

Analytical Report on EU SEE Country Focus Reports Recommendations 2025

JUNE 2026

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1. Introduction

The EU System for an Enabling Environment programme (EU SEE) equips civil society, governments and stakeholders with actionable insights to address challenges and leverage opportunities to support improvement of the enabling environment for civil society. As part of the programme, EU SEE Network Members and Consortium partners produce Country Focus Reports, Enabling Environment Snapshots, Early Warning Mechanism Alerts, and selected regional and global advocacy outputs.

Country Focus Reports (CFRs) are produced annually and include a brief overview of the country context, an assessment and scoring of the enabling environment by each of the six principles, a recommendations section and an explanation of the research process.

This analysis is based on the extraction and systematisation of the 1,218 recommendations included in 54 CFR from 2025 available in English by May 5, 2026. It analyses patterns and frequency of the recommendations by enabling principle, type and level of action and target actor, outlining overall, cross-cutting and regional trends, highlighting potential gaps and advocacy priorities. The analysis is global and regional, it doesn't dive into specific countries or contexts.

Regional Distribution of EU SEE Country Focus Reports Recommendations						
54 Country Focus Reports (CFR) analysed						
Region	EU SEE countries	% of total	No. of CFR	% of total	No. of Recomm.	% of total
Africa	31	40,8%	21	38.9%	492	40.4%
Americas and the Caribbean	18	23,7%	12	22.2%	203	16.7%
Asia and the Pacific	20	26,3%	17	31.5%	414	34.0%
Middle East and North Africa	7	9,2%	4	7.4%	109	8.9%
TOTAL	76	100.0%	54	100.0%	1218	100.0%

The 54 CFRs available in English for this analysis cover more than 70% of the total EU SEE countries, and the weight of each region in the CFR analysed is nearly proportional to its weight in the total EU SEE countries.

Africa and Asia and the Pacific together account for ~70% of both CFR and number of recommendations. The Americas and the Caribbean proportion of recommendations (16.7%) is slightly lower than its share of CFR (22.2%) since those reports tend to have fewer recommendations per report. MENA has 4 CFR analysed, with marked national specificities and although their 109 recommendations reflect a higher average per report, they should not be read as representative of the broader region.

2. Overall patterns analysis

This section presents the distribution of CFR recommendations throughout the five multi-value fields of the database, highlights the most recurring types, the main cross-field patterns, and present the main findings of the field-level analysis.¹

2.1 Field level distribution

Methodological note: multi-value fields means that a single recommendation can have more than one value per field. Percentages for these fields are calculated as the share of recommendations containing each value at least once. As a result, percentages across values within the same field do not sum to 100%, reflecting the cross-cutting nature of many recommendations (see Annex).

Enabling Principle (*chart 1*): Accessible and Sustainable Resources (P3) is the single most frequent principle addressed, appearing in 38.3% of the recommendations. Respect and Protection of Fundamental Civic Freedoms (P1) follows with 27.4%. The least addressed enabling principle is Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society (P5) at 16.5%. The other three principles sit at the middle with 24.1% for An Open and Responsive State (P4), 21.8% for Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework to Enable Association (P2) and 21.5% for Access to a Secure Digital Environment (P6).

Sub-dimension (*chart 2*): all 18 subdimensions are represented in the CFRs, and Civic Responsibility and Popular Sovereignty is noticeably lower appearing in 3.9% of the recommendations. The three P3 sub-dimensions (Accessibility, Effectiveness and Sustainability of Resources) dominate the top four places of the ranking, with Freedom of Expression slotted in at 3rd place with 19.1% of the recommendations. Conversely, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly stands in 12th place with 9.9%, and Digital Security and Privacy comes up in 8th place with 12.5% of the recommendations.

Type of Action (*chart 3*): Capacity building is the top type of action appearing in 28.1% of the recommendations, followed by reforms: Legal (24.9%), Funding (24.5%), Regulatory (22.2%) and Institutional (18.1%). Then come the process-oriented types of action directed to civil society or its relationship with the state: Transparency and accountability (17.4%), Coordination (16.4%), Protection of defenders (13.5%), Participation and consultation (12.8%) and Civic education (11.9%). Diplomacy and international advocacy is the least addressed, by 8.8% of the recommendations.

Level of Action (*chart 4*): is the most irregular in distribution with National level accounting for 93.8% of recommendations, followed by Global (16.7%), while Sub-national (5.9%) and Regional (0.9%) are marginal.

¹ Charts on the distribution and share of recommendations are available in the Annex.

Target Actor (chart 5): the National government (executive) is the dominant duty-bearer, targeted in 45.2% of recommendations. Local civil society follows with 26.8% and Donor governments with 24.7%. In a third tier is Parliament/legislature (16.9%), Multilateral organisations (14.4%) and International civil society / NGOs (13.8%). The most under-targeted actors are Judiciary (2.0%), Private sector (1.0%) and Multistakeholder international initiatives (0.4%).

2.2 Field level main findings

The **predominance of P3 (Accessible and Sustainable Resources)** over P1 (Protection of Fundamental Civic Freedoms) is counter-intuitive since P1 can be understood as the foundational layer of the enabling environment and P3 is somehow conceptually narrower. However, coupled with the weight of P3 subdimensions, funding reform and donor governments, reflects a clear concern of civil society organisations (CSOs) about the current fragile global aid system and decline in funding by traditional donors.

Having P5 (Supportive Public Culture) and its subdimensions as the least addressed, which are about civic culture and speak to citizens' political agency and inclusion, suggests that recommendations gravitate toward instruments the state and donors can change directly (laws, funding, institutions) rather than the slower, more transformative and normative work of changing public discourse and social norms about civil society. This is consistent with the **high frequency of legal reforms as the type of action, and national government and donors as the main target actors (chart 7)**.


On the subdimensions field, the data confirms but also refines the principle-level picture, with a relevant caveat: **Digital Security and Privacy's relative importance**, focused primarily on capacity building of local civil society (develop CSO digital security capability, baseline tools, training and protocols) and secondarily on the legal and regulatory frameworks for data protection and surveillance.

Regarding types of action, the recommendations give more weight to hard structural change (laws, regulations, funding mechanisms) than to softer relational and participatory work (accountability, coordination, consultation, narrative). Diplomacy and international advocacy is the least addressed action, which is consistent with the extreme concentration of national-level action in the recommendations. The regional level appears in only 11 recommendations, suggesting a gap in cross-border and regional bloc recommendations, whilst civic restrictions today are increasingly transnationally coordinated.

Looking at the target actors of the recommendations, the first three positions (national government, local civil society and donor governments) are coherent with the findings for enabling principle, type and level of action. In contrast, parliament/legislature is lower than expected given that legal reform recommendations should logically be addressed there. The judiciary is particularly under-targeted (2%) for a body focused on applying laws, administering justice and acting as a guardian of fundamental rights and civil liberties. Finally, the private sector / corporate actor appears in only 12 recommendations (1%), which is a

meaningful gap because some corporate practices (surveillance, lobbying, legal threats, etc.) are contributing to the shrinking of civic space.

2.3 Cross-cutting patterns and findings



Reading closer the patterns across multi-value fields, the main finding is the dominant triplet of P3 (Accessible and Sustainable Resources) + funding reform + donor governments as the most frequent combination in the recommendations and present in 51 of the 54 CFRs. International civil society / NGOs also pair strongly with P3 and funding reform. This reinforces the previous observation that a clear **binding constraint on civil society today is the resource environment**, and the principal demand is for donors and international NGOs to change how, what and who they fund.

Recommendations converge on the well-known **power shift and localisation agenda of development cooperation**, calling to move from short-term, project-based funding to multi-year, core, and flexible funding of CSOs that covers institutional and operational costs. Direct funding to grassroots, rural, marginalised and local organisations, beyond capital cities and large national CSOs, come up as a relevant ask. Complemented with a call to donors for simplification of administrative requirements, eligibility criteria, reporting templates and compliance regimes designed for international NGOs that are unworkable for small, rural, or politically constrained organisations.

However, recommendations do not place full responsibility for civil society's resource environment externally on donors and international NGOs alone. It places equally substantial responsibility internally on local civil society, this is what the second top triplet (P3 + capacity building + local civil society) tells us. Here recommendations are directed to **local CSOs themselves to strengthen their own** governance and financial systems and organise as a sector to work together in coalitions, networks and joint advocacy platforms.

Adding the regulatory architecture recommendations triplet (P2 + regulatory reform + national government) to the abovementioned clusters, together they describe a more complete **reform agenda targeting three duty-bearers** simultaneously. **Donors** must change funding behaviour, local CSOs must strengthen themselves internally and as a sector, and **states** must reform the regulatory architecture simplifying and streamlining CSO/NGO registration and oversight procedures, replacing discretionary regimes with declaratory, time-bound, decentralised, proportional and transparent systems.


Another relevant interconnected theme related to the legal framework and civic space protection comprises P2 and P1 + legal reform and protection of defenders + national government and parliament. Recommendations here are directed to:

- a) repeal, withdraw or substantially amend specific **civic-space restriction laws**, articles and draft bills that criminalise expression, association, and assembly related to CSOs, foreign agents, public order and assembly, security, counter-terrorism, cybercrime and data protection; and
- b) establish or **strengthen protection mechanisms** for defenders, journalists, and civil society actors such as protection units, rapid-response protocols, anti-SLAPP measures, and ending stigmatisation, surveillance and digital repression.

Finally, it is important to flag a strong specialisation identified: recommendations targeting **security forces** are 90% oriented to P1 (Respect and Protection of Fundamental Civic Freedoms), the cleanest single-principle correlation in the data, **concentrated on protection of defenders and institutional reform**.

3. Regional trends analysis

Following the overall analysis of the CFR recommendations database, this section presents the main trends and findings from a regional specific analysis of the data.



Across all four EU SEE regions there is a convergence of CFR recommendations patterns on the most recurrent enabling principle, target actor and level of action. Every region prioritises P3-Resources followed by P1-Civic Freedoms, but Africa is the only region where P6-Digital outranks P2-Legal Framework and P4-Open State. The national level is by far, over 90%, the main level of action in all regions (*chart 10*) and the national government is the dominant targeted actor by the recommendations, with local civil society and donor governments coming up next.

The civic responsibility subdimension of P5-Public Culture, that is about citizens' role in democratic life, appears consistently as the lowest across all regions. This is worth flagging as it may say something about how the diagnoses of enabling environment challenges in CFR recommendations are more institutional than citizen oriented.

Where the regions diverge most sharply is on the type of action (*chart 11*) and on the regional concentration of target actors (*chart 12*) in the CFR recommendations:

- In **Africa and the Americas/Caribbean** capacity building is confirmed as the priority type of action, while Asia/Pacific prioritises legal reform and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) funding reform.
- **Africa** recommendations focus on legislative reform through parliaments engaging the basic legal architecture of civil society (registration, assembly, expression, cybercrime), with international actors comparatively peripheral
- The **Americas/Caribbean** recommendations call less for action on legal and regulatory reform than other regions, more for civic education and protection and is the region that targets most multilateral organisations.
- **Asia/Pacific** targets more funding reform and donor governments over local civil society and has the highest share of recommendations on legal reform with parallel international leverage (diplomacy and international advocacy).

- **MENA trends are illustrative findings from 4 CFR, therefore not representative of the whole region.** In these, the focus is on funding and regulatory reform with international civil society/NGO as an important target actor that operational substitutes where donors and multilaterals are constrained.

State actors (national government, parliament/legislature, judiciary, independent /oversight bodies, security forces) are dominant in the CFR recommendations of every region, but **some variations are analytically meaningful**:

- **Africa is the most state-tilted region (48.4%)**, driven by the elevated parliament /legislature targeting in the recommendations, but with an average civil society share (local and international CSOs).
- **Americas and the Caribbean is the most non-state tilted region** with the lowest state actor share (43.1%) and the highest civil society share (28.0%). The region inclines more on empowering civil society and engaging international protection mechanisms than on reforming state action, relative to the others.
- **Asia/Pacific has the highest international actors share (26.8%)** explained mainly by donor governments addressed in the recommendations.
- **MENA** has the highest share of recommendations targeting the private sector, although it is the lowest targeted actor (2.8%), exclusively directed to the financial sector and heavily focused in one country.

3.1 Regional findings

Africa's recommendations are the most national-state and legislative focused of the four regions: 98.8% of its recommendations target the national level, only 12.4% the global level (the lowest of any region) and parliament/ legislature appears in nearly one in five recommendations (*chart 13*). This is consistent with the context reading of CFR in which **legislative reform pathways are viewed as active and actionable**, where the asks include both executive and legislative action and are structurally oriented to reform the CSO operating framework with specific laws, acts and statutes addressed.

The two most noteworthy findings are a strong appearance of P6-Digital and its subdimensions (digital rights, security and accessibility), and the significant concentration of recommendations targeting security forces (5.7% in Africa vs 2.0% in Americas/ Caribbean). An important caveat on the later: it is driven by the active conflict context in Sudan, accounting for one third of the recommendations targeting this actor, but it's recurrent in almost half of the other African countries analysed.

Recommendations are clustered around protest and assembly policing, digital surveillance and the online targeting of activists. It signals that civic space in African CFR is significantly diagnosed through what happens at the street level (demonstrations, rural community contexts and crowd management situations),

highlights the importance of state security organs in restricting civic space and underlines the **digital civic space as a contested terrain in the region**. Recommendations rarely ask for demilitarisation of security forces, they ask for professionalisation, oversight mechanisms, and protection of defenders from those forces.

A surprising finding is the low level -compared to other regions- of participation and consultation as a type of action addressed in the recommendations. This combined with above average share of recommendations on transparency and accountability and regulatory reform, seems to put **emphasis on what state institutions should do or stop doing**, more than on how civil society should be brought into decision-making, which differs from the more participatory framing prevalent in the other regions.

Americas/Caribbean has a distinctive recommendation profile with an important weight on civic culture, narrative legitimacy and protection architecture. The lowest share of legal and regulatory reform in all regions, the highest of civic education and above average attention to protection of defenders, participation and coalition-building (*chart 14*). Coupled with the highest local civil society targeting (30.5%) and an elevated share of the subdimension on public discourse and constructive dialogue, points to a region where the **diagnosis of civic space problems is less about the basic legal framework and more about the practices**, norms and protection gaps around it, with the exception of a clear regional pushback on foreign agents laws. A regional context where legal frameworks for CSOs often exist but are unevenly applied, defenders face high physical risk, and civic discourse is politically polarised.

Enabling and protection of civic space is sought less through legislative action and more **through narrative, protection and coordination**, where recommendations focus on:

- Countering stigmatisation and criminalisation of protest by state authorities, and demanding legitimacy of CSOs.
- Comprehensive protection mechanisms and emerging civic space threats (SLAPPs, AI, surveillance technology and environmental defenders).
- Coalition-building with media, academia and community networks to counter polarisation and jointly monitor civic space violations.

A strong representation of multilateral organisations as a target actor, the highest regional level orientation and the lowest state-actor share of the four regions, suggest that CFRs in Americas/Caribbean see **legitimacy and protection of CSOs as channelled substantially through Inter-American and UN mechanisms**.

The intersectional framing is more pronounced and operationally specific than in other regions, with recommendations more explicitly including indigenous, Afro-descendant, women, LGBTQI+, rural, youth, migrants, and persons with disabilities.

Finally, donor practice reform is recurrent and is not primarily about funding availability but about how donors operate (effectiveness of resources as the main subdimension addressed). The asks are consistent with the overall patterns mentioned in section 2.

Asia and the Pacific is in many fields the closest to the overall findings but has distinctive features on type of action and targeted actors. Considering the heterogeneity of country contexts, it's the region with the highest share of legal reform recommendations (28.5%), with more emphasis on diplomacy and international advocacy and global level recommendations (20.0%). In aggregate, Asia/Pacific CFR recommendations target more international actors than civil society, and donor governments are the second most targeted actor, a pattern unique to this region.

Legal reform is called for with high specificity on restrictive statutes and closing civic space acts being deployed across countries, clustered around three recurrent issues: assembly and public order acts, NGO/CSO operating frameworks, and cybercrime/ online safety legislation. The parliament/legislative, although having the lower share of the four regions, is clearly addressed by Asia/Pacific recommendations related to legal reform. In contrast, the judiciary is practically absent as a target actor (only 2 of 414 recommendations) even if judicial functions are mentioned across many legal reform recommendations (judicial review, judicial warrants for interception and judicial oversight of surveillance). CFRs depict courts as infrastructure for rights protection and ask the government (executive) to ensure judicial independence, rather than as an active duty-bearer to target in advocacy for civic space protection.

Almost every major **national legislative ask is matched with a parallel international leverage ask**. The diplomacy and international advocacy recommendations are directed in most countries to conditionality and external pressure for closing civic space contexts, asking for specific statutes to be addressed in bilateral human rights dialogues, for UN review of restrictive frameworks, for including civic space clauses in bilateral agreements and tying trade preferences to human rights benchmarks. However, there is a distinct set of recommendations from Afghanistan and Burma/Myanmar, where the domestic government is not a viable interlocutor, focused on non-recognition of the state and international accountability.

Other global recommendations are directed to funding reform, focused on donor practice shift to predictable, multi-year and flexible core funding but with a stronger **conditionality aspect of integrating civic space indicators into development cooperation strategies**. On the other hand, this region under-emphasises capacity building, protection of defenders, and transparency relative to other regions.

MENA analysis is indicative only of the 4 available CFR: a sample of two Maghreb (Algeria and Tunisia) plus two Levant (Jordan and Lebanon) countries with particular contextual features, rather than representative of the broader region. Therefore, findings from these CFR recommendations need to be read cautiously and are not representative of the region. Some marked patterns emerge from the four countries:

First, recommendations addressed to P3-Resources are the highest in any region (45.9%) driven by an extraordinary share on the Effectiveness of Resources subdimension (*chart 16*) and combined with funding reform as the top type of action (31.2%) over capacity-building and legal reform. This is an interesting finding

indicating that **recommendations focus heavily on making donor funding flow better and be more effectively used**, with three highly recurrent asks. Two of them consistent with other regions funding reform recommendations (i.e. multi-year, flexible, core institutional funding and decentralisation to reach grassroots, rural and women organisations), and one very distinctive and specialised: support CSOs to navigate the enhanced anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) compliance with technical assistance and intermediary funding mechanisms, specially asked by Lebanon CFR in relation to FATF grey-listing and EU high-risk designation.

Second, the lower representation of legal reform as a type of action combined with the lowest Parliament/legislature targeting of any region, suggests that in these four CFRs the recommendations look less at legislative reform as a vehicle for enabling civil society, focusing instead on regulatory reform (27.5%) through coordination and coalition building, protection of defenders and participation, with a clear call for international civil society engagement (highest of all regions). The pattern is **reform through existing frameworks and institutions rather than reform through new legislation**. The three most recurrent regulatory asks are:

- Procedural simplification for CSO operation within the existing legal framework with digitalised processes and replace discretionary with a declaratory system.
- Independent appeal mechanisms for CSOs and strengthening of oversight bodies.
- Prevent misuse of AML/CFT and security frameworks against civil society. This bridges back to the first cluster but operates on the regulatory side (proportionate criteria and simplification of administrative procedures).

Regarding international civil society/NGO (INGOs) engagement, recommendations concentrate on INGOs as intermediary, flexible funders and capacity-building providers for independent organisations, rapid-response mechanisms, monitoring and documentation work, legal defence, digital security, navigating AML/CFT compliance requirements and as diplomatic engagement actors to raise concerns about detentions, civic space restrictions, and the use of restrictive laws. **INGOs occupy a distinctive operational niche in MENA recommendations**: more flexible and quicker than donor governments, more substantively engaged than multilateral organisations, capable of working around state constraints and as partners in evidence-production. This is a specific role in a constrained civic space environment, and it differs analytically from how INGOs feature in the other regions.

Finally, the absence of recommendations on Civic Responsibility and Popular Sovereignty is worth flagging. Though, given the small 4 CFR sample and having Political and Civic Equality and Inclusion with the highest share of all regions, it could reflect coding choices or report framing rather than a substantive regional pattern.

4. Conclusions and advocacy priorities

This final section synthesises the main analytical findings from the systematisation of the 54 CFR recommendations and presents some advocacy priorities (global and

regional) that draw on those findings and extend them into interpretative recommendations for EU SEE advocacy and programming.

4.1 Global advocacy priorities

- a) **Reform the donor funding architecture.** The best evidenced single call in the recommendations across the database asks for a better use of resources with multi-year, core, and flexible support, direct funding to grassroots and marginalised organisations and a reduction in administrative and reporting burden.
- b) **Strengthen civil society from the inside and build capacity.** Capacity building is the top type of action appearing in 28.1% of the recommendations and the second largest cluster of CFR recommendations is directed at civil society itself to strengthen internal governance and financial management, build coalitions and increase sectoral coordination. The most requested kind of capacity building is on digital security and emerging technologies competencies. Then follows financial sustainability and resource mobilisation of CSOs to reduce donor dependence and build durable financing. Third comes advocacy, strategic and documentation skills, significantly linked to coalition-building and sectoral coordination.
- c) **Repeal restrictive legal frameworks and protect defenders.** A consistent demand runs across the database for the repeal or amendment of laws that criminalise expression, assembly, and association; for the simplification of CSO registration and oversight regimes; and for operational protection mechanisms for human rights defenders and journalists. The substantial overlap of P1-Civic Freedoms and P2-Legal Framework in CFR recommendations addressed overwhelmingly to national governments and parliaments suggests that in many contexts the legal framework is the instrument of civic space restriction.
- d) **Engage overlooked actors.** Two relevant actors in shaping civic space are almost absent from how CFR currently frame the asks: the judiciary appears in 2% of the recommendations and the private sector in 1%. Independent courts are often a critical actor in the defence against restrictive laws and private actors increasingly shape the legal and digital environment in which civil society operates.
- e) **Work on narratives and public legitimacy.** The recommendations database captures well the demand for legal protection, funding and capacity-building of civil society, but does not surface clearly the need for developing new effective narratives as a long-term strategy for enabling civic space, protecting human rights and regaining legitimacy.
- f) **Treat digital security and rights as a core need for civil society.** Digital security and privacy is the third most concentrated thematic cluster in recommendations. The main demand is to build the digital security capacity of civil society, pointing to a structural gap rather than a one-off training need. Another significant ask is for legal frameworks that protect data and constrain state (and non-state) surveillance.

- g) The **transnational dimension blind spot in CFR recommendations**. The database reflects an overwhelmingly national-oriented framing with 93.8% of recommendations directed at the national level and only 0.9% at the regional level. Transnational repression is not mentioned at all in any CFR recommendation.

Finally, it is worth signalling that 81% of the recommendations targeting **international CSOs** are related to P3-Resources (the highest single-principle concentration among target actors), suggesting that CFR read international CSOs primarily as resource channelers, intermediaries and capacity providers, not as advocacy actors. It's a structural gap, to read cautiously since the national is by far the main level of action.

4.2 Regional advocacy priorities

Africa has the strongest concentration of digital rights and digital security demands, with some urgent regional priorities: surveillance expansion, internet shutdowns, and platform level restrictions. Combined with elevated security forces targeting, this suggests CFR recommendations identify digital repression as a particular concern and call for protective measures and accountability mechanisms. Another priority is the importance of legislative pathways through parliaments for civic space protection, and the call for legal advocacy where reform windows open (usually after political transitions). Local CSO need the institutional capacity to engage properly in this action.

Americas and the Caribbean is the less legal reform focused region and more oriented to civic culture and coalition-building. A clear advocacy priority is the protection of human rights and environmental defenders and journalists, which requires operational mechanisms, relocation support and rapid response capacity, channelled in part through multilateral organisations and international solidarity. A second priority is investment in public narrative work to counter the political delegitimation and stigmatisation of civil society now well advanced across much of the region. In addition, the CFRs call for strengthening collective civic work at CSO sector level (not just individual CSO), including support regional peer-learning and south-south cooperation.

Asia and the Pacific has the highest share of CFR recommendations directed at international and diplomatic channels alongside legal reform. The regional priority is framing civic space advocacy around the legal architecture (restrictive NGO laws, registration regimes, assembly restrictions, cybercrime and online safety legislation), to be conducted locally and through multilateral and international advocacy using leverage instruments such as human rights clauses in agreements, UN mechanisms, diplomatic engagement and aid conditionality.

MENA findings reflect recommendations from 4 CFR (Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon) with marked national specificities, they are illustrative and should not be read as representative of the broader region. With that caveat, the distinguishing signal is concentrated on the effectiveness of resources reaching civil society. The

regional priority is rigorous attention to how funding is strategically delivered, absorbed, and accounted for under restricted political conditions, including support to navigate AML/CFT compliance. Freedom of expression, including its judicial and media dimensions, is a particular issue for local and international advocacy work focused on regulatory frameworks, civil society coalitions and protections of defenders.

Research Author:

Camilo Tovar, May 2026

Contributions:

Emma Achilli
Ana Anguladze
Jake Wieczorek

*This publication was funded by the European Union.
Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
European Union.*

