

Chad

Country Focus Report

2025



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A) An Introduction to the Enabling Environment

What we understand by an Enabling Environment is the combination of laws, rules and social attitudes that support and promote the work of civil society. Within such an environment, civil society can engage in political and public life without fear of reprisals, openly express its views, and actively participate in shaping its context. This includes a supportive legal and regulatory framework for civil society, ensuring access to information and resources that are sustainable and flexible to pursue their goals unhindered, in safe physical and digital spaces. In an enabling environment, the state demonstrates openness and responsiveness in governance, promoting transparency, accountability, and inclusive decision-making. Positive values, norms, attitudes, and practices towards civil society from state and non-state actors further underscore the supportive environment.

To capture the state of the Enabling Environment, we use the following six principles:

SIX ENABLING PRINCIPLES

-  **Respect and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms**
-  **Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework**
-  **Accessible and Sustainable Resources**
-  **Open and Responsive State**
-  **Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society**
-  **Access to a Secure Digital Environment**

In this Country Focus Report, each enabling principle is assessed with a quantitative score and complemented by an analysis and recommendations written by our Network Members. Rather than offering a singular index to rank countries, the report aims to measure the enabling environment for civil society across the six principles, discerning dimensions of strength and those requiring attention.

The findings presented in this report are grounded in the insights and diverse perspectives of civil society actors who came together in a dedicated panel with representatives from civil society to discuss and evaluate the state of the Enabling Environment. Their collective input enriches the report with a grounded, participatory assessment. This primary input is further supported by secondary sources of information, which provide additional context and strengthen the analysis.

Reporting period covered: November 2024–November 2025

Brief Overview of the Country Context

The period from late 2024 to November 2025 was characterised by a post-transition political order that consolidated executive dominance, narrowed civic space, and heightened surveillance of civil society. Despite their indispensable role in humanitarian response and community-level resilience, civil society organisations continued to face severe limitations on their ability to advocate, monitor governance, or exercise fundamental freedoms.

Chad's current civic environment cannot be understood without recalling the [trajectory of political consolidation](#) that began in April 2021, when the [death of President Idriss Déby Itno](#) on the battlefield enabled the *Transitional Military Council (TMC)* under the president's son, Mahamat Idriss Déby to seize power, suspend the 2018 Constitution, and centralise authority through a Transitional Charter. Although [the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue \(DNIS\)](#) of 2022 was presented as a national consultation intended to steer the country back to constitutional order, [extensive boycotts](#) by civil society and opposition groups weakened its legitimacy and ultimately enabled the military leadership to maintain control while framing the process as participatory.

This sequence set the stage for the December 2023 [constitutional referendum](#) and the promulgation of [Chad's fifth constitution](#)—both marked by controversy—which paved the way for the 2024 electoral cycle. The May 2024 presidential election, [marred](#) by allegations of violence, restricted monitoring, and opposition exclusion, reinforced executive dominance and unfolded against the [backdrop of lingering impunity for past abuses](#), including the October 2022 crackdown. The [December 2024 legislative elections](#), the first in more than a decade, produced a sweeping majority for the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) party and triggered [opposition protests amid accusations](#) of fraud, intimidation, and implausible turnout figures. Although a new National Assembly was inaugurated in February 2025, the concentration of political power remained effectively unchanged, heightening concerns about pluralism and institutional oversight.

Throughout this period, civic space faced significant contraction. Authorities frequently employed Ordinance No. 011/PR/2023 to [block peaceful assemblies](#)—including youth- and rights-based mobilisations—and episodes such as the [February 2024 killing](#) of the opposition

Socialist Party Without Borders leader Yaya Dillo by security forces during their attack on the party's headquarters in N'Djamena deepened the climate of fear. Independent [assessments](#) consistently documented repression of civil society activists, arbitrary detentions, and excessive force against protesters, underscoring the state's preference for coercive control over genuine engagement.


Meanwhile, regional insecurity and humanitarian pressures intensified. Spillover from the Sudan conflict, [renewed rebel activity](#) (including Front for Change and Concord in Chad - FACT), and worsening cross-border instability contributed to state securitisation, further justifying restrictive governance practices. The arrival of more than 240,000 [new refugees](#) from Sudan in 2024 placed additional strain on national systems, increasing reliance on civil society actors for protection, mediation, and basic services even as these same actors operated under heightened administrative and political constraints.

B) Assessment of the Enabling Environment

PRINCIPLE SCORE

1. Respect and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms

Score:¹



Chad's civic space between November 2024 and November 2025 was rated as [repressed](#), marked by deepening de-constitutionalisation, where constitutional guarantees and international commitments to fundamental freedoms were systematically hollowed out by security-driven governance and an expansive interpretation of "state interests." Despite Article 28 of the [2023 Constitution](#) and the ICCPR formally protecting freedoms of association, assembly and expression, these rights became largely illusory as administrative opacity, arbitrary bans, and ministerial decrees—particularly under Ordinances No. 011/PT/2023 and No. 023/PR/2018—enabled widespread restrictions on civil society activity. CSOs faced prolonged registration delays, threats of dissolution, intimidation, surveillance and low-intensity judicial harassment, while public assemblies were routinely prohibited on vague grounds of public order. This shrinking physical civic space was compounded by a digital erosion, with recurrent internet shutdowns and social-media blackouts—especially in Lac province and during political tensions in N'Djamena—undermining communication, coordination and real-time documentation of abuses. International assessments consistently classified Chad as having a restricted civic space, where only humanitarian or apolitical organisations enjoyed limited tolerance, while actors engaged in governance, accountability, or rights-based advocacy operated in an unpredictable and increasingly repressive environment that stifled dissent and curtailed their role in democratic mediation.

1.1 | Freedom of Association

¹This is a rebased score derived from the [CIVICUS Monitor rating](#) published in December 2025.

Freedom of association remained formally guaranteed under Article 28 of the 2023 Constitution and reinforced through Chad’s commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Yet, by late 2024 and throughout 2025, these protections were systematically eroded by administrative practices and security-driven governance. The registration of civil society organisations (CSOs) became an increasingly opaque process, marked by extended delays—often exceeding twelve months—without legal justification, mirroring patterns of obstruction documented in other areas of civic participation. The centralisation of registration authority in N’Djamena, combined with limited transparency, created structural barriers for rural and emerging organisations, particularly youth and community-based groups, thereby deepening existing inequalities within the sector.

The environment worsened with the expanded use of Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018, which provided broad discretionary power to dissolve organisations by ministerial decree on vague grounds such as “national unity” or “public order.” Between September 2024 and November 2025, several civil society organisations, such as the Association of Young People for Rural Development and Activities (AJADR) and the National Coordination of Young People for Peace and Development in Chad (CONAJEPDT), were dissolved by the authorities for failing to comply with legal provisions. This practice aligned with [documented cases](#) where the government has historically invoked security concerns to [suppress](#) political opposition or civic mobilisation, including violent crackdowns and repression of civil society actors. The lack of prior judicial review or access to independent appeals mechanisms further entrenched the risk of arbitrary dissolution of CSOs.

Civil society organisations such as Reporters Without Borders (RSF) have [documented](#) a resurgence of intimidation, ranging from arbitrary police summonses to the use of unmarked vehicles with tinted windows by the intelligence services to track civil society actors covering sensitive topics. This panoptic surveillance apparatus, coupled with persistent impunity for perpetrators of violations, forces civil society organisations into widespread self-censorship, limiting their ability to document abuses independently. The [case study](#) by the Chadian League for Human Rights (LTDH) in November 2025 perfectly illustrates this hostility: a team on a mission to Bol (Lake Province) for a project to prevent violent extremism was detained by local authorities without any clear legal basis. This incident, denounced by the FIDH, demonstrates that even research and awareness-raising activities are viewed with suspicion by an ultra-centralised government

Throughout 2025, [political developments](#)—including opposition protests over the disputed 2024 election results—contributed to a hostile climate for associations perceived as critical of state policy. Reports of intimidation, surveillance, and temporary detention of CSO leaders increased, with patterns resembling earlier practices described in the [Civicus 2025](#). In this environment, human rights organisations, advocacy networks, and watchdog groups faced heightened scrutiny, while humanitarian and service-delivery CSOs experienced comparatively fewer obstacles, reflecting a broader pattern of “utilitarian tolerance” within authoritarian contexts. Overall, trends from late 2024 to November 2025 indicate a continued decline in freedom of association, characterised by administrative repression, security-based justification of restrictions, and progressive legal de-constitutionalisation.

1.2 | Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

Although the 2023 Constitution protects the right to peaceful assembly, the legal framework governing demonstrations—including Ordinance No. 011/PR/2023—effectively transformed notification requirements into a de facto authorisation regime. From late 2024 into 2025,

authorities increasingly invoked broad notions of “public order,” “security risks,” or “risk of infiltration” to justify the refusal of protest notifications, mainly targeting mobilisation linked to governance, elections or civil rights. Examples include the ban on the march [planned by the collective of bailiffs-commissioners](#) of justice on Thursday 17 October 2024, [and the ban by decree](#) No. 11 on the activities of the Mouvement Citoyen le Temps. In early 2025, two prominent bans illustrated the systemic nature of these restrictions. The Ministry of Public Security [prohibited a peaceful protest](#) planned by the *Rassemblement des Jeunes Africains (R.J.A.)* for 24 January 2025, citing non-compliance with articles 5 and 6 of Ordinance No. 011/PR/2023, relating to demonstrations on the public highway; and banned on grounds of risks to public order. A similar justification was used [to block a march](#) planned for 17 March 2025 by the *Collectif des Victimes de licenciement supposé abusif de la CNDH*. These decisions occurred against a backdrop of tighter policing of demonstrations linked to governance, labour rights, or institutional reform debates—particularly following the contested 2024 legislative elections. This mirrored documented trends in previous election cycles where authorities used security legislation to regulate political expression in public spaces, notably the [disputed 2024 election protests](#). The cumulative effect was a predictable pattern of bans targeting politically sensitive gatherings.

Security forces continued to manage assemblies through low-intensity coercion, including temporary arrests of organisers, pre-emptive detentions, and the presence of heavily armed units at potential protest sites. These methods echoed earlier patterns of excessive force and celebratory gunfire documented by [Human Rights Watch](#) in the post-election violence of May 2024. Compounding this, civil society organisations reported periodic internet disruptions—particularly in conflict-affected provinces such as Lac—that hampered coordination and prevented real-time reporting of abuses. This tactic, previously noted in [regional security assessments](#), contributed to an environment where monitoring and mobilisation were structurally suppressed.

Overall, by November 2025, the freedom of peaceful assembly in Chad was characterised by systematic bans, securitised administrative oversight, differential treatment of political or rights-based gatherings, and the use of technological restrictions—all contributing to a significantly diminished public sphere for civil society engagement.

1.3 | Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression during this period underwent further “de-constitutionalisation,” reflecting a widening gap between formal guarantees and restrictive administrative practice. While Article 28 of the 2023 Constitution and Article 19 of the ICCPR protect free expression, the authorities intensified the use of Ordinances No. 011/PT/2023 and No. 009/IPT/2023 to criminalise commentary related to governance, security operations, or electoral disputes. In 2025, such legislation was increasingly used to justify arrests, confiscation of equipment, and intimidation of journalists, bloggers, and human rights observers.

Between 2024 and 2025, multiple cases pointed to a tightening crackdown on freedom of expression in Chad. In March 2024, journalist Idriss Yaya and members of his family [were killed](#), with no effective investigation. In July 2024, authorities forced media outlets to remove content and [temporarily suspended](#) a news website through misused legal procedures. An RSF investigation published in August 2025 documented the surveillance and intimidation of at least six journalists by security services. In 2025, journalist Olivier Monodji was [detained for over four months](#) before his acquittal in July, and in September 2025, human rights activists

Makaila Nguebla and Charfadine Galmaye Saleh [had their nationality revoked](#) following sustained criticism of the authorities.

Freedom House [reported escalating intimidation](#) and violence against protesters, activists, and journalists throughout 2024 and into 2025, noting that several high-profile actors—including opposition politician Yaya Dillo, killed in February 2024—were targeted in circumstances that intensified fears of reprisals. These incidents reinforced a pervasive climate of self-censorship, particularly for individuals reporting on corruption, abuses by security forces, or the conduct of electoral institutions. Traditional media outlets, meanwhile, operated within an environment of informal censorship and state pressure, often avoiding coverage of opposition positions or governance controversies to reduce the risk of sanctions.


By late 2025, topics deemed “sensitive”—including security force abuses, ethnic dynamics within the military, rebel activity, political corruption, or electoral legitimacy—were increasingly off-limits for public debate. Civil society testimonies collected throughout 2025 highlighted a growing sense of insecurity among actors who feared reprisals for online or offline speech critical of state policy. Trend analyses across sources indicate overall decline, with shrinking space for investigative journalism, rights-based advocacy, and accountability work and increasing consolidation of government control over both traditional and digital information environments.



PRINCIPLE SCORE

2. Supportive Legal and Regulatory Framework

Score:



The legal and regulatory framework governing civil society in Chad during 2024–2025 remained structurally restrictive, marked by a widening disconnect between constitutional guarantees and administrative practice that directly undermined CSO registration, independence, and protection from interference. While Article 28 of the 2023 Constitution formally upholds freedom of association, the continued application of [Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018](#) entrenches a prior-authorisation system characterised by opaque procedures, excessive centralisation, and discretionary decision-making exercised without any obligation to provide justification. This framework enables the executive, under Article 11 of the same Ordinance, to dissolve organisations by simple ministerial decree on vague grounds such as threats to “national unity” or “public order,” with no requirement for prior judicial review. The law has been used as a lever to transform what should be a mere formality into a tool for rigorous political screening. The restrictive trend has been reinforced by [constitutional amendments](#) adopted in November 2025 that elevate national security above individual freedoms and by the instrumentalisation of criminal legislation—particularly Ordinances No. 011/PT/2023 and No. 009/IPT/2023—to criminalise monitoring activities and intimidate human rights defenders. Judicial recourse remains largely ineffective, as appeals before the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court produced no documented reversals of dissolution orders or accreditation refusals in 2025. Combined with persistent legislative stagnation, digital surveillance, and increasing financial vulnerability, these measures produce an environment of chronic legal uncertainty in which CSOs operate under continuous threat of administrative obstruction, compromising their independence and curtailing their capacity to act as neutral mediators or accountability actors.

2.1 | Registration

The civil society landscape in Chad in 2025 is marked by a profound contradiction between a protective constitutional foundation and an increasingly restrictive regulatory reality. Whilst

Article 28 of the 2023 Constitution formally enshrines freedom of association, secondary legislation, primarily Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018, has established a regime of ‘freedom under supervision’. Registration, far from being a mere formality, has become a tool for political screening via Article 5 of the said ordinance, which makes the legal existence of CSOs subject to prior authorisation from the Minister of Territorial Administration. Although Articles 8 and 9 theoretically set a three-month deadline for the ministerial decision, documented practice in 2025 reveals processing times that consistently exceed 12 months. This administrative opacity, coupled with the lack of any obligation to provide reasons for tacit refusals, creates an insurmountable barrier for local initiatives, whose applications become bogged down in centralised procedures in N’Djamena, requiring informal follow-up fees and complex documents (criminal record extracts, notarised articles of association) that are inaccessible to marginalised groups.

This legal uncertainty was exacerbated in 2025 by a recurring practice of direct administrative dissolutions. Relying on Article 11 of Ordinance 023, the executive can dissolve an organisation by simple ministerial decree on vague grounds such as “undermining national unity” or “public order”, without prior recourse to the courts. Several civil society organisations were dissolved or suspended during the monitoring period. For example, the Wakit Tama coordination body was [subject to a ban on its activities](#) since October 2022, which was effectively maintained during the 2024–2025 period. Other organisations, such as the CTDDH, have faced temporary suspensions and administrative pressure whereas, several local CSOs have had their authorisation to operate delayed for extended periods without legal justification, constituting an indirect form of restriction. This instantaneous ‘closure’ was reinforced by the constitutional amendments of November 2025, which enshrine the primacy of national security over individual freedoms, thereby weakening judicial oversight. Examples include a local human rights organisation whose operating licence was delayed for over a year without legal justification. This deliberate obstruction not only undermines the credibility of CSOs but also paralyses the implementation of projects funded by international partners, reducing civic space to a mere survival zone for those entities that avoid critical advocacy.

At the same time, the legislative arsenal relating to national security, the fight against disinformation and public order is being exploited to indirectly restrict citizen monitoring. The [reports](#) documented several suspensions of association activities without effective appeal mechanisms, as legal channels remain either too complex or inaccessible for challenging the arbitrary decisions of the local administration. The instrumentalisation of criminal law through the restrictive ordinances of 2023 (No. 011/PT/2023 on demonstrations and No. 009/IPT/2023 on internal security) transforms civic space into a zone of exclusion. Articles 6 and 7 of Ordinance 011 impose such a rigid framework that almost all citizens’ marches, such as that organised by [the SABARNA platform](#) in November 2025, have been banned, leading to the preventive arrest of community leaders without formal charges.

Access to financial resources constitutes another lever of control, with the state using Ordinance 023 to closely monitor foreign funds. This interference creates constant friction with technical and financial partners and undermines CSOs dependent on international aid, leaving them vulnerable to accusations of “politicisation”. Despite the theoretical existence of appeal mechanisms—such as administrative appeals to the Minister or appeals for abuse of power before the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court—the effectiveness of judicial protection remains non-existent. In 2025, no successful appeal brought by a CSO against a dissolution or a refusal of accreditation resulted in the administrative decision being overturned, confirming that impunity remains the norm for violations committed against civil society actors.

2.2 Operational environment

Although the 2023 Constitution and Law No. 27/PR/94 theoretically proclaim freedom of association, the operational environment in 2025 reveals a civic space under siege. This structural decline stems from a regulatory shift in which Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018 replaced the declaratory regime with a de facto authorisation system. The exercise of civil liberties is now subject to the discretionary use of ministerial power, which can order the immediate dissolution of organisations such as CONAJEPDT or AJADR by simple decree, citing vague grounds of undermining “national unity” or “public order” provided for in Article 11 of the said order, without any prior judicial review.

This legal uncertainty is exacerbated by a body of ad hoc legislation adopted in 2023, which criminalises grassroots civic action. Ordinance No. 011/PT/2023 (public demonstrations) and Ordinance No. 010/PT/2023 (public meetings) impose procedural requirements (a five-day notice period, Articles 6 and 7) so rigid that they justify the systematic refusal of permits. In 2025, these texts served as the legal basis for the violent dispersal of peaceful gatherings and the banning of fact-finding missions. For example, independent investigations into the [violence in Mandakao](#) were hampered by instructions from the public prosecutor’s office invoking Ordinance No. 008/PT/2023 on the state of emergency, transforming human rights monitoring into a criminal offence of ‘interference in matters of state security’.

The state makes a strategic distinction in its tolerance, favouring apolitical humanitarian action at the expense of advocacy, which is now stifled by panoptic financial control. In 2025, the Ministry of Territorial Administration tightened the requirement for compliance with the provisions of Ordinance 023 concerning external funding. Several human rights CSOs have reported delays in funding approvals and the freezing of bank accounts, with the authorities demanding exhaustive activity reports before authorising access to foreign currency. One notable case in 2025 involved the withholding of bilateral funding intended for an election monitoring project, under the pretext of combating “destabilising foreign influence”.

Ultimately, this coercive environment, characterised by selective tax audits and surveillance of digital communications, drives citizen movements towards self-censorship or underground activity. The systematic use of impunity for law enforcement during the dispersals of 2025 effectively paralysed the mediating role of CSOs, depriving them of their capacity for counter-power, which is essential to democracy.

2.3 | Protection against interference

Chad’s legal framework, although formally aligned with international standards, was transformed in 2025 into an instrument of systemic oppression where organisational autonomy is sacrificed in favour of absolute state control. State interference has become institutionalised through multi-faceted harassment, combining physical surveillance of the headquarters of organisations such as the LTDH with the criminalisation of civic action. This shift towards a security-driven approach reached a peak in 2025 with the proliferation of intrusive administrative inspections. These interventions, based on a broad interpretation of Ordinance 023/PR/2018, no longer aim at regulatory compliance but serve as a legal basis for paralysing the activities of CSOs through selective financial audits and incessant requests for mission reports, under threat of immediate suspension.

The precarious situation of civil society actors is cemented by radical administrative measures against which there is no effective remedy. In June 2025, Ministerial Orders Nos. 011 and 012 of the Minister of Territorial Administration ordered the [direct dissolution](#) of youth associations AJADR and CONAJEPDT, illustrating the executive’s ability to dismantle an associative structure without recourse to the courts. This hostility reached a historic threshold with the decree of 17 September 2025, whose key provisions allow for the revocation of citizenship for citizens whose activities are deemed “incompatible with the national interest”. This extreme

measure, used against critical voices, acts as a powerful deterrent, turning advocacy into a risk of death and statelessness.


The judiciary, far from acting as a bulwark, has become an instrument of intimidation where impunity is now set in legislative stone. The ongoing impact of the amnesty law of 23 November 2023 is being felt acutely in 2025: it has permanently blocked access to justice for victims of repression, ruling out any criminal liability for state agents. This denial of justice encourages abuses on the ground, as illustrated by the incident in November 2025 in Bol, where human rights defenders were subjected to abductions and humiliation by military authorities with complete impunity.

Overall, the near-total absence of effective legal protection against state interference has created an enabling environment that is profoundly hostile to independent civil society, where intrusive inspections, arbitrary dissolutions, and even citizenship revocation operate as powerful tools of intimidation. This climate of unchecked executive authority and judicial impunity not only paralyses organisational activity but also deters advocacy altogether, reducing civic engagement to a high-risk endeavour incompatible with genuine democratic participation.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

3. Accessible and Sustainable Resources

Score:



Access to financial resources represented a major existential challenge for Chadian civil society during the monitoring period, transforming the issue of economic survival into a matter of sovereignty and independence. The trajectory initiated at the 2018 National Forum has led to an unprecedented tightening of regulations which, under the guise of ensuring accountability, has resulted in a drastic reduction in funding opportunities. Drawing on [Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018](#), the government has introduced a rigorous control mechanism for foreign funds intended for CSOs and NGOs. This drive for state oversight creates constant friction between civil society organisations, technical and financial partners (TFPs) and the authorities, with the latter using financial leverage as a tool for political regulation of the civic space.

Reports from [CSOs](#) in 2024–2025 confirm a tightening of administrative controls, marked by increasingly onerous compliance and reporting requirements. These bureaucratic constraints disproportionately affect small local CSOs and those working on issues deemed sensitive (human rights, governance, transparency), often pushing them towards financial suffocation. The almost exclusive reliance on international funding leaves civil society vulnerable to fluctuations in bilateral aid, whilst national resources, whether public or private, remain marginal and uninstitutionalised. Despite these constraints, resilience is being built through humanitarian mechanisms and partnerships with international NGOs, as illustrated by the case of a local coalition that maintained its activities following the suspension of several bilateral funding streams, although these short-term solutions do not allow for sustainable strategic planning.

3.1 | Accessibility

Access to financial resources for Chadian civil society organisations in 2024–2025 was characterised by a structural dependence on international aid, now stifled by suffocating state oversight. Whilst external funding remains the driving force for survival, access to it is

compromised by the rigid application of Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018, which transforms the requirement for accountability into a tool for political filtering.

Under this legislation, the government exercises discretionary control over financial flows, creating constant friction between CSOs, technical and financial partners (TFPs) and the executive. This interference hinders the autonomy needed to respond to urgent crises, such as food insecurity, whilst fostering a climate of suspicion where the receipt of foreign funds is systematically equated with a “destabilising influence”. In March 2025, the arrest of media figures on charges of “collusion with foreign powers” illustrated this desire to criminalise international links and stigmatise independent civic engagement.

This vulnerability is exacerbated by a punitive tax and banking framework that ignores the specificities of the non-profit sector. The General Tax Code (CGI), particularly in its articles relating to Value Added Tax (VAT) and payroll deductions, provides no substantial exemptions for advocacy CSOs, unlike purely humanitarian organisations which benefit from selective tolerance. At the same time, the banking sector has become an instrument of state surveillance: opening accounts is conditional upon obtaining approvals that are often held up for over a year, and international transactions are subject to preventive freezes under the pretext of combating money laundering. In the absence of institutionalised and transparent national funding mechanisms, small local organisations find themselves deprived of independent resources. Their capacity for action, particularly in resolving inter-community conflicts, is thus directly subject to the political approval of the authorities, transforming development support into a lever for pressure and social control.

3.2 | Effectiveness

The effectiveness of resources accessed by Chadian civil society organisations in 2024–2025 is severely hampered by an environment that prioritises bureaucratic control at the expense of social impact. Whilst Chad languishes at the bottom of the global HDI rankings (190th place), this economic precariousness is exploited by the state to keep civil society organisations in a state of permanent vulnerability. Instead of focusing on strategic planning, CSOs are forced into a “survival mode” dictated by humanitarian emergencies and selective administrative harassment.

This fragility is compounded by the complexity of relations with international donors, whose management requirements paradoxically become a hindrance to operational agility in a crisis context. By November 2025, donors had tightened the conditions for the use of resources, imposing increasingly burdensome compliance audits to guard against the risks of misappropriation or misinterpretation of Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018. This “dual bureaucracy” – state and international – reduces CSOs’ flexibility in the face of political risks. Furthermore, donors’ responsiveness to security threats facing activists remains insufficient: financial security protocols rarely provide for emergency funds for the exfiltration or immediate legal protection of civil society leaders, as demonstrated by the violent obstruction of the mission in Bol in November 2025.

Chad’s regulatory framework, notably Article 36 of Ordinance 023, which subjects the use of foreign aid to close scrutiny by the relevant ministry, turns every transaction into a potential criminal risk. As of November 2025, funding regulations were supplemented by restrictive banking directives requiring justification for every cent received from abroad, on pain of having accounts frozen. Between selective tax scrutiny, donors’ excessive monitoring requirements and physical insecurity on the ground, civil society action in Chad has become an exhausting administrative struggle. This coercive framework strips organisations of their operational

substance, preventing them from acting as genuine drivers of development and confining them to the role of crisis managers under close supervision.

3.3 | Sustainability

The sustainability of civil society resources in Chad in 2024-2025 is hampered by structural precariousness that reduces organisational engagement to a focus on immediate needs. Whilst the sustainability of CSOs resources relies on a balance between institutional support and programme funding, the current model suffers from an almost exclusive dependence on international donors. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the ephemeral nature of short-term funding cycles, which preclude any strategic planning in the areas of reconciliation and peacebuilding. The absence of national support mechanisms is glaringly obvious: in 2025, no evidence of significant government grants or long-term institutional support programmes had been documented. Domestic philanthropy remained in its infancy and was not encouraged, leaving local organisations without a safety net in the face of endemic unemployment and food crises.

This fragility is deliberately perpetuated by a regulatory framework that has become hostile. Financial autonomy, though suggested by Law No. 27/PR/94, is undermined by Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018, which strictly regulates fundraising. Article 36 of this ordinance, combined with the 2023 regulations on law enforcement, poses a constant risk of assets being frozen on grounds of “disturbing public order” for any organisation receiving foreign funds. From a tax perspective, the General Tax Code provides for no exemption on income generated by CSOs’ self-financing activities (sales of services or products), subjecting them to the ordinary tax regime. This tax burden, combined with social security contributions, prevents staff retention and the stabilisation of employment contracts, leading to a brain drain towards international agencies and disrupting the succession of activists.


By 2025, gaps in the funding cycle had critical operational impacts: several inter-community mediation projects had to be abruptly halted due to a lack of financial bridging between two grant instalments, creating security gaps on the ground. The inability of CSOs to generate their own income legally and securely, due to the lack of a clear legal framework for the social and solidarity economy, keeps them in a state of chronic instability. This context transforms activism into a struggle for institutional survival, depriving civil society of its ability to formulate long-term proposals and act as a genuine lever for sustainable social transformation.



PRINCIPLE SCORE

4. Open and Responsive State

Score:



Relations between the state and civil society in Chad in 2025 remained trapped in a structural imbalance, where dialogue is often reduced to a mere formality devoid of any real influence on public policy. CSOs highlighted that, whilst consultation frameworks exist, they remain ad hoc and are generally limited to the humanitarian and social sectors, neglecting strategic governance issues. This dynamic is exacerbated by an ultra-centralised power structure where decisions are handed down vertically from ‘above’, leaving little room for diverse grassroots initiatives. The lack of transparency regarding the follow-up to recommendations made by CSOs, coupled with the absence of official feedback, as observed during the drafting of sectoral policies in 2024, reinforces the perception of a sham participation rather than a substantive engagement.

This mutual mistrust is fuelled by a political culture characterised by the manipulation and co-optation of civil society leaders based on their loyalty to the regime. CSOs, particularly those defending human rights, find themselves caught in a binary polarisation, being alternately accused of being ‘close to the regime’ or ‘in the pay of the opposition’. This stigma of politicisation, used by the authorities to delegitimise any criticism, hinders technical collaboration and confines organisations to the role of service providers (health, education) rather than partners in policy design. Although examples of tripartite partnerships exist, notably with the Ministry of Education, the real influence of women’s and youth organisations remains marginal, due to a lack of institutional mechanisms guaranteeing the integration of their contributions into final budgetary and legislative decisions.

4.1 | Transparency

The ideal of an open and responsive government in Chad is currently hampered by a systemic culture of secrecy and exclusion. Whilst transparency should form the basis of interactions

between the state and civil society, opacity in decision-making has become the institutional norm. Legally speaking, Chad suffers from a major regulatory vacuum: no specific law on access to information had been adopted by November 2025, and the 2023 Constitution remains silent on the practical arrangements for this right. Citizens and independent organisations are thus deprived of their ability to scrutinise public affairs, facing a total lack of justification for administrative acts. Whether it be refusals of authorisation based on Article 5 of Order No. 023/PR/2018 or bans on demonstrations under the guise of Order No. 011/PT/2023, the administration's deliberate vagueness renders any scrutiny of legality ineffective and turns legal remedies into purely illusory procedures.

The absence of binding legal obligations for public bodies regarding the publication of draft laws, detailed budgets or audit reports reinforces this power imbalance. In 2025, there was no formal procedure for requesting access to information (deadlines, fees or standard forms), leaving CSOs at the mercy of officials' goodwill. No independent appeal mechanism is in place to challenge a refusal to provide information, and the judicial system remains paralysed by influence peddling. The state's responsiveness is now expressed through repression rather than accountability. The use of extreme measures, such as the [September 2025 decrees](#) revoking citizenship used as political sanctions, illustrates a brutal breach of the social contract aimed at banning all documented dissent.

The openness displayed by the authorities is superficial and discriminatory: the government favours co-opted organisations whilst marginalising independent structures, particularly youth movements and feminist groups. This behind-closed-doors approach has led to a "sanctification" of crisis zones. In 2025, the public prosecutor's office systematically invoked "defence secrecy" or "national security" to block any independent investigation into the tragic events in Mandakao or military operations in Lac Province. By refusing to account for its commitments and ignoring civil society's recommendations during purely ritualistic consultations, the government is transforming the public sphere into a zone of exclusion where dialogue is replaced by total opacity regarding governance and security issues.

4.2 | Participation

The inclusion of civil society organisations in Chadian governance in 2024–2025 was marked by a shift from dialogue towards a sham of participation. Although the Transition Charter and the 2023 Constitution make vague reference to citizen participation, there is no organic law or implementing decree establishing mandatory, early or inclusive consultation mechanisms. In the absence of formalised channels for participation (monitoring committees, platforms for co-drafting legislation), the state favours ad hoc and selective meetings. These consultations, when they do take place, are held exclusively in person in N'Djamena, effectively excluding rural and digital organisations, and generally occur after the fact, once strategic decisions have already been centralised and finalised. Whenever the few CSOs are seldomly invited to consultation forums, the incorporation of their recommendations into public policy remains largely symbolic.

This approach to participation is deeply discriminatory, favouring 'compliant' or faith-based organisations at the expense of independent actors, youth movements and human rights groups. The lack of empirical evidence of meaningful consultation in 2025 underscores this marginalisation: recommendations from the rare civil society panels are never incorporated into the final texts, as demonstrated by the development of sectoral health and education policies in 2025. Critical voices are silenced by targeted repression, as seen in the arrests of March 2025, turning journalism and advocacy into high-risk activities. The institutional

monologue thus replaces the social contract, barring access to decision-making spheres for those who refuse to align themselves systematically with the powers that be.

Several Chadian civil society organisations have been directly affected by administrative measures restricting their participation in key public processes. For example, during the presidential election of 5–6 May 2024, CSOs such as the Observatory of Associations on the Electoral Process in Chad (OAPET), the League Chadian for Human Rights (LTDH) and the Organisation of Non-State Actors (OANET), united within the Citizens' Alliance for Elections in Chad (ACET), had their applications for accreditation to deploy nearly 2,900 citizen observers [rejected without official justification](#) by the National Election Management Agency (ANGE). This refusal was [formally criticised](#) by the European Union delegation as an obstacle to citizen oversight of the credibility of the election, thereby blocking CSOs' access to a key arena for public participation.

The closure of the space for expression is cemented by a systematic obstruction of the right to demonstrate. In 2025, more than a dozen administrative bans were recorded, based on Order No. 011/PT/2023, rendering any form of public protest illusory. This breakdown is exacerbated by institutionalised impunity, notably through the amnesty law of 23 November 2023, which has rendered legal recourse against the perpetrators of past political violence impossible. In this climate of mistrust, where the state perceives citizen oversight as a security threat rather than a lever for development, the influence of CSOs on public policy has become non-existent. Civil society is now treated as a target to be neutralised, rather than as a partner, crushing any hint of open or responsive governance.

4.3 | Accountability

The Chadian state's obligation of accountability, the theoretical pillar of transparent governance, comes up against a culture of institutionalised impunity in 2024–2025 that strips the social contract of its substance. Whilst the 2023 Constitution, in its preamble and provisions on the rule of law, should guarantee a sincere dialogue on the impact of citizens' contributions, the state apparatus uses its legislative arsenal to evade its sovereign duties. The [General Amnesty Act](#) of 23 November 2023 constitutes the most flagrant evidence of this abuse: by erasing the crimes linked to the repression of 'Black Thursday' in October 2022, it sacrifices the victims' right to truth and redress. This denial of justice discredits in advance the [judicial reforms](#) adopted in October 2025, which are perceived as purely cosmetic in the face of the absence of any real prosecution of state agents.

Public accountability is all the more lacking given that, in practice in 2025, there is no feedback mechanism regarding the contributions of civil society organisations. The government documents neither the decisions nor the outcomes of the rare consultations carried out, leaving the recommendations of civil society actors without any official follow-up. No monitoring system or appeal mechanism is in place to challenge government inaction following a consultation. CSOs are thus deprived of any means to ensure the state honours its commitments, due to the absence of laws on administrative procedures that would oblige the executive to justify its actions or publish periodic accountability reports. This information blackout turns consultations into monologues of legitimisation. In the absence of official feedback on citizens' contributions, as documented during the 2024–2025 sectoral consultations, dialogue remains formal, keeping civil society in the role of a service provider rather than a partner in political decision-making

This lack of accountability is reinforced by unprecedented emergency measures, such as the September 2025 decree revoking citizenship, which is exploited as a political sanction against dissent. Impunity is particularly glaring in the handling of inter-communal violence and allegations of torture, where the public prosecutor's office systematically invokes "national security" imperatives to block independent investigations. This refusal to be held to account is corroborated by the alarming score of [15/100 assigned by Freedom House](#) in 2025. In this climate, human rights defenders and journalists become prime targets, operating in a legal vacuum where the state, far from being a protector, becomes an entity absolved of any responsibility towards its own people.


In the absence of transparency and in the face of public stigmatisation of NGOs labelled as "spies", civic engagement in Chad is no longer an exercise in citizenship but a struggle for survival. Endemic corruption and the surveillance of private meetings, justified by the imperative of national security, render the Constitution meaningless. The judiciary now serves only to rubber-stamp the arbitrary arrests of opinion leaders, as observed in March 2025, confirming that the state no longer views civil society as a partner in governance, but as an existential threat to be neutralised through violent interference and legalised repression.



PRINCIPLE SCORE

5. Supportive Public Culture and Discourses on Civil Society

Score:



Public discourse regarding civil society in Chad in 2025 is characterised by strategic ambivalence, drawing a clear distinction between ‘useful’ humanitarian action and ‘subversive’ monitoring and advocacy. Community and charitable organisations receive official recognition for their role as a social safety net in a context of extreme poverty, whilst CSOs engaged in the defence of human rights are systematically portrayed by the authorities as politicised entities or under the influence of external interests. This rhetoric of mistrust, widely echoed in the state media, aims to delegitimise critical voices by stripping them of their civic character and equating them with foreign interference. This divide undermines the cohesion of the civil society movement, forcing advocacy actors to constantly justify their neutrality in the face of an ultra-centralised power that perceives any counter-power as a threat to national stability.

Despite this narrative pressure, a dynamic of resilience is evident at the community level, where public perception is evolving independently of the official discourse. Initiatives led by women’s and youth organisations, focused on economic inclusion and social mediation, are gaining visibility and enjoying growing grassroots support. These CSOs are managing to transform their local roots into a shield of legitimacy, making their marginalisation more difficult for the administration.

5.1 | Public discourse and constructive dialogue on civil society

Public discourse regarding Chadian civil society in 2025 has deteriorated into systemic hostility. This trajectory marks the end of any ambivalence, giving way to a rhetoric of criminalisation in which independent actors are systematically portrayed as “agents of foreign powers” or “enemies of the nation”. This climate of defamation reached a climax in September 2025 with the implementation of the decree revoking citizenship against prominent critical voices. This exceptional measure, coupled with the dissolution by ministerial decrees of

platforms such as AJADR and CONAJEPDT in June 2025, signals that any attempt at advocacy is now treated as an existential security threat, stifling any possibility of evidence-based dialogue.

The information landscape is saturated with state-sponsored disinformation that polarises public opinion against human rights defenders. The incident in Bol in November 2025, where members of the LTDH were publicly labelled “infiltrators” by military officials, illustrates how official rhetoric physically exposes activists to violence by the security forces. This stigmatisation is reinforced by a total lack of positive public recognition of CSOs’ contributions, whose mediation or monitoring activities are either ignored or distorted by state media. In 2025, no media data show a balanced representation of civil society actors, and there are no examples of citizen expertise having a real influence on national political debates.

This strategy of ‘total disengagement’ strips the social contract of its substance by substituting institutional monologue for democratic pluralism. The use of Order No. 023/PR/2018 and the 2023 emergency laws to justify punitive administrative controls transforms civic engagement into a struggle for survival. By hermetically sealing off spaces for dissent and institutionalising impunity through the amnesty law of November 2023, the government has transformed the public sphere into a zone of exclusion. This information lockdown and orchestrated hatred towards independent expertise are destroying the trust necessary for any form of open governance, condemning civil society to marginalisation or internal exile.

5.2 | Perception of civil society and civic engagement

The landscape of civic engagement in Chad in 2025 was marked by a tragic paradox. Whilst the population still perceived civil society organisations as an essential bulwark, this legitimacy is being systematically eroded by state rhetoric that criminalises international support. In March 2025, this stigmatisation served as the legal basis for the arrest of journalists and activists on charges of “collusion with foreign powers”. This hostility crossed a threshold of extreme legal exclusion in September 2025 with the decree revoking citizenship targeting dissidents, effectively establishing a two-tier citizenship system where political criticism leads to the loss of fundamental rights.

Among the population, admiration for CSOs has now been supplanted by collective trauma. The deaths of iconic figures in October 2025, perceived as direct consequences of the crackdown, have cemented the idea that civic engagement is a deadly activity. This climate of total insecurity stifles the initiative of young people and women, despite the absence of formal public opinion data or direct surveys in 2025 to quantify this sentiment. The dismantling of coalitions and the dissolution of associations such as AJADR (June 2025) confirm systemic discrimination aimed at neutralising any independent structure. At the same time, the lack of accessible civic education programmes and the blocking of traditional forms of participation (banned demonstrations, monitored private meetings) reduce public action to a matter of survival.

The credibility of CSOs is also undermined by a forced polarisation between organisations co-opted by the regime and those targeted by repression. The state skilfully exploits rare cases of fraudulent behaviour to justify Order No. 023/PR/2018, transforming regulation into a tool for bureaucratic and financial harassment. In the absence of effective remedies and faced with impunity enshrined in the 2023 amnesty law, the right to participate in public life has become illusory. Civic engagement in Chad is no longer a constitutional right, but a perilous heroic act in a fractured public sphere, where the intrusive surveillance and targeted repression documented by HRW in 2025 have ultimately rendered any meaningful inclusion impossible.

5.3 | Civic equality and inclusion

Civic equality and inclusion in Chad in 2025 had been reduced to mere window-dressing, contradicted by a reality of systemic marginalisation. Although Article 14 of the 2023 Constitution proclaims the equality of all before the law without distinction of origin, sex or religion, the application of regulatory texts in 2025 reveals deep-seated structural discrimination. The participation of women and young people, whilst encouraged in local micro-initiatives, remains non-existent in national decision-making circles, due to a lack of official data on their actual representation within institutions. This divide is exacerbated by insurmountable socio-economic barriers: with over 42% of the population living below the poverty line, daily survival overshadows civic engagement, creating a public sphere reserved for an elite or aligned organisations.


The breaking point was reached in September 2025 with the use of revocation of nationality against critical voices. By misinterpreting the provisions of the Nationality Code, the executive has established a 'variable-geometry citizenship' where the exercise of fundamental freedoms can lead to de facto statelessness. This modern-day banishment, which turns opponents into strangers in their own country, constitutes the most extreme violation of civic equality. This measure, coupled with the targeted repression documented by Human Rights Watch in 2025 (the killing of opponents and the harassment of activists), justifies the rating 'Fully disabled (1)'. Unlike a score of 2, which would imply residual progress, the 2025 data show a clear regression and the formal legal exclusion of dissidents from the life of the nation.

This exclusion is now cemented by the systematic dismantling of spaces for dialogue. In the absence of effective legal safeguards and data on social tolerance towards marginalised groups, the state does not merely stifle debate; it fuels a sense of social injustice that undermines national unity. Inclusion is now nothing more than an empty slogan, giving way to pervasive discrimination that punishes independent thinking and transforms the public sphere into a zone of privilege for co-opted actors.

PRINCIPLE SCORE

6. Access to a Secure Digital Environment

Score:



The online operating environment for civil society actors in Chad in 2024–2025 was characterised by structural insecurity and systemic surveillance. Human rights defenders and journalists operate in an online climate of constant risk, where protection mechanisms remain largely inadequate. Digital accessibility is undergoing an authoritarian curtailment, transforming cyberspace into a terrain of control where the state’s deliberate disconnection serves as a systematic response to any dissent. In 2025, Chad [ranked 108th out of 180](#) in RSF’s World Press Freedom Index, a position reflecting a “difficult” situation and a sharp decline in fundamental freedoms [reported](#) by the ATUDDH in December 2025. Although judicial reforms were adopted in October 2025, their practical impact remains invisible to those on the ground, who face constant administrative and physical harassment, often justified on the grounds of national security. In this context, Chadian civil society operates in a zone of exclusion where physical and digital surveillance undermines coordination and advocacy capabilities, making civic engagement a high-risk activity.

6.1 Digital rights

The digital environment in Chad in late 2024 to 2025 was characterised by a shift from brutal censorship (total blackouts) to granular and sophisticated surveillance. Unlike the transitional years marked by nationwide blackouts, 2025 saw no country-wide internet shutdowns. However, targeted restrictions and increased technical surveillance were [documented](#), notably during the post-election tensions of May 2025 and during military operations in Lac Province in November 2025. These interventions, although limited in duration (often less than 48 hours) and geographical scope, were sufficient to isolate crisis zones and prevent the circulation of critical information.

The legal framework governing this space remains characterised by deliberate opacity. Although the 2023 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, Law No. 005/PR/2015 on

cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime, and particularly Articles 27 and 28 thereof, grants the authorities extensive powers to intercept private communications without a prior judicial warrant in the event of a “threat to national security”. In 2025, this framework was supplemented by unpublished guidelines from the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (ARCEP), requiring internet service providers to provide immediate technical cooperation for the filtering of keywords and the moderation of content deemed “subversive” on social media.

The lack of verified data on content removal at platform level (Meta, X, TikTok) suggests that the state favours direct pressure on users rather than formal requests for international moderation. The arrest of journalists in March 2025, based on intercepted private messages, demonstrates that surveillance precedes criminal punishment. This climate, as analysed in the EU SEE Enabling Environment Snapshot report of July 2025, fosters a culture of digital self-censorship. The internet is no longer a tool for mobilisation, but a means of tracking where every online interaction can be reclassified as “foreign collusion” or “a breach of public order” under the vague provisions of the revised Criminal Code.

Digital repression played a central role in restricting expression. Internet shutdowns and social media blackouts, notably documented by UNHCR in conflict-affected regions responding to refugee flows ([UNHCR 2025](#)), reduced the capacity of CSOs to communicate, organise, or document violations. These disruptions heightened vulnerability for human rights defenders, particularly in remote areas where alternative communication infrastructures were limited.

6.2 | Digital security and privacy

The digital security landscape in Chad in 2025 reflects an environment where state surveillance and the manipulation of information create a climate of sporadic but very real insecurity. Although there is a lack of technical evidence of widespread deployment of spyware or systematic cyberattacks (device hacking or phishing for credentials) for the year 2025, the interception of private communications remains a constant threat. This vulnerability was illustrated in March 2025 by the [arrest of journalists](#) whose private exchanges were produced as evidence of “collusion with a foreign power”, demonstrating a capacity to compromise networks without effective judicial recourse.

Legislatively, Chad faces a critical gap: there is no specific law on the protection of personal data nor an independent regulatory authority to sanction privacy abuses in 2025. The legal framework remains Law No. 005/PR/2015 on cybersecurity and the fight against cybercrime, Articles 27 and 28 of which authorise the interception of data on vague grounds of “national security”. In the absence of clear redress mechanisms, civil society organisations (CSOs) operate in a climate of total legal uncertainty. The [incident in Bol](#) in November 2025 demonstrated that even in rural areas, digital surveillance of human rights defenders hinders the secure collection of testimonies, forcing actors to practise digital self-censorship to protect their sources and members.

6.3 | Digital accessibility

Digital accessibility in Chad in 2025 remains among the most restrictive in the world, characterised by a structural divide that the state exploits as a lever of control. The legal framework, governed by [Law No. 014/PR/2014](#) on electronic communications, theoretically enshrines the principle of “universal service” (Article 52), but its implementation remains deficient.

In 2025, [limited internet accessibility](#) continued to constrain the enabling environment for civil society in Chad. While mobile penetration was relatively high (73.3% of the population), low internet use (13.2% penetration) and social media reach (11.3%) restricted civil society organisations' ability to disseminate information, mobilise support, and engage communities online. This digital gap disproportionately affected rural and marginalised groups, reinforcing barriers to participation, advocacy, and accountability. Whilst urban centres such as N'Djamena enjoy relative connectivity, rural areas, where the majority of the population lives, have rates below 5%. This geographical exclusion is compounded by an insurmountable financial barrier: the cost of 1 GB of [data represents around 12%](#) of the average monthly income, placing Chad among the countries where the internet is most expensive relative to purchasing power.

This digital precariousness is exacerbated by a limited technological culture within CSOs. Few CSO staff possess advanced ICT skills (data security, cloud database management), with the majority limited to basic use of social media. Consequently, the capacity of civil society actors to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) or emerging technologies is virtually non-existent, due to a lack of stable infrastructure and dedicated training programmes. Far from addressing these shortcomings, the state imposes targeted internet cuts in areas of tension such as Lac Province, creating “digital grey zones” that isolate populations during security crises.

Beyond access, the security of the digital space is compromised by intrusive surveillance. The use of sophisticated technical means to intercept communications, documented by RSF in August 2025, turns going online into a legal risk. Access to networks is now subject to the threat of prosecution for “collusion with a foreign power”, a charge used in March 2025 to arrest journalists and silence dissent. By maintaining prohibitive prices and restricting access in rural areas, the government is turning digital technology into a weapon of selective persecution, reducing citizen participation to a clandestine and perilous activity.

Overall, digital accessibility in Chad is undergoing an authoritarian crackdown, with cyberspace no longer a space of freedom but a terrain of heightened surveillance. Sporadic internet cuts and the blocking of social media, particularly in Lac Province, serve as a systematic response to any critical documentation of human rights abuses. This climate of surveillance, illustrated by the use of unmarked vehicles to track journalists and defenders (denounced by RSF in 2025), as well as the harassment of field teams such as that of the LTDH in Bol in November 2025, forces civil society actors into widespread self-censorship. This legal and security framework, once designed to protect civic engagement, now constitutes an obstacle to the truth, limiting the ability of CSOs to act as neutral mediators in peacebuilding.

C) Recommendations

Recommendations to the STATE (Government of Chad)

1. Repeal or amend Ordinance No. 023/PR/2018 to simplify the legal recognition of CSOs (registration system) and remove provisions for the revocation of nationality as a political sanction.
2. Adopt a law on access to public information and create a digital portal where national budgets, draft laws and audit reports are published prior to adoption.
3. Enact legislation on the protection of personal data and limit the interception powers under Law No. 005/PR/2015 through systematic judicial oversight.
4. Guarantee the freedom of movement of human rights defenders, particularly in Lac Province, by ending the security-driven “sanctification” of crisis zones.

Recommendations for the attention of Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs)

1. Include flexibility clauses in grants to allow CSOs to reallocate funds in the event of a security crisis or judicial harassment (emergency funds for legal protection).
2. Prioritise institutional funding (operating costs, salaries) rather than strictly project-based funding, in order to stabilise CSO staff and promote internal succession.
3. Link budgetary support to the state to measurable indicators of respect for civic space (e.g. number of licences issued, absence of internet cuts, inclusion of CSOs in budgetary debates).
4. Provide substantial funding for cybersecurity and digital literacy programmes for local CSO staff to reduce their vulnerability to surveillance.

Recommendations for the attention of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

1. Develop self-financing models (social and solidarity economy) to reduce dependence on donors and collectively advocate for preferential tax status under the General Tax Code.
2. Create joint advocacy platforms to break down the polarisation between “compliant” and “critical” organisations, and pool legal resources in the event of harassment of one of their members.
3. Widespread adoption of encrypted communication tools and establishment of protocols for backing up data outside the country to prevent loss during searches or hacking.
4. Strengthen internal transparency and communication with rural communities to counter the state’s rhetoric of the “foreign agent” and reaffirm community legitimacy.

D) Research Process

Each principle encompasses various dimensions which are assessed and aggregated to provide quantitative scores per principle. These scores reflect the degree to which the environment within the country enables or disables the work of civil society. Scores are on a five-category scale defined as: fully disabling (1), disabling (2), partially enabling (3), enabling (4), and fully enabling (5). To complement the scores, this report provides a narrative analysis of the enabling or disabling environment for civil society, identifying strengths and weaknesses as well as offering recommendations. The process of drafting the analysis is led by Network Members; the consortium provides quality control and editorial oversight before publication.

For Principle 1 - which evaluates respect for and protection of freedom of association and peaceful assembly - the score integrates data from the [CIVICUS Monitor](#). However, for Principles 2–6, the availability of yearly updated external quantitative indicators for the 86 countries part of the EUSEE programme are either limited or non-existent. To address this, Network Members convene a panel of representatives of civil society and experts once a year. This panel uses a set of guiding questions to assess the status of each principle and its dimensions within the country. The panel for this report was convened in November. The discussions are supported by secondary sources, such as [V-Dem](#), the [Bertelsmann Stiftung Governance Index](#), the [RTI Rating from the Centre for Law and Democracy](#), and other trusted resources. These sources provide benchmarks for measuring similar dimensions and are complemented by primary data collection and other secondary sources of information available for the country. Guided by these deliberations, the panel assigns scores for each dimension, which the Network Members submit to the Consortium, accompanied by detailed justifications that reflect the country's specific context. To determine a single score per principle, the scores assigned to each dimension are aggregated using a weighted average, reflecting the relative importance of each dimension within the principle. This approach balances diverse perspectives while maintaining a structured and objective evaluation framework.

This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.



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