



SUPPORTING  
AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT  
FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

# Enabling Environment

## Snapshot

Peru

March 2026

## Context

Period covered by this report: October 2025 – March 2026

Peru is currently experiencing [political tensions](#), intensified by the upcoming national and regional elections scheduled for April 2026 within a context already marked by political instability, recent regulatory changes, rising public insecurity, and deteriorating public perceptions of authorities. For instance, in October 2025, the Plenary of the Congress of the Republic of Peru declared the [vacancy](#) of the President of the Republic, removing Dina Ercilia Boluarte Zegarra from office citing alleged acts of corruption, abandonment of office, irregular use of official travel, inability to address citizen insecurity, and alleged cosmetic procedures carried out during the exercise of her duties.

José Jerí [assumed](#) the office of President of the Republic in October 2025, but was [censured](#) and removed from the presidency in February 2026, with a 67% disapproval rating according to the [Instituto de Estudios Peruanos](#) (IEP). Prior to his removal, Jerí had been implicated in [alleged acts of corruption](#), as well as [irregular visits and hiring practices](#). Meanwhile, the Congress of the Republic of Peru reached an 89% disapproval rate, once again demonstrating widespread public rejection. The new president, José María Balcázar, began his term in February 2026 with a [63% disapproval rating](#).

Corruption continues to be one of the main obstacles to the country's economic and social development. According to Transparency International's 2025 [Corruption Perceptions Index](#), Peru fell from position 127 in 2024 to 130 in 2025. According to the National Survey on Perceptions of Corruption ([Proética, 2025](#)), this issue negatively affects both the population's quality of life and the functioning of the State. This perception is supported by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), which in its preliminary calculation for April–September 2025 on governance, democracy, and trust in institutions identified corruption (59.3%) and crime (53.5%) as the [main problems](#) facing the country.

The environment is further deteriorated by disinformation and the lack of effective spaces and mechanisms for dialogue between citizens and the government, which limits the capacity to prevent or resolve conflicts in a timely and collaborative manner.

## 1. Respect for and protection of fundamental freedoms

[Article 2](#) of the 1993 Constitution of Peru guarantees freedom of association, expression, and peaceful assembly. However, there are concerns regarding its practical implementation. Repression during peaceful protests in Peru is not an isolated incident but rather part of a

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pattern that has intensified since [November 2020](#), characterised by the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by the National Police of Peru, which has resulted in serious and even fatal injuries. Since then, social mobilisations have revealed deep structural discontent with a political system widely perceived as corrupt, exclusionary, and disconnected from citizens' demands.

The so-called “Generation Z” [organised](#) a series of protests between September to November, as the Peruvian political crisis deepened. On 15 October, one of the most violent demonstrations took place, culminating in intense clashes between protesters and the National Police, leaving more than [80 people injured](#)—including civilians and police officers—and resulting in the [death](#) of Eduardo Mauricio Ruiz Sanz, aged 32. [Similar situations](#) occurred throughout 2025.

On 21 October 2025, through [Supreme Decree No. 124-2025-PCM](#), a [State of Emergency](#) was declared in Metropolitan Lima and Callao. Although the measure was justified as a response to rising insecurity, the El Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos ([IDEHPUCP](#)) and the [Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos \(CNDDHH\)](#) alerted that the restrictions imposed could affect the right to protest and citizens' demonstrations.

Also in October 2025, the President of the Congress of the Republic of Peru, Fernando Rospigliosi, introduced Bill N° [13048/2025-CR](#) proposing to [authorise](#) the National Police of Peru and the Armed Forces of Peru to use their weapons and exempting them from criminal liability when acting in defence of the constitutional order or in response to violent attacks against public infrastructure such as airports, roads, and public or private buildings. The bill also includes a transitional provision so that the exemption from liability would apply to police officers involved in the repression of protests during 2022 and 2023. This bill has been in the Justice and Human Rights Commission since November 2025. According to the [CNDDHH](#), the bill hinders access to justice for victims of violence committed by the Police and the Armed Forces during the 2022 and 2023 protests and also puts at risk the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of movement in future mobilisations.

This bill comes after the approval of [Law No. 32419](#) in 14 August 2025, which benefits members of the Armed Forces of Peru, the National Police of Peru, and Self-Defence Committees accused of human rights violations. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights [spoke out against the law's](#) application, warning that the measure could lead to impunity in cases involving serious crimes committed during the internal armed conflict. Another example is [Law No. 32107](#) approved in August 2024, which establishes that crimes against humanity and war crimes will not apply to acts committed before 1 July 2002. This provision led to the [annulment](#) of the 12-year prison sentence of former Interior Minister Daniel Urresti, who had been convicted as co-author of the 1988 murder of [journalist Hugo Bustíos](#).

In another key deteriorating development, in January 2026, the Special Prosecutors' Team for cases involving victims during social protests [was dissolved](#). While this decision does not imply the closure of ongoing investigations, it may affect the progress of cases related to excessive

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use of force. One of civil society’s responses to this decision was the “[Marcha de Sacrificio – Uyariy](#),” during which police allegedly detained two individuals and harassed protesters by carrying out eight unnecessary identity checks during the march. Additional [arbitrary detentions](#) related to protests were reported in February.

At the same time, [restrictions on press freedom](#) have been identified. The [Annual Report – Attacks on Press Freedom 2025](#), produced by the Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Periodista (OFIP), revealed that 458 attacks against the press were recorded in the country during 2025. The most severe impact was the killing of four journalists during 2025: [Gastón Medina Sotomayor](#) in Ica, [Raúl Celis López](#) in Iquitos, [Fernando Núñez Guevara](#) in Pacasmayo, and [Mitzar Castillejos](#) in Aguaytía.

In February 2026, the Municipalidad Distrital de Miraflores [requested a criminal investigation](#) against journalists Ernesto Cabral and Brandon Quevedo, from the digital news outlet La Encerrona, after they publicly revealed the high vulnerability of the district’s digital platform, which exposed sensitive data of thousands of taxpayers. Additionally, the official X account of the Presidency of the Republic of Peru [published a statement](#) in which one section claimed that “the corresponding legal actions are being evaluated in order to uphold the institutional integrity of the Presidential Office.” According to the [Consejo de la Prensa Peruana](#), these legal actions would be directed against media outlets that reported on irregular hiring practices involving individuals close to José Jerí within the State. The statement was later withdrawn and replaced with a new version in which that phrase was removed.

## 2. Favourable legal framework for the work of civil society actors

The sixteenth edition of [the Peruvian Civil Code](#), published in 2015, establishes three types of legal entities: associations, foundations and committees (Articles 80, 99 and 111). According to [Article 3 of Law 27692](#), the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI) is responsible for controlling, supervising and [monitoring](#) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that receive international cooperation funds. With regard to the tax treatment of organisations that receive other types of donations, the [National Superintendency of Customs and Tax Administration \(SUNAT\)](#) is responsible for supervising compliance with applicable tax regulations.

However, in April 2025, President Dina Boluarte [enacted](#) Law 32301, which [amends](#) the Law on the Creation of the International Cooperation Agency (APCI). Despite strong opposition from civil society, the [law was rushed](#) and passed by congress. On 14 September, Law APCI published its [regulations](#) along with the document classifying [infractions and sanctions](#) with the aim of establishing provisions for their enforcement. This new regulation has generated significant concern among national organisations and the international community, which have issued [statements](#) condemning the regulation for its impact on fundamental rights, including freedom of association, expression, opinion, and citizen participation. The regulation imposes excessive state control by requiring prior approval—based on subjective criteria—for the

projects, programmes, or activities of organisations funded with foreign resources. Moreover, its approval contributes to the criminalisation of civil associations whose work may be uncomfortable for or opposed to the state's agenda, particularly those addressing issues such as human rights, gender equality, environmental protection, and anti-corruption efforts. Additionally, the amendment restricts the ability of many civil associations to provide legal representation to communities and individuals in vulnerable situations, undermining access to justice in cases of human rights violations and corruption.

With the publication of the regulations amending the APCI Law, together with the list of offences and penalties, concern has been raised due to the [possible imposition of fines](#) of up to 500 Tax Units - UIT (more than 2.5 million soles). It also provides for the suspension of benefits and even the cancellation of the registration of a non-governmental organisation for serious breaches, such as providing false information, obstructing an audit or using funds for undeclared purposes.

The effects of the laws are already being felt by civil society actors. On 12 November 2025, a Congressman requested that the Executive Director of the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation evaluate the initiation of [sanctioning proceedings](#) against the NGOs Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) and the CNDDHH. According to the congressman, both organisations allegedly committed very serious infractions by [submitting a request](#) to the Board of Supreme Prosecutors of the Public Prosecutor's Office to call for the selection of a new person for the position of Attorney General, considering the appointment of Tomás Gálvez to be null. According to the current amendment to the APCI Law (Article 21), this would constitute "improper use" of funds, as such resources would have been used against the Peruvian State.

However, in January 2026, the Judiciary of Peru declared the [APCI Law inapplicable](#) to IDL, considering that its provisions violate constitutional rights and international law standards. The decision followed a constitutional protection lawsuit (amparo) filed by IDL against the Executive Branch of Peru, the Congress of the Republic of Peru, and APCI.

### 3. Accessible and sustainable resources

The main source of funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Peru comes from international donors. To access these funds, NGOs must [register](#) with the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI), which is often also required by international donors. Registered organisations are subject to APCI oversight and accountability through [declarations](#) of the activities and projects they carry out. Donations outside this framework are audited by [the National Tax Superintendency \(SUNAT\)](#).

Article 21 of the amendment to the APCI Law imposes a significant restriction on the use of international cooperation resources by civil society organisations (CSOs), explicitly prohibiting these funds from being used to advise or finance legal actions against the State.

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This restriction not only limits the legitimate use of received resources but may also have a chilling effect on international cooperation by creating a restrictive and uncertain regulatory environment for organisations working to ensure accountability and defend fundamental rights.

In practice, this measure directly undermines access to justice for victims of human rights violations, many of whom rely on free legal assistance provided by internationally funded CSOs. Restricting this support exacerbates the lack of protection for victims and their families and fosters impunity.

A significant development in 2025 that is still affecting access to resources was the suspension of funding from the United States Agency for International Development, which was estimated to impact more than 60 NGOs in Peru. Funding was frozen for [strategic projects](#) such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, aimed at combating HIV/AIDS; ECOS, a programme focused on fighting illegal mining, logging, and wildlife trafficking in border areas; and FUEGO, the first line of defence against forest fires. These environmental projects, projected to run until 2030, represented funding of more than 70 million dollars. USAID funding also supported programmes aimed at replacing hectares of coca leaf cultivation with [alternative crops](#).

## 4. Openness and responsiveness of the State

Access to public information is a fundamental right that allows citizens to request, receive, and obtain information from public entities to verify that funds are being used appropriately.

According to Article 2, paragraph 5 of the [Peruvian Constitution](#), every person has the right to request information from any public entity within the legally established period, assuming the cost of reproduction when applicable. This provision also includes legitimate exceptions related to personal privacy and national security. Furthermore, since 2002, Peru has enacted [Law No. 27806](#) – the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law, which aims to promote transparency in public administration, access to information, and accountability. This law guarantees the right of any person to request and receive information from the Public Administration without having to justify the reason for the request.

Despite Peru's commitments to citizen participation, such as the Ibero-American Charter on [Citizen Participation in Public Management](#) and the [National Policy for the Modernisation of Public Management](#) and the publication of the [VI Open State Action Plan 2026 - 2027](#), interaction and dialogue between the government and civil society are limited. Consultations on government plans and [bills](#) are limited to interaction on websites, and subnational governments only engage with citizens and civil society for [planning processes](#) and [participatory budgeting](#). Likewise, there is evidence of discontent among indigenous communities due to insufficient [prior consultation](#) in the implementation of public policies in their territories.

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According to the Office of the Ombudsman of Peru, in its Social Conflicts [Report](#) No. 262, published in December 2025, a total of 204 social conflicts were identified: 164 active, of which 98 are currently undergoing dialogue processes, and 40 are considered latent. Of the total active conflicts under dialogue, 63.3% (62 cases) correspond to socio-environmental conflicts, followed by conflicts related to matters involving the national government, which represent 15.3% (15 cases). In January 2026, the Office of the Ombudsman of Peru reported [seven new social conflicts](#).

Most conflicts are rooted in the lack of accountability processes, insufficient access to information, or the absence of a timely response from the government. This State inaction can lead to dissatisfaction among citizens and civil society organisations, which may prompt them to resort to protest against local, regional, or national government authorities, potentially triggering violent confrontations—especially considering the previously documented use of violent deterrence strategies by the police and armed forces.

Given these risks, monitoring reports are produced to flag new cases or track ongoing situations, with the aim of addressing them through peaceful means before the conflict escalates.

## 5. Political culture and public discourse on civil society

Over the past year, the Peruvian Government has [justified the use of force](#) against protesters by labelling them [intolerant](#) and using other [derogatory terms](#). Similarly, Congress, some ministers and former President Dina Boluarte have [downplayed](#) some of the actions taken by civil society, such as the [national strike](#) from 26 to 29 July 2025, called to demand justice for the deaths in the protests of 2022 and 2023. Likewise, on 21 August, transport unions demanded effective measures against crime, the repeal of [pro-crime laws](#) and the removal of the President from office. The Minister of Transport referred to this strike as a [“failure”](#).

This discourse against protesting citizens continued during the Peruvian political crisis following the removal from office of former President Boluarte and the assumption of José Jerí as President of the Republic. On 20 October 2025, The President of the Congress of the Republic of Peru publicly referred to Eduardo Ruiz Sanz, known as “Trvko,” as a [“terrucó”](#) (a derogatory term used in Peru to associate individuals with terrorism). Ruiz Sanz died in the context of the protests in October. In the same context, the Lima Mayor called on the President to [close the Historic Centre](#) in anticipation of possible new demonstrations. Additionally, prior to the marches called for in November 2025, [the Congress president backed police actions](#) and warned that during future mobilisations: “The police must act with full force to repress these violent protesters.”

In addition, civic equality and inclusion have also been under threat, with the Congress of the Republic of Peru continuing to be a hostile space for the LGBTQ+ community. In February 2025, during an event, a [Congresswoman](#) and chair of the Commission on Women and Family

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[described](#) same-sex relationships as lacking “true love” and stated that gender ideology represents a “cultural struggle.” In response to these remarks, LGBTQ+ organisations—with the minority support of Congresswoman Susel Paredes—organised a [sit-in outside Congress](#) on 3 March, which concluded with a [press conference inside Congress](#) where they expressed their rejection of the congresswoman’s statements. Such statements threaten the enabling environment for civil society by enhancing stigmatisation of the LGBTQ+ community to limit participation in decision-making processes, as well as stigmatising the civil society actors who represent them.

Public perception on civil society is not strongly positive. A [Survey on perceptions](#) of NGOs and civil society in 2025, conducted by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, shows that 42% trust NGOs a lot or somewhat. Meanwhile, according to the [World Values Survey Peru 2025](#), 27% of citizens consider freedom of expression and publication to be of little or no importance, while 59% consider limits on public protests and political opposition to be fairly or very important.

## 6. Access to a secure digital environment

The operations of civil society organisations in the digital environment have not suffered significant restrictions. To date, there have been no [interruptions](#) in Internet service, except those related to the quality of service provided by Internet providers. In addition, the State has a National Digital Defence Centre, which allows digital security incidents to be reported via an online [form](#).

The country also has a [personal data protection law](#); however, [data leaks](#) from government servers and the misuse of personal information highlight the fragility of the system. In addition, the government has implemented surveillance systems such as [facial recognition](#) and the unauthorised processing of biometric data. This could pose a risk to civil society actors, especially if there are no adequate controls, transparency or legal safeguards. Although progress has been made in digital transformation with the [National Digital Transformation Policy](#) until 2030, the results are limited.

On March 2025 the committee report about bills [8842/2024-CR](#) and [9906/2024-CR](#) by the Commission on Science, Innovation and Technology was approved. The committee report on the creation of the Peruvian State High-Level Cybersecurity Committee, with the aim of preventing cyberattacks and reducing the vulnerability of the digital systems of institutions and citizens, is awaiting debate in the plenary session of Congress. On April 2025, Law 32314 was also enacted, which penalises the use of [artificial intelligence](#) in crimes. However, the lack of a detailed analysis in each case could lead to disproportionate penalties for the use of digital technologies and media, which could have a deterrent effect that discourages citizens from exercising their rights through these tools. This reflects a punitive approach that could restrict fundamental rights, such as the rights of freedom of expression and access to public information.

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Finally, bots and fake profiles operated by anonymous accounts on social media are used to discredit civil society organisations' publications, depending on their political stance and interests. This occurs especially when they issue a statement or file a complaint against the authorities or government entities. For example, journalists [Clara Elvira Ospina](#) and [Anali Andrade](#) reported being harassed on social media and blamed by the government for the situation. It is important to note that cyberbullying is a criminal offence, but only in the educational and sexual spheres.

## Challenges and opportunities

Following the enactment of the APCI Law, the approval of the regulation governing NGOs, and the first attempts at its implementation, the main challenge in the coming months will be the continued use of the law to negatively impact the operations of civil society actors who face increasing risks. As such, civil society must remain vigilant and organised, not only to protect its autonomy and freedom to carry out its projects, but also to respond to the government's efforts to criminalise protests, as well as to monitor cases that may be at risk of impunity.

When the APCI Law was enacted, civil society organisations issued joint statements and created training spaces to better understand the newly approved legislation. The current situation may present a new opportunity to strengthen coordination and collaboration among different organisations within the civic ecosystem by disseminating information on cases where the regulation has been declared inapplicable, as well as by providing training to smaller organisations that may need support in meeting APCI requirements.

Defending civic space also involves empowering a conscious and democratic citizenry with the capacity to identify and respond to potential threats to fundamental rights and freedoms. Organisations such as the CNDDHH have already been publishing information on safety [measures](#) to take when participating in protests and on what to do in case of [detention](#).

Additionally, in this electoral context, it is important to promote informed voting among citizens through [platforms](#), training sessions, [events](#), [debates](#), [informational materials](#) and [election monitoring](#).

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