During a plenary session on 22 July 2026, the Senate passed for second reading a bill sponsored by Senator Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo that seeks to establish a National Donor Coordination Framework and mandate compulsory registration of all foreign aid and donor‑funded projects with the federal government. Entitled ‘A Bill for an Act to Provide for the Regulation, Coordination, Transparency and Disclosure of Foreign Aid, Grants and Donations in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2026 (SB. 10340)’, the Senator argued that the bill was supported by constitutional provisions on legislative oversight for public funds and that foreign aid deployed to Nigeria should be treated as such. The proposed law would create a national database of foreign assistance, require that donor‑funded interventions be integrated into national planning and budgeting processes, and impose mandatory public disclosure of funding sources and project implementation details.
Lawmakers justified the move by citing concerns about weak transparency, fragmented oversight, and possible national security risks associated with unregulated foreign aid flows, especially through NGOs and sub‑national entities. This is in line with previous narratives by lawmakers alleging that foreign aid is used to fund Boko Haram, including an investigation into USAID funding in 2025. After debate, the Senate referred the bill to the relevant committees on National Planning and Economic Development, Finance, and in some accounts Foreign Affairs for further legislative work and public hearings, with a directive that they report back within four to six weeks.
By centralising control over all foreign aid and donor‑funded projects in a mandatory registration and national database system, the bill would significantly reshape the legal framework and conditions under which NGOs and other actors can receive and use foreign funding, increasing state discretion and compliance burdens. This directly affects civil society’s access to resources and limits operational freedoms, especially in an already restrictive and over‑regulated context for Nigerian civil society. NGOs, development partners and government agencies would all be covered by the new regime, but independent and rights‑based CSOs are likely to feel the greatest pressure, as funding oversight can easily be used to discourage critical advocacy or steer resources towards government‑aligned priorities. Over time, such a framework can lead to large‑scale, systemic change by normalising tighter control over civil society financing, changing who gets funded and what issues are deemed acceptable, and setting a precedent for further restrictive measures justified in the name of transparency and national security.