity initiatives continue to face regulatory obstacles.

Internet disruptions further underscore these inequalities. SAFEnet documented 125 internet access disruptions in 2025, a 7.96 percent increase from the previous year. A significant incident occurred in August 2025, when damage to the Sulawesi–Maluku–Papua undersea cable system between Sorong and Merauke disrupted broadband services across parts of [southern Papua, including Merauke, Timika, and Kaimana](#). In May 2026, a major transmission system failure in [Sumatra](#) similarly disrupted digital connectivity by causing widespread electricity outages that affected telecommunications and internet-dependent services across several provinces. These incidents disrupted communication, advocacy, and civic participation among communities and CSOs. Digital literacy remains uneven. While larger organisations increasingly adopt digital technologies and cybersecurity practices, smaller and grassroots organisations often lack sufficient technical capacity, making them more vulnerable to cyber threats, misinformation, and disinformation.

A significant incident occurred in August 2025, when damage to the Sulawesi–Maluku–Papua undersea cable system between Sorong and Merauke disrupted broadband services across parts of southern Papua, including Merauke, Timika, and Kaimana. In May 2026, a major transmission system failure in Sumatra similarly disrupted digital connectivity by causing widespread electricity outages that affected telecommunications and internet-dependent services across several provinces.

Persons with disabilities continue to face significant barriers to digital participation. Government websites, banking services, complaint mechanisms, and public consultation platforms often remain inaccessible due to incompatible screen-reader systems, inaccessible CAPTCHA features, unreadable PDF formats, and the lack of captions, sign-language interpretation, and easy-to-read materials. Women with disabilities in rural areas encounter additional challenges related to device ownership, affordability, digital literacy, and poor network connectivity, further limiting their ability to participate in civic life online.

In conclusion, Indonesia’s digital environment is increasingly constrained in practice. Expanding surveillance, selective censorship, cyberattacks, weak privacy protections, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and persistent digital inequalities have diminished the security and inclusiveness of online spaces. Although digital platforms remain essential tools for civic organising, public participation, and social mobilisation, escalating risks of

intimidation, hacking, harassment, and exclusion have created an increasingly uncertain environment for civil society, activists, and marginalised communities.

C) Recommendations

I. Recommendations to the Government of Indonesia

1. Strengthen the Legal and Policy Framework

- Revise or repeal restrictive laws and regulations that unduly limit civic space, including provisions that enable arbitrary dissolution of CSOs, criminalisation of peaceful expression, and excessive restrictions on digital rights.
- Simplify and harmonise CSO registration procedures, ensuring transparent, accessible, and timely administrative processes with effective appeal mechanisms.
- Ensure all future legislation is developed through meaningful, transparent, and inclusive public consultation in accordance with constitutional principles and international human rights standards.

2. Protect Civic Freedoms and Human Rights Defenders

- Ensure prompt, independent, and impartial investigations into attacks, intimidation, and digital harassment targeting civil society actors, journalists, and human rights defenders.
- Strengthen legal protection mechanisms for human rights defenders, environmental defenders, journalists, and vulnerable groups, including protection against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs).
- Train law enforcement agencies on human rights-based policing, emphasising necessity, proportionality, de-escalation, and accountability during public assemblies.

3. Strengthen Transparency and Public Participation

- Institutionalise structured public participation throughout policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation at national and local levels.
- Require public institutions to publish consultation processes and explain how public input has influenced final policy decisions.
- Improve implementation of the Public Information Disclosure Law by ensuring timely publication of legislation, budget documents, and other public information.

4. Promote Sustainable Civil Society Financing

- Establish a transparent, independent, and multi-stakeholder National CSO Endowment Fund (Dana Abadi OMS) to provide long-term institutional support for civil society organisations.
- Reform government funding mechanisms to ensure equitable access for advocacy organisations, grassroots initiatives, and organisations representing marginalised communities.

5. Strengthen Digital Rights and Inclusion

- Fully implement the Personal Data Protection Law and establish an independent Personal Data Protection Authority.
- End arbitrary digital surveillance, internet restrictions, and politically motivated online censorship.
- Expand affordable, reliable, and accessible digital infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions and for persons with disabilities.

II. Recommendations to Civil Society Organisations

1. Strengthen Institutional Sustainability

- Diversify funding sources by combining philanthropic support, domestic fundraising, social enterprise, and community-based financing.
- Invest in leadership development, organisational regeneration, and long-term institutional resilience.

2. Strengthen Collective Action

- Build stronger cross-sectoral and cross-regional coalitions among human rights, environmental, labour, women's rights, Indigenous Peoples, disability rights, and youth organisations.
- Strengthen collaboration on evidence collection, strategic litigation, policy advocacy, and rapid response to civic space restrictions.

3. Enhance Digital Resilience

- Strengthen evidence-based public communication to counter disinformation and anti-CSO narratives.
- Develop internal protocols for digital risk management, secure communications, and emergency response.

4. Strengthen Public Engagement

- Expand civic education initiatives, particularly among young people and marginalised communities.
- Promote positive and evidence-based narratives demonstrating civil society's contribution to democracy, public services, and sustainable development.

III. Recommendations to International Development Partners and Donors

- Increase flexible, multi-year core funding that supports institutional sustainability rather than only project-based activities.
- Expand direct funding opportunities for grassroots organisations, women's rights organisations, Indigenous people's organisations, disability organisations, and organisations outside major urban centres.
- Strengthen support for digital security, emergency protection, legal assistance, and psychosocial support for civil society actors facing reprisals.
- Promote participatory grant-making and locally led development approaches that increase local ownership and reduce administrative burdens.
- Coordinate funding strategies to minimise duplication, reduce fragmentation, and mitigate the impact of declining international development assistance.

IV. Recommendations to the Private Sector and Digital Platforms

- Increase transparency and accountability in content moderation, account restrictions, and responses to government requests for content removal.
- Strengthen measures to detect and mitigate coordinated disinformation campaigns, online harassment, and gender-based digital violence targeting civil society actors.

- Improve cooperation with civil society organisations to enhance digital safety, digital literacy, and responsible platform governance.
- Expand affordable, reliable, and inclusive digital connectivity, particularly for underserved communities and vulnerable groups.
- Strengthen responsible corporate philanthropy and partnerships that support civic participation, independent media, and public-interest initiatives.

V. Recommendations to the International Community

- Continue monitoring developments affecting civic space in Indonesia and raise concerns through bilateral, regional, and multilateral human rights mechanisms.
 - Support implementation of Indonesia's international human rights obligations, including those under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
 - Expand technical cooperation on judicial independence, democratic governance, digital rights, and protection of human rights defenders.
 - Facilitate South–South learning and exchanges on enabling environments, participatory governance, and civic space protection.
 - Continue engaging directly with Indonesian civil society organisations, including grassroots and marginalised groups, to ensure their perspectives inform international cooperation and policy dialogue.
-

D) Research Process

Each principle encompasses various dimensions which are assessed and aggregated to provide quantitative scores per principle. These scores reflect the degree to which the environment within the country enables or disables the work of civil society. Scores are on a five-category scale defined as: fully disabling (1), disabling (2), partially enabling (3), enabling (4), and fully enabling (5). To complement the scores, this report provides a narrative analysis of the enabling or disabling environment for civil society, identifying strengths and weaknesses as well as offering recommendations. The process of drafting the analysis is led by Network Members; the consortium provides quality control and editorial oversight before publication.

For Principle 1 - which evaluates respect for and protection of freedom of association and peaceful assembly - the score integrates data from the [CIVICUS Monitor](#). However, for Principles 2–6, the availability of yearly updated external quantitative indicators for the 86 countries part of the EUSEE programme are either limited or non-existent. To address this, Network Members convene a panel of representatives of civil society and experts once a year. This panel uses a set of guiding questions to assess the status of each principle and its dimensions within the country. **The panel for this report was convened in June 2026.** The discussions are supported by secondary sources, such as [V-Dem](#), the [Bertelsmann Stiftung Governance Index](#), the [RTI Rating from the Centre for Law and Democracy](#), and other trusted resources. These sources provide benchmarks for measuring similar dimensions and are complemented by primary data collection and other secondary sources of information available for the country. Guided by these deliberations, the panel assigns scores for each dimension, which the Network Members submit to the Consortium, accompanied by detailed justifications that reflect the country's specific context. To determine a single score per principle, the scores assigned to each dimension are aggregated using a weighted average, reflecting the relative importance of each dimension within the principle. This approach balances diverse perspectives while maintaining a structured and objective evaluation framework.

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