



SUPPORTING
AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Enabling Environment Baseline Snapshot

Guinea

February 2026

Background

With the organisation of the constitutional referendum in November 2025 and the presidential election on 28 December 2025, Guinea is completing the transition that began after the coup d'état of 5 September 2021 led by the National Committee for Rallying for Development (CNRD) headed by Mamady Doumbouya. Having become a general, he ran for election despite his initial commitment not to stand as a candidate and was declared elected with [86.72% of the vote, according to the Constitutional Court](#).

The conditions under which the elections were held were contested. The three main opposition parties did not participate. On 23 August 2024, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MATD) [suspended](#) the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) and the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG), among others, for failing to comply with their obligations. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) considered that [this decision risked hindering democratic debate](#). The MATD extended these suspensions in February 2025 and then in [December 2025](#) for [six months](#), limiting the participation of these opposition leaders.

Since 2022, the political context has been marked by a ban on demonstrations, the use of force and restrictions on critical voices. According to [Amnesty International](#), at least 47 demonstrators were killed between September 2021 and March 2024. Enforced disappearances have been reported, including those of human rights defenders Oumar Sylla and Mamadou Billo Bah, leaders of the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC), a coalition of civil society actors, in July 2024, as well as that of journalist Habib Marouane Camara. In February and June 2025, other human rights defenders and critics Abdoul Sacko and Mohamed Traoré were [abducted and later found injured](#). Since then, several opponents of the regime [have reported the abduction of their relatives](#) by armed men. This is particularly the case for [investigative journalist Mamoudou Babila Keita, whose father, Adama Keita](#), has still not been found since he was forcibly taken away by unidentified men in September 2025.

Meanwhile, the launch of the Simandou mining project in December 2025 marks a major economic turning point. The World Bank forecasts growth of 6.5% in 2025 and [around 10% in 2026-2027](#). However, concerns about transparency and corruption raise fears of risks to inclusive growth. [Guinea scored 26/100](#) on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index.

1. Respect for and protection of fundamental civil liberties

[The Transition Charter](#), adopted at the beginning of the transition, guarantees civil liberties. The last paragraph of Article 8 specifies that no "exceptional or emergency situation shall justify violations of human rights". The new [Constitution of 26 September 2025](#) also enshrines the right to peaceful processions and demonstrations (Article 12), freedom of association (Article 13), access to public information and freedom of the press (Article 19). In law, these guarantees lay the foundations for an environment conducive to civil society during and after the transition.

In practice, these freedoms remain restricted. According to CIVICUS, with a score of 29 out of 100 in 2025, [civic space is repressed in Guinea](#). On 11 May 2022, the CNRD [banned](#) public demonstrations. This decision was condemned by national and international human rights organisations such as [Amnesty](#) and the [United Nations](#). The authorities applied this ban to opposition rallies, while [pro-government](#) gatherings [were tolerated](#). For example, the demonstration organised by the opposition on 5 September 2025 against the constitutional

referendum was violently prevented by the defence and security forces. According to [Amnesty International](#), at least 47 demonstrators were killed between September 2021 and 15 March 2024. This figure has been revised upwards by the [Coalition Tournons la Page \(TLP – Guinea\)](#), which reports that at least 70 people were killed by the defence and security forces between 2022 and 2025. Despite some positive signs, notably the trial over the repression of the demonstrations of 28 September 2009, human rights violations have largely gone unpunished.

[Law 2010/02/CNT](#) on press freedom enshrines the end of custodial sentences for press offences. However, it has often been [circumvented in recent years to sentence journalists to prison terms](#). Since the start of the transition, press freedom has faced significant restrictions. In May 2023, for example, access to social media was [restricted](#) and several online media outlets were [disrupted](#). Decree A/2024/686/MIC/CAB/SGG of 21 May 2024 [withdrew the licences](#) of the main private audiovisual media outlets, resulting in the loss of more than 700 jobs, according to [RSF](#). The High Authority for Communication (HAC) [suspended the news website GuinéeMatin.com](#) and its Web TV on 6 September 2025, in the midst of the referendum campaign, citing "failure to respect the principles of impartiality, equality, neutrality and balance of information in times of crisis". [The authority lifted this suspension on 10 September 2025](#), after stating that it had received a "letter of apology" from the site's administrator. Furthermore, on 22 December 2025, the [HAC suspended the Africa 24 channel](#), accusing it of covering the election campaign in Guinea without prior authorisation.

Journalist Sekou [Jamal Pendessa was convicted in February 2024](#) for, among other things, undermining security and public order, and publisher Habib Marouane Camara has [been missing](#) since 8 December 2024. On 2 October 2025, following an altercation with a "blogger" close to the government, [journalist Djiba Millimono was arrested](#) and then released six days later following mediation initiated by the high command of the National Gendarmerie.

Freedom of association is also under severe strain. On 8 August 2022, the Ministry of Territorial Administration [dissolved the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution \(FNDC\)](#). On 2 September 2024, the issuance of licences to NGOs was [suspended](#) before [a resumption announced in January 2025](#). Despite this resumption, civil society organisations report persistent obstacles to the renewal of their licences, linked in particular to the administration's failure to respond to requests.

2. Legal framework conducive to the work of civil society actors

The Constitution of 26 September 2025 guarantees freedom of association. Article 13 states that "all citizens have the right to form associations or societies to exercise their rights collectively". The applicable legal framework is based mainly on Law [L/2005/013/AN](#) on the regime governing associations and the [revised Civil Code of 2019](#).

However, these texts contain contradictions. Law L/2005/013/AN makes the legal existence of an association subject to obtaining "administrative approval" issued by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MATD) or its branches, within a maximum period of 90 days. Conversely, the revised Civil Code provides for a declaratory regime for national associations. In practice, the authorities apply the approval system, which places civil society organisations (CSOs) in a situation of administrative dependence.

[According to a survey conducted by ABLOGUI in 2023](#), 32% of the organisations surveyed have never obtained approval despite their efforts. For those that have obtained the document, the authorities require that it be renewed every three years, following procedures similar to those for the initial application. Stakeholders report that this discretionary power is sometimes used to delay or refuse renewals, affecting CSOs' legitimacy and access to funding.

In recent years, stakeholders have been unanimous on the need to revise Law L/2005/013/AN, which is no longer in line with the current context. Regional workshops were organised in 2025 with the support of the UNDP for this purpose. However, CSOs do not have access to the final version of the text currently being prepared, raising concerns about the transparency of the process.

Although CSOs formally enjoy internal autonomy, the administrative inspections carried out in 2025 at some of them and the lack of communication on their results reinforce the perception of increased control.

3. Accessible and sustainable resources

Guinean civil society operates in an environment marked by political stigmatisation, restrictions on civic space and a scarcity of financial resources. In an economic context characterised by high poverty rates and a low capacity to mobilise internal resources, civil society organisations (CSOs) are largely dependent on external funding. However, access to these resources remains unequal. Most local CSOs lack the administrative and financial capacities required by major international donors, notably the European Union, which limits their direct access to grants. The most active organisations often partner with international NGOs to benefit from indirect funding.

The requirement for valid administrative accreditation is an additional obstacle. Delays or refusals to issue accreditation by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MATD) directly affect the eligibility of CSOs for funding, including small amounts.

In July 2023, the [MATD adopted Decree A/2023/3146/MATD/DNAPROMA/SGG](#) on combating money laundering and terrorist financing through non-profit organisations. This decree requires CSOs to declare to the authorities any funding exceeding 150,000,000 GNF (approximately 15,000 euros). Several stakeholders have expressed concerns regarding the potential impact of this monitoring mechanism in a context where the enabling environment is already restricted.

At the national level, some public institutions have funded specific activities, such as promoting awareness of the Constitution and election observation. However, this funding has been allocated without transparent communication on the selection criteria, amounts or objectives assigned. According to information gathered whilst compiling this snapshot, CSOs reported that perceived proximity to the authorities influences access to these resources.

Overall, the lack of core funding, dependence on projects and legal uncertainty limit the financial sustainability and operational autonomy of CSOs.

4. Openness and responsiveness of the state

Law [L/2020/0027/AN](#) on the right of access to public information, adopted in 2020 and promulgated in 2021, remains [unenforced in practice](#). In the absence of effective mechanisms, civil society organisations (CSOs) face obstacles in obtaining information from public institutions.

After the CNRD took power in 2021, [national consultations involved representatives of civil society](#). However, the authorities have not provided any information on the effective integration of the contributions gathered. Whilst the Transition Charter provides for a consensual definition of certain stages with civil society, the CNRD has favoured a route through the National Transition Council (CNT), drawing [criticism from political parties and CSOs](#).

The decline in dialogue between the authorities and civil society is also evident in the failure to restart discussions on joining the [Open Government Partnership \(OGP\)](#). The executive no longer responds to requests, particularly regarding budget transparency, complicating civil society's advocacy initiatives.

Despite initiatives such as the structured dialogue framework supported by the European Union, there is no permanent, inclusive and formalised mechanism to ensure the participation of civil society, including women and marginalised groups, in decision-making processes.

5. A supportive public culture and discourse on civil society

Official discourse on civil society has evolved throughout the transition that began in September 2021. In the first months after the CNRD took power, the authorities emphasised the need to involve the "vital forces" in the transition. Gradually, certain critical organisations were publicly associated with political agendas or destabilisation strategies.

In January 2024, when the Union of Press Professionals of Guinea (SPPG) announced a demonstration against the "jamming and censorship" of the media, the government spokesperson, Ousmane Gaoual Diallo, [accused](#) the union's general secretary of acting "in the name of and on behalf of political actors". This stance illustrates a tendency to politicise professional or civic demands.

In September 2024, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MATD) [justified the suspension of the issuing of licences to NGOs](#) by citing "actions disrupting public order carried out on the ground by several NGOs and community groups". This type of argument contributes to associating certain community activities with a security threat.

Official criticism has also targeted international human rights organisations. In July 2024, [the government spokesperson denounced reports that "tarnish Guinea's image"](#). In January 2025, [he accused a United Nations report of "discrediting Guinea and its institutions"](#).

Such rhetoric influences public perception and can undermine the legitimacy of civil society organisations, particularly those active in the fields of human rights, governance and accountability. Nevertheless, the independent media generally continue to report on the activities and positions of civil society.

6. Access to a secure digital environment

Digital freedoms have been systematically restricted in Guinea in recent years. Since the CNRD took power in September 2021, four major acts of cyber censorship have been documented, ranging from total or partial internet shutdowns to targeted restrictions on social media and news sites. These measures have resulted in more than 100 cumulative days of disruption, mainly during periods of political tension or elections.

In the run-up to the presidential election on 28 December 2025, [the authorities restricted access to Facebook six days before the vote](#). In the past, the authorities have [justified these measures on "security grounds"](#). These restrictions affect the exercise of freedom of expression and access to information, which are protected in particular by Article 19 of the Guinean Constitution and by international instruments ratified by Guinea. The [ECOWAS Court of Justice has already ruled](#) that internet shutdowns constitute a violation of fundamental rights, particularly during election periods. The associated practices hinder the work of journalists and limit the election monitoring activities of Guinean civil society organisations.

At the same time, internet use is growing rapidly. According to [the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority \(ARPT\)](#), penetration rates rose from 0.4% in 2010 to nearly 58% in the second quarter of 2025. The [Digital 2025 report](#) estimates the number of social media users at 3.05 million, with Facebook being the dominant platform. However, this growth has not been accompanied by a proportional increase in digital skills, including within civil society, which increases vulnerabilities in a context of restrictions and the use of tools to circumvent cyber-censorship.

Some activists and journalists have expressed fears of cyber surveillance, but there is no verifiable evidence to confirm these allegations.

Challenges and opportunities

As the transition nears its end, Guinean civil society is evolving in an institutional context that is undergoing restructuring but still marked by structural weaknesses. The announced revision of Law L/2005/013/AN on associations is a key issue. In the absence of explicit guarantees for a clear, transparent and non-discriminatory registration system, there remains a risk that the authorities will maintain or even strengthen their discretionary control over the approval, renewal and operation of civil society organisations (CSOs). In a context where access to funding, spaces for dialogue and the media remains unequal, this reform will be crucial to creating a favourable environment.

The fight against impunity is another major challenge. Several civil society actors are still missing and their fate remains unknown. Establishing the truth and punishing those responsible are essential to restoring confidence and reducing the climate of fear affecting CSOs. Organisations that document human rights violations and call for prosecutions are exposed to pressure, stigmatisation and increased marginalisation. The absence of fully independent judicial mechanisms limits the prospects for accountability.

Internal divisions within the sector, exacerbated by unequal access to public resources and institutional spaces, also undermine cohesion and the capacity for collective action. At the same time, recurring digital restrictions and alleged online surveillance necessitate an urgent strengthening of technical capacities and resilience in the face of limitations on civic space.

Opportunities do, however, exist. The establishment of the institutions provided for in the new Constitution, post-transition normalisation and Guinea's international commitments may open up scope for greater participation. To capitalise on these, civil society will need to consolidate its alliances, strengthen its legal and digital capabilities, and structure advocacy based on verifiable data in order to promote a sustainable enabling environment.



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